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Some Important Issues in Philosophy |
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Some Forms of Realism A Critique of Representative and Presentative Realism by Celestine N. Bittle,
O.F.M.Cap.
Presentative realism (immediate realism, intuitive realism, natural realism, perceptionism) is the theory which maintains that physical, external objects are "presented" directly in some form to consciousness in sense-perception, so that their reality is perceived as it exists in itself "out there" in nature. In this view the objects are "present" or "presented" directly to the mind through the medium of the senses; hence the term "presentative." The external object itself is "immediately" the object which is "perceived" or "intuited"; this explains the terms "immediate" and "intuitive" realism and "perceptionism." And since it is "natural" for man to think that he actually perceives the objects themselves as they are "out there in nature," this theory is also called "natural" realism. The fundamental thought in presentative realism is that the objects themselves, in some form or other, are directly perceived in sense-perception. Because of the active influence of both object and mind upon the sense-process, it is natural that some realists will give a more "objective" and others a more "subjective" interpretation of the facts involved. And thus two rival theories have been advanced to account for our experiences: rigid and naive presentative realism and moderate or critical presentative realism. The difference between these is one of degree, not of principle. Rigid or naive perceptionism is the realism of the ordinary man and of the philosopher who is convinced that the things he perceives are actually in nature as they appear to his senses. If he sees a colored object, the color is really "outside" in the thing, just as he sees it. Sounds are real tones emitted by the sounding object, just as he hears them with his ear. And all objects are extended, have a definite shape, and are at rest or in motion, just as he experiences them through one or more of his senses. In other words, all qualities are objectively real as perceived. Critical or moderate perceptionism claims that some qualities of objects are "objectively" real and as such are perceived immediately and intuitively by the senses; other qualities are not present in the object as such, independent of the sensing subject, but exist only potentially or causally in the objects. Thus, extension, shape, motion or rest, unity or multiplicity, would be considered "objective" qualities inherent in the bodies themselves, independent of sense and mind, and as such would be directly perceived. But color and sound, for example, do not exist in the objects themselves as "color" and "sound"; these are "subjective" qualities which exist only in the perceiving senses, with this distinction, however, that they are causally produced in the senses by vibrations coming from the objects "out there" in nature. In order to understand the problem better, it will be necessary to explain the various kinds of sense-qualities. It has become customary to divide the sense-qualities of objects into primary and secondary, or as Aristotle and the scholastics did, into common and proper. Any object, quality, or feature of reality, which can be perceived by a sense, is called a "sense-object," "sensile," "sensible," or "sense-quality"; they all mean the same thing. Now, some of the sensibles or sense-qualities can be perceived by a single sense only. Thus, the organ of sight alone perceives colors; the organ of smell alone perceives odors; the organ of hearing alone perceives sound: such qualities are proper or secondary sensibles. Other sensibles or sense-qualities can be perceived by more than one sense-organ. Extended surface, shape, volume, number (i.e., whether one or many), rest and motion, can be perceived by at least two of the senses, sight and touch: they are common or primary sensibles. And this brings us to the very heart of the controversy waged between rigid and critical perceptionism: Are all sense-qualities "objective" or are some of them "subjective"? Rigid or naive perceptionism stands for the theory that all sensibles are "objective"; they are really in the objects as perceived. Moderate or critical perceptionism, on the other hand, claims that the common sensibles are really in the objects as perceived, but the proper sensibles are more or less "subjective" in character. 5. The Case of Rigid Presentative Realism The rigid realist occupies a naturally strong position, for he has practically all humanity to support his view. The man in the street, undisturbed by the findings of science and the psychological difficulties involved in sense-perception, is a naive realist who is thoroughly convinced that he directly perceives all extra-mental and extra-subjective objects as they really are in themselves. The philosopher, who is a rigid perceptionist, is not so unreflecting and unscientific; he knows that he cannot take things for granted and that many objects do not always "appear" as they "really are." Still, while he is fully aware of the many philosophic difficulties inherent in rigid realism, he places himself frankly on the standpoint that all sense-qualities, primary and secondary, are intuitively perceived as they "really are" in nature, provided the normal conditions of sense-perception are present. If conditions are abnormal, errors will be committed; if they are normal, errors can be eliminated. These conditions pertain to the "sentient subject," to the "sensed object," and to the "medium" intervening between the object and the subject. As far as the sentient subject is concerned, it is necessary that the sense-organs be free from organic and functional defects. If any of the senses are abnormally constructed or if their proper function is impeded in any important degree, it will be but natural that they cannot register the data properly; distorted perceptions will result, and errors of judgment will be the inevitable consequence. The case would be similar to using defective instruments or tools in highly specialized crafts. Regarding the sensed