|
|
||
 |
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||
|
Some Important Issues in Philosophy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Background Essay: The Truth-Value of Consciousness Background Essay: Extra-Mental and Extra-Ego Reality Some Forms of Realism A Critique of Representative and Presentative Realism by Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M.Cap.
INDEX:
Realism, which contends that extra-mental and extra-Ego reality exists and can be known by the human mind, must be accepted as the only true and valid theory of human knowledge, because it alone gives an adequate interpretation of the facts and data revealed by our consciousness. By accepting realism, however, as a general theory, the problem of the validity of human sense-knowledge is not completely solved. There are rival theories of realism. Realists are not in accord as to the manner in which the mind receives its knowledge of the external physical world through sense-perception. Due to their divergence of views in explaining the manner in which the mind effects its knowledge, realism appears in two radically different types: representative and presentative realism. These will now be examined and evaluated. 1. Types of Representative Realism Representative realism (mediate realism, hypothetical realism, cosmothetical realism, inferential realism) is the theory which maintains that the human mind is immediately aware, not of the external objects themselves, but of its own internal representations only, from which it then infers the existence of external, non-Ego reality as their cause. Representationists accept, of course, the existence of an external, physical, extra-Ego world, otherwise they would not be realists; but they claim that we are incapable of "perceiving" it in any way directly and immediately by means of intuitive sense-perception. We have only subjectively produced images or "representations" in our mind. The mind perceives these images or representations and, since it is aware that it is not their sole cause, reasons to the existence of an outside world as their physical cause. The existence of the non-Ego world is thus a matter of inference on the part of our intellect; hence the name "inferential" realism. And since this gives us no immediate but only a mediate knowledge of the world, we have "mediate" realism. The world is simply assumed as a necessary hypothesis, in order to give an adequate explanation of the data of sense-perception; therefore the term "hypothetical" or "cosmothetical" realism. In any case, we never perceive directly anything but our own internal mental representations, and these are produced partly by the outside objects and partly by the subjective action of the perceiving mind. The question naturally arose: Is there any resemblance between these "representations" and the extra-mental and extra-Ego objects which they represent? The answer led to two main kinds of representative realism: subjective and objective. According to subjective representationalism our knowledge of the existence of an extra-mental universe is mediate, indirect, inferential; we know that extra-mental reality exists, but that is all we know. What the objects in this universe really are like in nature, is beyond our knowledge, because our "representations" of these things are merely "mental images" or "symbols." These images or symbols bear no resemblance whatever to the objects they "represent"; they resemble them no more than the printed words on a page are similar to the things for which they stand. The outside reality itself is absolutely unknown and unknowable; we can only know that something exists which produces this subjective image in us. The "representations" of our perception are indeed caused by external objects, but they tell us nothing about the reality of the objects which cause them. Such is the view of the hypothetical dualists of modern epistemology. Since, however, this class of representationists admits the existence of some sort of extra-mental and extra-Ego reality, they claim that their theory is a genuine form of realism. The objective representative realists agree with the preceding class of philosophers in contending that what the mind immediately perceives is the mental image or "representation"; and from this "representation" they also infer the existence of an outside world. But they differ from "subjective" representationists in claiming that the mental images or "representations" resemble the objects which cause them. They base this resemblance on the Principle of Causality. They argue that an effect must resemble its cause. All operations proceed from the nature or essence of a thing; different natures, then, will produce different kinds of operations. Consequently, the kind of operation will reveal the kind of nature from which it springs. And, thus, from the effects of these operations we can logically infer the qualities of the nature operating. Applying this principle to the case of sense-perception, they contend that the "representations" produced in the mind by external, physical objects enable us to draw a legitimate inference to the qualities and nature of the causes which produce the "representations" in us. In this manner, these "representations" are truly "images" of the things outside and much more than mere "symbols" of them. The knowledge thus acquired contains genuine information regarding the extra-mental and extra-Ego world, even though we have no immediate perception or intuition of the objects themselves. This view of sense-perception is held by many neo-Scholastic and neo-Thomist philosophers. Some Critical Realists also belong to this class. According to them, the mind perceives the "essences" of things, not the things themselves; but these "essences" resemble the nature of the individual realities. 