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GLOSSARY |
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Plato's investigations begin on the Socratic plan, that is, with sensitive cognition, with the purpose not only of transcending the data of sense and arriving at concepts (a problem already solved by Socrates), but also of going beyond Socratic conetps to the point of reaching a world where concepts are actual realities and not only simple representations. There are two ways to knowledge: the sense and the intellect. The two kinds of knowledge which result differ essentially: sensitive cognition tells us that a thing is, but does not tell us what that thing is; sensitive cognition shows us the existence but not the essence of the thing known. Consequently sense knowledge is devoid of the characteristics of universality and necessity. On the other hand, intellective (conceptual) knowledge tells us what the object is that we know, and has at the same time the characteristics of necessity and universality. According to Plato, these two kinds of knowledge are not derivable one from the other. Intellective knowledge does not take its origin from sensitive cognition. First of all, the characteristics of both are diametrically opposed: sensitive cognition is contingent and particular; intellective knowledge is necessary and universal. Since the perfect cannot be derived from the imperfect, intellective knowledge cannot be derived from that which is sensitive. Moreover, Plato, led by his mathematical and aesthetic studies, finds not only that these concepts cannot be derived from experience, but also that such concepts precede experience. I must, for example, have first the concept of a circle in my mind in order to know whether that particular figure on the blackboard is a circle or not. If the knowledge of just what a circle is (the concept of a circle) were not anterior to the data of the senses (the circle drawn on the board), I would be unable to affirm that the given figure is a circle. Having affirmed the distinction of inderivability and the precedence of intellective over sensitive knowledge, Plato makes of our concepts more than representative signs; he makes of them a world of actual realities. The Ideas of Plato are endowed with real existence in a world superior to the world which we see, which is the object of sensitive cognition. Ideas as they appear in our own mind are but the images or representations of things in this world apart. Plato was induced to admit the existence of this world of Ideas from a parallelism which he noted between intellective and sensitive cognition. If sense knowledge presupposes a world constituted of beings and is derived from them, equally so must it be said of intellective knowledge; hence there exists a world of beings (Ideas) from which our ideas draw their representations. The suprasensible world of Plato must be considered as constituting a multiplicity of subsistent ideas which find their unity in the Idea of the Good. Platonic Ideas in fact are but the realities which refract the single Idea (the Good). Granted, then, the identity of the Good and of the True and the Beautiful, all ideas are at the same time true, good and beautiful, i.e., perfect models. The world of Ideas is the world of true reality. The metaphysical structure of material being is explained according to the principles of ontology, that is, by act and potency. Since, however, we must consider in cosmology the presence of matter, act and potency are given a new terminology, namely, substantial form and prime matter, Prime matter is an element undetermined in itself but capable of determination by the substantial form, which is the element determining matter. What might appear as mere tautology in this statement actually emphasizes the close interrelationship existing between these two elements. For it is the form which makes matter what it actually is. Prime matter and substantial form are imperfect being. They do not exist separately from one another. The existing being is a composite of both matter and form, which is usually called substance. In the composite substance, prime matter represents the passive element (potency), the substratum of all change. The substantial form, on the other hand, represents the specific perfection of the substance; it is the substantial form which endows the substance with the particular activity it happens to have (the nature). The substantial form is the source of all the activities of the substance. Besides the substantial form, there are in any substance other forms perfecting it in its existence and its activity - e.g., the forms of shape, color, weight, etc. These forms are called secondary or accidental because they presuppose a being already established by prime matter and substantial form. St. Augustine's "Illumination" Regarding the origin of knowledge, St. Augustine as a Platonist underrates sensitive cognition, which he does not make the foundation of intellective knowledge. Whence, then, does intellective cognition draw its origin? From illumination. As the eyes have need of the light of the sun in order to see sensible objects, so the intellect needs the light of God to know the world of intelligible beings. Eternal truths, ideas, species, formal principles are imparted to our intelligence by Wisdom, the World of God. Intellectual knowledge is not the result of the acquisitive operation of the intellect, but a participation or grant from God. It is in this participation that Augustine's innatism with regard to ideas consists. It follows from this that the intellect, considered in itself, is incapable of acquiring knowledge of intelligible beings, but is made capable of such knowledge through illumination. St. Anselm's "Ontological Argument" The name of Anselm is linked to philosophy by virtue of his celebrated ontological argument. This is an a priori argument which Anselm formulated in the Proslogium with the intention of convincing the atheist of his folly. In this argument Anselm seeks to prove the real (objective) existence of God by beginning with the concept of God, a concept which even the atheist possesses in his mind. The argument may be formulated thus:
The problem of universals, which was discussed for centuries by the Scholastics, was occasioned by a passage in Porphyry's "Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle," translated by Boethius and very widely used in the school as a textbook in logic. The problem was put in these terms: The concept or idea which we have in our mind is by nature universal. In the world of reality, what is the thing which the idea represents? Does there exist in the world of reality something of which our concepts are the image, or are our concepts only simple concepts, and mere names? Such a problem had already been discussed in classical philosophy and had been given various solutions by Plato, Aristotle, the Sophists, and the Stoics. As the teachings of Greek philosophy were widely ignored at the time, this problem received new importance during the Scholastic period. The solution given during this period may be reduced to three, all of which have historical precedent in Greek philosophy. 1. First Solution: Transcendental Realism According to this theory, the universal, the idea, the concept represents an objective reality which exists not only outside the mind but also outside particular individuals and before the individuals. This, of course, is Plato's doctrine of separate Ideas. See Plato's World of Ideas. 2. Second Solution: Immanent Realism The universals, ideas, or concepts are representative of a reality which exists outside the mind, but not outside individuals. They exist in the individuals as essences, immanent forms, or principles of activity. This solution finds its basis in the classical period in Aristotle, who considers the universal in the world of objective reality as a form immanent in matter. From the union of this form with matter, the universal beings becomes individuated, so that in the world of reality individuals exist in act, while the universal exists only in potency. It seems that this form of Aristotelian realism was upheld in the Middle Ages by William of Champeaux (died about 1121), who argued the question with Roscelin and his disciple Peter Abelard. 3. Third Solution: Conceptualism The universals, ideas, or concepts have no basis in the world of reality; they are mental signs, subjective representations, which the intellect produces for the purpose of regrouping the likenesses of objects in a single symbol. Such mental signs can also be representative of simple names. Nominalism is a variant of conceptualism. Pure conceptualism was defended by William of Ockham; nominalism by Roscelin and Abelard. In the classical Greek period, this third solution had been advocated in the Empirical and Sensist schools, in the teachings of Sophistic, Stoic, Epicurean and Skeptic philosophy. Final Thoughts The problem of universals, which arose through a discussion of the processes of logic, was not slow to insert itself into metaphysical and theological questions. Thus the nominalism of Roscelin went contrary to the dogma of the Trinity, since it logically held that the unity of the divine substance was only a name and the three persons were three distinct substances. This heresy was condemned by the Church in the year 1092. The Period of Naturalism - The Metaphysical Period - The Ethical Period The Religious Period - The Period of Evangelization The Period of Patristic Philosophy - The Period of Scholastic Philosophy Humanism and the Renaissance - The Philosophy of Rationalism
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