objects, they must be placed at the right distance and in the right setting. Every sense has its own definite field of operation; within this field its efficiency is high, and beyond this field it is low or even nil. A specific relation exists between object and sense, and this relation cannot be appreciably disturbed without incurring the risk of faulty perception. The medium intervening between object and sense must also be normal, otherwise perception cannot be normal. A change of medium will naturally bring about a change in the relation between the object and the subject, with the result that the perception of the object will be distorted. An oar partly submerged in water will appear bent, because a part of the rays of light reaches the eye through the medium of air alone, while the other part reaches it through air and water. In a similar manner, due to the refracting action of the atmosphere at the horizon, the morning sun is seen before it actually rises above the earth's rim, and it appears red and much larger than it really is; variations in the density of the atmosphere medium account for the phenomenon. It is unquestionable that the normality of conditions is an important factor in true sense-perception. Given the presence of normal conditions, the rigid perceptionists claim, our senses must be considered reliable within the sphere of their proper function and enable the intellect to draw proper conclusions from the data presented by the senses. To deny this would mean that our normal senses under normal conditions would give us a false and illusory picture of the world around us; and that would be tantamount to the assertion that illusion and error would be the normal result of our faculties in their normal and natural operations. Such an assertion, however, would inevitably lead to general skepticism, because neither our senses in their normal operations nor reason in its legitimate conclusions could be trusted. That, of course, would be the bankruptcy of all knowledge, and science and philosophy would be hopeless and useless occupations. But this is evidently absurd. Consequently, our senses under normal conditions must be reliable sources of information concerning the extra-mental and external world. If errors occur, they are only incidental and accidental and can be avoided by careful and thoughtful attention to the data. This general principle the rigid perceptionists then apply to the perception of sense-qualities. And they argue in the following fashion . . . "There are innumerable instances in which we act with deliberate attention and with a knowledge of the essential normality of our senses. In applying our senses to an object, we are conscious that all our sense-perceptions testify with equal force to the existence of certain qualities in the single bodies, namely, motion or rest, volume, shape, and distance. "The conjunction of these conditions, however, entitles us to pass a judgment on the sense-qualities of the single bodies, because we thereby find ourselves forced to pass this judgment, and we consider any serious doubt to be unreasonable. "If our judgment, notwithstanding this compulsion, were false, we would be subject to error out of necessity and would have to despair of all certitude. In special and definite instances, therefore, our reason is capable of judging with certitude on the sense-qualities of bodies. "With regard to the particular case of the so-called secondary sense-qualities, there can be no doubt that our subjective sense-perceptions, if we presuppose the existence of bodies, will find their adequate explanation in nothing but the specific qualities of bodies through which the latter act upon our senses. For even the existence of bodies could not be known to us except by means of those qualities in virtue of which the bodies appear to us as colored in this way or that way, as having this or that taste or odor, or as being hard or soft. "To deny or doubt the trustworthiness of our senses in the perception of these qualities would therefore be as much as to question the possibility of a knowledge of the bodies themselves." Immediate intuitive perception of sense-qualities we certainly have. Then why make a distinction between primary and secondary sensibles at all, some of which are supposed to be "objective," while others are considered more or less "subjective"? There seems no reasonable cause in the qualities themselves to judge any of them to be more subjective or less objective than the others. Furthermore, humanity in general has the spontaneous conviction that all sense-qualities, primary and secondary, are found in the objects as they appear in perception. This is the verdict of common sense and therefore of natural reason. Can all humanity be wrong in a matter which is so interwoven with daily experience of the most intimate character? If so, is human reason then not unreliable? And if unreliable, is not every philosophical theory then just sheer waste of time and energy? If we impugn the reliability of reason and our senses, must we not end in the bog of skepticism? We must remember that the constant and universal conviction of mankind gives presumptive evidence of tremendous force to this view of the objectivity of all sense-qualities without exception. This theory explains the facts so fully and convincingly that it amounts practically to a scientific and philosophic law of nature. 