2. Subjective Representative Realism We group in this class all those theories which, while maintaining the fundamental idealist principle that the mind cannot transcend its own conscious states, accept the existence of an extended, material reality as the hidden and unknown cause of our sense-perception. Such are, for instance, Immanuel Kant's phenominalism and Herbert Spencer's "transfigured realism." There are, of course, many variations of this general theory of representative realism, but they all agree in this that they are a form of hypothetical dualism and realism; they postulate the existence of extra-mental and extended things, claiming at the same time that the human mind can have no knowledge or perception of them. Such a realism is no realism at all; it is a disguised and veiled idealism. These philosophers intend to be realists, but they could not escape the net of idealism. According to subjective representationism we can know only our own conscious states. All perception of extension and extended objects is merely a conscious state. Therefore, they say, all such perception is nothing but a modification of our mind and reveals nothing of the qualities and nature of the objects themselves. If this were the case, our knowledge of our body (extra-mental reality) and of the external world (extra-Ego reality), would be purely of an imaginary and subjective character. And since, according to these thinkers, this knowledge tells us nothing whatever about the things-in-themselves outside the mind, this knowledge is illusory. Our intellectual knowledge, however, is based on this sense knowledge, and as such must also be illusory. What value, then, can our knowledge have? It is all a mental construction, a subjective fabrication. That this would destroy the validity of all our knowledge, must be obvious. Skepticism is inevitable. Practically all subjective representationists, unless they are thoroughgoing idealists, speak of the brain and brain-conditions, nerves and neural currents, sense-organs and sentient experiences. But what meaning have such terms and phrases except that they refer to a real body with the side-by-sidedness of extended, material parts? If the body is real, we know a great deal about the "extra-mental" body and its operations, and representationism refutes itself; and if the body is not real, these philosophers are illogical and inconsistent in speaking of such things and building their theory upon them. The adherents of subjective representative realism admit that some form of extra-mental and extra-Ego reality exists. Most of them are even willing to concede that this reality consists of a multiplicity of things; they are pluralistic. Some lean toward the notion of a vague "world stuff," "mind-stuff," or "neutral stuff," very much akin to the Absolute of the more pronounced idealists. But whether their conception of extra-mental and extra-Ego reality be pluralistic or dualistic or monistic, they thereby claim to know more about this reality than its mere existence. This, however, is inconsistent, because their fundamental position is thus relinquished. Besides, on what grounds do they acknowledge the existence of this reality? On the grounds of causality: these things or this reality is the cause of our perceptions. But if the Principle of Causality enables them to infer this existence, why should this same principle not enable them to infer more than the mere existence? One can see no logical reason why it should be restricted to this one fact alone. If representationists were consistent with the tenets of their theory, they could not conclude legitimately even to this fact of existence, because in this knowledge they actually transcend their own conscious states; they do know something which lies outside the confines of their mind. Again, if all our knowledge is purely mental, then the Principle of Causality is also nothing but a purely mental product; as such, this principle would demand only a mental cause for our perceptions. For them to apply a principle of the mental and ideal order to the real and physical world is, according to their own theory, an illogical and unwarrantable procedure. What, then, is left for them but an unmitigated idealism which must eventually end in solipsism? But would be intellectual suicide. Representative realism is the outcome of empiricism, and empiricism is the philosophic offshoot of science. Above all things, these philosophers want to be scientists and be in accord with science. We agree with them in the view that science must furnish the groundwork, the raw material, of philosophy. But science is by no means a champion of subjective representative realism. On the contrary, science absolutely demands extra-mental and extra-Ego reality, not only so far as its existence is concerned, but also as regards the nature, qualities, and operations of the extended, physical objects as we know them. Or would anyone seriously assert that the laws of science are