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Some Important Issues in Philosophy |
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Background Essay: The Truth-Value of Consciousness Extra-Mental and Extra-Ego Reality A Critique of the Realistic Position by Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M.Cap. Table of
Contents:
From the welter of conflicting systems and theories of knowledge which have come into vogue during the last three centuries, it is possible to draw but one conclusion: there must be something radically wrong with the starting point and the method used in the attempt to solve the problem of knowledge. When the results are so disastrous, the principle must be faulty. The only logical thing to do, then, is to disregard these systems and begin the solution of the problem from a commonsense standpoint; scrutinize the facts, note their implications, interpret their meaning, and draw the implied conclusions. Three main factors enter into the problem of knowledge: the human mind, the human body, and the external physical world. 
The body, if it exists, is an extra-mental reality, distinct from the mind; but it belongs to the human Ego as an integral part, together with the mind, and as such it would be extra-mental but intra-Ego. The physical world, on the other hand, if it exists, would be extra-mental and also completely external to the perceiving subject; it would be extra-Ego and non-Ego. The best procedure will be, therefore, to see whether we can vindicate the existence and perception of the extended, extra-mental human body, and then proceed to investigate the existence and perception of the extended, external world: because the world cannot come into contact with the mind except through the body. If the existence and perception of the body, as distinct from the mind, cannot be vindicated, then there is no possibility whatever of establishing the existence and perception of the external world at large. The Data Concerning Extra-Mental Reality Besides my mind, I perceive within my being a reality which possesses extensity, and this reality I call my "body." There is a very definite spatial configuration to my body. By passing my hand over the body, I obtain a clear impression and touch-perception of its relative size and contour. I know, for instance, that my body occupies a very limited area from head to foot which, measured by a standard rule, will be, perhaps, more than five feet in height and less than six. I know, too, that different members comprise the complex of the body, and that these members occupy separate and distinct positions, both in relation to each other and to the body as a whole. Feet and head form the extremities, while the limbs and the torso have intermediate locations. Touch, especially the experience of double-contact, reveals voluminousness in my body. In moving my hands over the body, I obtain an immediate perception of "up and down," "right and left," "before and behind." I thus perceive that my body possesses the three dimensions of length, breadth, and depth. The intramuscular sense reveals to me the fact that the different parts of my body change position in space: I sit, I stand, I lie down, I stretch, I bend backward, I incline forward. I also perceive that the entire body moves at times: I walk, I run, I swim, I rise, I climb. Weight is revealed to me in the difference experienced in ascending and descending a sharp incline or in being lifted into the air and then dropped to the ground. And solidity is manifested to me in the fact that one part of the body cannot penetrate the other. My experiences also make me aware of various sense-organs and their distribution and localization within the confines of my body. I have eyes to see, ears to hear, a palate to taste, a nose to smell, and touch pervades the entire body. Each organ, I note with intuitive consciousness, has its own specific type of object for perception: colors, flavors, sounds, odors, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, hardness and softness, smoothness and roughness, freshness and fatigue. During active sensation I experience, by means of the intramuscular sense, the precise place on and within the body where the sensation is localized; in this manner I experience not only the actual perception as such (for instance, the perception of color, sound, etc.), but also the organic activity accompanying this perception, showing me that the perception is mine and belongs to a definite portion of my body. In this manner I have a clear picture of my body in its parts and as a whole. Furthermore, and this is important, in this concrete picture I concretely perceive through immediate awareness that my body is a reality distinct from the thinking mind; it is an extra-mental reality. At the same time, however, I am also concretely aware that my body is an integral factor, together with the mind, in the process of perception. If I close my eyes, I cannot see; if I open them, I see again. If I touch a burning object, I experience heat; if I withdraw my hand, the sensation ceases. If I push against a wall, I feel resistance; if I step away, the feeling of resistance ends. And since the sensation becomes perception only when the mind adverts to it and becomes aware of it, I notice that both body and mind are necessary for perception, although I clearly realize that both are not the same thing. But both are felt to belong to my Ego. It is my body and my mind; I think and am conscious, and I weigh so-and-so-much and move about from place to place. Whatever affects my body I am conscious of as affecting me, and whatever takes place in my mind I am aware of as taking place in me. My Ego is thus perceived to be something that possesses both body and mind, forming a unitary combination of the two which, notwithstanding their distinct differences, makes them act together in perception. These, then, are in brief the data of consciousness regarding my "body." These data cannot be denied; for any person, observing himself in the manner indicated above, will readily verify them through his own experience. The facts must be accepted; it is in the interpretation of them that various theories arise. The Existence of Extra-Mental Reality In placing an interpretation upon the aforementioned data, it must be borne in mind that no a priori presuppositions or theories can be allowed to dictate the explanation. The facts must speak for themselves, and mere difficulties do not constitute impossibilities. The facts must assuredly be accounted for, and that theory alone should be accepted as true which gives the most natural explanation of the data in their entirety. Now, the most natural and most general explanation is the one which claims that my perceptions reveal my body as an existent reality. This view is in agreement with the spontaneous conviction of men in all ages. Even the educated and intelligent, notwithstanding their knowledge of physics and psychology, accept the reality of their own body as an indubitable fact, because this view alone harmonizes with everyday practical life. Our entire mode of living is devoid of sense and reason, if the reality of our body be considered merely as an "internal state," "idea," "image," "representation," or "percept" of the mind. When we give food and drink to the body, when we labor unto fatigue and exhaustion, when we are sick and in suffering, when we break an arm or undergo an operation, when we experience physical comfort and pleasure, when we grow from childhood into maturity and decline into old age -- these actualities of life are meaningless except under the supposition that our body is a physical