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Introduction
to Philosophy
Philosophy
and Science
Modern man is fascinated by science. Today he
possesses a wider knowledge of scientific truths
than ever before, and everything indicates that
still greater advancement will be made in the near
future. Passing over the extraordinary progress
achieved by man during the ages since his first
appearance upon earth, let us consider briefly his
progress in the field of scientific endeavor during
modern times. In the sphere of electronics we note
the discoveries that led to the invention of radio,
television, and the personal computer. In nuclear
physics there is the splitting of the atom and the
harnessing of atomic energy. Progress in mechanics
has resulted in the construction of gigantic -- and
at the same time delicately perfect -- instruments.
Indeed we must conclude that modern man may be
justly proud of the progress of science. Since,
moreover, nature seems inexhaustible and thus far
has revealed only a small part of her mysteries,
there is every reason to hope that man will be able
to make very more extraordinary and surprising
progress in science. Thus no one will deny that
with the utilization of atomic and other forms of
energy we will be on the threshold of a new era of
progress.
However, no matter what scientific discoveries
have been made to date, and no matter how great may
be those of the future, it is certain that man's
desire to know cannot be restricted to the
sciences. Science explains existing facts which
fall under the observation of the senses and hence
are the object of experience. Science presupposes
the existence of nature with all its laws, and the
scope or purpose of the sciences is to interpret
the laws found in nature and to learn how they are
exercised. When we speak of scientific knowledge,
we mean the understanding of a fact or law in the
field of science. With this knowledge of the law
and the conditions for its exercise, we can put
such a law into operation and obtain the same
result for our own use.
Side by side with scientific knowledge there
arises in man the desire for another kind of
understanding more profound than that of science.
It is the understanding of the "why" of existing
things, and the "why" of their exercise in this
particular manner and not in another. When the
question is posed of the "why" of nature, the "why"
of its laws, and the reason these laws operate in a
certain determined manner, the limits of science
are overstepped, and one enters into philosophy.
Science is the study of how nature, accepted
as it exists, act; philosophy is the study of
why nature exists and why it acts in
this determined manner.
Having thus established the limits of both, we
can also comprehend the different methods which we
must use in philosophy and science. Science is the
fruit of experience. "By proving and reproving
(i.e., by trial and error)," said Da Vinci, "is
science built up." What does not fall under the
perception of the senses, and consequently does not
come under the data of experience, does not pertain
to science. Hence the object of science is nature
and its laws -- nature and the laws which are
presupposed to exist, and whose function the
sciences seek to understand.
It is clear, on the other hand, that all the
questions regarding the ultimate "why" (or reason)
of things -- e.g., why nature exists, why such laws
are found in nature, why such laws operate in this
fashion, etc.: all questions regarding the "why" of
things -- do not fall under the perception of the
senses and cannot be ascertained through the method
of trial and error. Only through reason can we
arrive at the root of things, and reason alone can
open to us the way to an understanding of their
origin and of the forces contained in them.
Science is therefore distinguished from
philosophy because the former seeks to extend the
field of its investigations by means of data
offered by experience, while the latter seeks to do
this through reasoning.
Once science and philosophy are distinguished
from one another by the object of their
investigations and by the method of these
investigations, it follows that both the
philosopher and the scientist must be mindful of
their respective limits. The scientist, if he
wishes to remain a scientist, must remain in the
field of how the phenomena are produced and
of the how of their immediate causes, and
not invade the field of the ultimate reason
why such phenomena are produced in such a
manner and in no other.
Thus, when he asks himself the question of the
ultimate reason, he is no longer doing the work of
science but of philosophy, in which case he is to
be judged not as a scientist but as a philosopher,
and his hypotheses will be valid only when his
reasons are valid. When, for example, the scientist
studies the phenomena of nature and presumes to
explain the ultimate reason of these phenomena
through an appeal to chance or to motion or to the
law of selection, he is no longer a scientist but a
philosopher; and the solution of the ultimate
reason, which he presumes to derive from chance or
from the law of selection, should be judged in the
philosophical field. In such a case it is reason
which should judge whether or not chance or the law
of selection is adequate for the solution of the
problem. It is equally true that the philosopher
must guard against invading the field of the
sciences. To know nature in its principles does not
mean to know all the applications of such
principles. This latter is the object of
science.
When we state that philosophy is distinguished
from science, we do not mean that it is opposed to
it. Distinction does not necessarily mean
opposition. Thus the results obtained by science
cannot be unacceptable to philosophy; nor indeed
are the principles reasonably established by
philosophy to be in contradiction to the findings
of science. If either of these two cases should be
verified, we must conclude either that the findings
of the sciences are not true findings but, at most,
hypotheses, or that philosophy must review its line
of reasoning.
It is this concordance which should exist
between science and philosophy that should lead the
scientist to keep in mind the principles of
philosophy while making his hypotheses, and should
incline the philosopher to be moderate in his
investigations of the conclusions of science. Truth
is always one, no matter from what point we decide
to consider it. Philosophy and science move on
different planes and with a different object in
view. This does not mean, however, that what is
true in the field of philosophy is false in the
field of science or vice versa. The one must be
allied with the other, even while remaining in its
own field of investigation, and the two should work
together to give man that which he desires most to
know: Truth.
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The
Oxford Companion to
Philosophy,
by
Ted Honderich
An
Introduction to
Philosophy,
by
Daniel J Sullivan
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