only "mental" laws which regulate the relations of "symbols," "ideas," and "representations" of the mind? Do they not apply, according to the intentions of scientists, to actually existing objects of a real, material universe? The scientists themselves certainly are convinced that they are dealing with extra-mental and extra-Ego realities that have an existence of their own, independent of the mind that conceives and knows them. Subjective representative realism is thus seen to be contrary to all suppositions and conclusions of science. If these things are not real, science loses all meaning and purpose. But a theory that is so subversive of the fundamentals of exact science, must be fallacious. Subjective representative realism is nothing but a halfhearted idealism and therefore is no realism at all. It cannot explain the facts and must be rejected. 3. Objective Representative Realism While objective representative realism agrees with subjective representationism in admitting that the mind perceives directly and immediately only "images" or "representations," from which it then infers the reality of extra-mental and extra-Ego objects (the human body and the universe), it differs radically from it in contending that these "images" or "representations" bear a resemblance to these objects and thereby give us a genuine knowledge of their being. They base this contention, as we have seen, on the Principle of Causality. The question then arises: Must effects "resemble" their causes? If so, the theory can be considered valid; if not, our knowledge of the external world is no better than that of subjective representationism, which is, as we have just noted, only idealism in disguise. The whole matter, then, resolves itself into this: Does the fact of causality always imply a similarity between cause and effect, so that a knowledge of the effect (the "representations" here) automatically gives us a knowledge of the nature and being of the cause (the extra-mental and extra-Ego objects)? Experience tells us beyond reasonable doubt that effects do not always resemble their causes; in many cases there is no similarity whatever between the two. Our daily contact with causality shows plainly that effects are of two kinds: univocal and equivocal. "Univocal" effects are those which are similar in kind to the causes which produce them. We see innumerable instances of this in nature. Plants, animals, and men reproduce their own kind, and here the effects are certainly similar to the causes. Horses produce horses, cows produce cows, eagles produce eagles, man produces man, and so on, throughout the entire kingdom of living things: the offspring (effect) resembles the parent (cause). These are univocal effects similar to their causes. "Equivocal" effects, on the other hand, are dissimilar in kind to their causes. The world is also full of these. The music (effect) of a pipe organ is no way resembles the pipes, the mechanism, the organist, the air (cause). The destruction caused by a shell hitting a building has no similarity to the shell, the exploding powder, the gun, or the gunner. A piece of sculpture representing a horse carries no resemblance to the chisel or the sculptor. Bearing this in mind, we are now in a position to pass judgment on the validity of the theory of objective representative realism. The main contention, that the "images" or "representations" of extended material objects bear a real resemblance to these objects, is groundless and gratuitous. These "representations" are produced by external objects, but what guarantee can they give us that these "representations" are univocal effects? This is, from what we have seen above, certainly not self-understood; because an effect might be either univocal or equivocal, and there is nothing to show why these "representations" must be, or will be, univocal rather than equivocal. And if they should happen to be equivocal, their "resemblance" to the external objects is gone, and then we know nothing about what these external objects are in themselves. The only things the mind can perceive are the "images," the "representations." They may resemble external objects, but they may also, as far as we can tell, be totally unlike the external objects which produce them. Our mind must forever in doubt on this score. Our knowledge of the external world loses all certainty, and we are again on the threshold of idealism and skepticism. Objective representative realism thus offers no solution for the problem of the validity of human sense-knowledge. It also is but a veiled and disguised form of idealism and as such is erroneous and fallacious. What, then, is the outcome of our present investigation? Just this: every form of representative realism, whether subjective or objective, restricting the human mind to a knowledge of its own internal conscious states and denying a direct perception of extra-mental and extra-Ego reality, is no realism at all, but only a disguised variant of idealism. To Part Two of Some Forms of Realism - A Critique Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book...
|
|||
|
Main Page & Index |
|||
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
||
[Homepage] [Newsletter] [Search] [Support the Academy] [Link to Us] [Contact the Academy] [Citing Articles from Our Website] [Privacy Policy & Disclaimer]
Copyright 1998-99, 2000-01, & 2002-03 by The Radical Academy. All Rights Reserved.