6. Answer of Critical Presentative Realism As far as the arguments of the rigid realists are concerned, the critical perceptionists subscribe to them, considering their general trend and import. But they deny that the arguments prove that all sense-qualities without exception, primary and secondary, must be accepted as objectively present in the objects "out there" in nature just as they "appear" to the senses. This conclusion exceeds the premises. The argument merely proves that in general immediate, intuitive perception of the external, physical qualities of objects is the correct theory of knowledge, but it does not prove that all sense-qualities in particular are intuited as objectively present in the things themselves. To argue from the "general" truth of a statement to every "particular" instance and case which apparently falls under it makes them guilty of the fallacy of passing from an "absolute" to a "qualified" statement. Certainly, if the argument were as exclusive as the rigid realists assert, the question would be definitely settled; but that they have not proved. After all, the question is a matter of facts properly interpreted. The facts are the same for everybody, and no one denies them; but the interpretation of these facts is a different affair, and reason is the arbiter here. We must always bear in mind, that the senses themselves do not judge: they merely report the presence of certain sense-impressions. It is reason, and reason alone, which judges whether anything "objective" corresponds outside in nature to the subjective sensations and perceptions thus recorded by the senses. Truth resides in the judgment, and judgment is exclusively the function of the intellect. The senses can do no more than present the data, which reason must then interpret according to its own lights. And if reason, after a careful scrutiny of the data of sense-perception, is forced to judge that certain sense-qualities are not objectively present in nature as perceived by the senses, we must accept the dictates of reason as final. Any other course would be unscientific and unphilosophical and would be bound to lead ultimately into error. General statements will not settle the issue; facts alone can. So let the facts speak for themselves. Again, rigid realists assert that the secondary qualities of bodies must be objectively present in them; otherwise we would not know even of the existence of bodies themselves, and thus the possibility of a knowledge of bodies themselves would be called into question. They are wrong, for they prove too much and therefore nothing. Both rigid and critical presentationists consider the primary qualities as perfectly "objective," as really existing in the bodies as they are perceived by the sense of touch. It is through these qualities that the existence, extension, shape and voluminousness of bodies are observed in sense-perception. Here we have the essential guarantee of the reality of external bodies, and this guarantee is not invalidated by the assumption that the secondary qualities are not actually present in the bodies as perceived. Furthermore, rigid perceptionists maintain that there is no foundation in nature for making such a radical distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Again they are wrong. Nature itself gives us the ground for making this distinction. The primary qualities are in themselves more fundamental in character than the secondary. To have definite shape, volume, weight, and impenetrability, flows necessarily from the extension of bodies. There could be no colors, sounds, odors, flavors, temperature, and resistance, if these primary qualities were not present before them, since these secondary qualities need extended surface in order to exist and be what they are. The primary qualities can exist without the secondary, but the secondary cannot subsist without the primary. And then, too, the very nature of the perceptive act provides a reason for this distinction. The primary qualities are perceived by direct contact between our body and other bodies through the immediate perception of the sense of touch. Herein lies the ultimate assurance that these bodies and their fundamental qualities are real and objective. Other qualities, like color, sound, etc., are perceived, not through direct contact, but through some "medium" distinct from the bodies and distinct from the qualities themselves, namely, vibratory motions of ether, air, and so on. Hence, it is false to assert that there is no natural distinction between the two sets of qualities and that bodies could not be known unless the objectivity of secondary qualities were also admitted. It might, then, very well be that the latter are more or less subjective, while the primary qualities alone are objectively present in bodies, without destroying the essential validity of sense-perception. Finally, rigid perceptionists appeal to the spontaneous conviction and the commonsense judgment of mankind; all men, they say, consider the secondary as well as the primary qualities to reside in the objects as perceived. In answer to this, critical perceptionists maintain that this argument is of very dubious force, because this conviction is not at all as universal as claimed. In fact, it was the natural philosophy of the ordinary man which coined the phrase that "appearances deceive." This implies the well-grounded judgment that things are not always as they "appear" to the senses. He corrects many sense-impressions through the judgment of his reasoning faculties, so that he is by far not as "naive" as many people think. For instance. . .
Hundreds of similar examples could be adduced which manifest his conviction that things are frequently quite different in reality from what they appear to be according to the testimony of his senses. If he is not fully conscious of the corrective judgment of his interpreting reason in these and similar cases, this is due to the habitual action of lifelong experience which enables him to interpret these deceptive appearances correctly without being aware that he is doing so. All of which shows that the spontaneous convictions of the ordinary man do not favor rigid realism as much as is claimed. Such is the answer of the critical perceptionists to the arguments of the defenders of rigid presentative realism. Their answer so far is negative in intent, showing that the opposing arguments lack cogency. More than this, of course, is required in order to prove that critical, and not rigid, presentative realism deserves to be classed as the only theory of sense-perception which explains all the facts. Facts must prove or disprove a theory. And critical perceptionists produce a formidable array of facts from science and from everyday life which, according to their view, furnish positive and incontestable proof of the truth of critical perceptionism. To Critical Presentative Realism: A Critique and a Defense Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book...
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