reality just as we perceive it to be in consciousness. Idealism, with its reduction of all knowledge to terms of mental "percepts" or "ideas," may do in books and classrooms, but will serve little purpose in the stark necessities of life which confront man in his bodily being day after day. Idealism puts no bread into the mouth of the starving and eases no pain in the sick. Only an idealist philosopher could be satisfied with the theory that the reality behind his bodily "appearances" and "phenomena" is some unknown and unknowable, unperceived and unperceivable X; our body is far too real and personal for us to rest content with such vaporous, hypothetical existences. And even the most inveterate idealist is only an idealist in theory; when he goes about his daily occupations and supplies the daily needs of his "phenomenal" body, he acts and behaves like the simplest and most plebeian realist. But a theory that cannot be lived, that must be contradicted by every unphilosophical act of daily life, must be essentially wrong. This view also agrees with empirical science. The departments of anatomy, physiology, biology, physics, genetics, medicine, and psychophysics, when not influenced by the purely theoretical considerations of idealistic thinking, are frankly realistic: they accept the human body as given and as perceived, and their treatment of it shows plainly that they are convinced of its reality and existence. Here again, some scientists may be idealists in theory, but in every practical issue they are realists. This, of course, does not prove that realism is necessarily true in itself; it does show, however, that human reason can accept an idealistic interpretation of the human body only by doing great violence to its natural judgment. After this indirect argument, we must consider the direct evidence of consciousness. Consciousness must be essentially free from error in all matters of which it has immediate intuition. To doubt or deny this is equivalent to the suicide of reason, because then all knowledge must be adjudged illusory. But the evidence of consciousness is transparently clear in testifying to the reality and existence of our body. We can discover no difference between the intuition which consciousness has of mental states and that which it has of the reality and existence of the body. There is indeed a difference in the object of awareness, but there is no essential difference in the nature of the act of awareness itself. Now, if this act of awareness is perceptive of the reality and existence of internal states, why should it not be equally perceptive of the reality and existence of the human body with which it is so obviously connected? The testimony of consciousness is equally clear and intuitive in both cases. To affirm the validity of its perception in the one case and to deny it in the other, amounts to a practical destruction of its character as a reliable witness in both. We could no longer trust its testimony; certain knowledge would be impossible, and skepticism would inevitably follow. Hence, the testimony of our consciousness concerning the reality and existence of our body as perceived by us must be accepted. The Perception of Extra-Mental Reality The entire difficulty of the idealists arises from the view, prevalent since Descartes, that mind and body are so antithetical and foreign to each other, that there can be no real communication between the two. The mind is conceived as a purely unextended entity which is the total subject of knowledge. This view of the "subject of knowledge" is arbitrary and false; it is an unwarranted assumption, contradicted by the very data of consciousness. My Ego is the real subject of my knowledge: that is the verdict of my consciousness. The mind is a mere instrument of my Ego, and this is clearly perceived by introspection: I think, I imagine, I remember, I judge, I reason. It is the Ego, then, and not the mind itself, which is the ultimate subject of intellectual knowledge. And the same is true of sensory knowledge: I feel, I see, I hear, I have pain in my hand, I have a fever. Thus it is seen that the Ego is the real subject of both intellectual and sensory knowledge, that is, of all knowledge. Now, if we analyze our sensory knowledge, we must come to the conclusion that it involves "extension" in the very act of perception. I perceive, for instance, "colored surface"; but how could I perceive a "surface" which is extended, if my act of perception were totally unextended? I feel the "whole length of my arm"; but can I feel or perceive such a thing, if my feeling and perception were wholly mental? I experience a pain "down my left side"; again, how is such an experience possible, if there be no extension in the act of perception? We could multiply such instances by the thousands. They are evident data of our consciousness. But these facts are unintelligible, if we maintain that sense-perception takes place in an unextended subject. Sense-perception is a vital act, certainly; but it is also an "extended" act. The subject of sense-perception must, therefore, also be a vital and extended reality. And since the Ego is the real subject of sense-knowledge, it must be a reality which is both vital (perceptive) and extended. Only a body, however, is extended. Consequently, an extended body must form an integral part of the being of our Ego, in order to account for the psycho-physical character of our sense-perception as a vital yet extended act. We are thus forced to conclude that our Ego does not consist solely of our unextended mind, but is a compound of mind and body, united in such a way that our Ego is a unified living organism consisting of both. Neither the mind alone nor the body alone can explain sensation and perception; both are required for an adequate explanation. And both must be fused together so intimately in their being, that they form a single principle of perceptive action. Since our body is an integral part of our Ego and is thus partly identical with it, our Ego must be capable of perceiving its body just as well as it is capable of perceiving its own mind with its internal states: both belong as constituents to an in our Ego. There is, then, no intrinsic impossibility for our Ego to perceive its own body; on the contrary, the Ego should be able to perceive that which is a component part of itself as a factor in sense-perception. The above analysis of the data of consciousness concerning the reality and perception of our own body shows how arbitrary and fundamentally wrong Descartes was in his treatment of the relation existing between mind and body in the human being. In his eagerness as a mathematician to deduce all knowledge from a single principle he disdained to submit the data of our consciousness to a close scrutiny. Instead, he attempted to give an a priori definition of mind and body and built his entire theory of knowledge upon this foundation. The facts of experience certainly do not bear out Descartes' antithesis. We are conscious beyond doubt that we are one single being, not two, and this presupposes that the mind-body combination in our person is a unitary principle of action. It takes more than a definition and a statement to sever the union between them. Simply because "thought" is an obvious characteristic of mind, Descartes judged it to be the exclusive characteristic of mind and proceeded to define "mind" as "thought"; and for the same reason he defined "matter" (body) as "extension." But this is the fallacy of definition by initial predication, and on this fallacy the whole system of idealism has been reared.
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