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On
Metaphysics
by Averroes (Ibn Roshd)
It has already been demonstrated in natural
science that everything that is moved presupposes a
moving principle; that, furthermore, the moved is
moved only in so far as it exists potentially and
that the mover carries out a movement in so far as
he is in actu; and that the mover, if one
time he carries out a movement but the next time
does not produce such, must, in a certain manner,
be passively moved, since active motion exists only
potentially in him if he does not actually move. If
we thus assume in this case that the first mover of
the world one time carries out a movement, but not
the next time, then we have to conclude inevitably
that a further mover, prior to this one, must exist
in the world. This one is, therefore, not the prime
mover. Now, if we thus assume in the case of the
second one that he moves one time and does not move
the next time, we necessarily get the same result
with respect to it as we got in the first case.
Therefore, it is an irrefutable consequence that
either this succession yields an infinite chain or
that we admit that in the "here" [i.e., the
world] there exists a mover who is in no manner
moved nor may yet be moved, neither as concerns his
essence, nor yet per accidens. Since matters
lie thus, this mover is consequently of necessity
eternal; the object that is put in motion by him is
likewise eternally in motion; for if something
existed that, at a given time, were potentially in
a position to be moved by the eternal mover, then a
mover who would precede the eternal mover, would
inevitably have to exist "beyond." For this reason,
the mover whose existence has been demonstrated in
the 16th Book of Zoology, would not possess the
qualification sufficient for carrying out a special
movement without the aid of the mover of the whole
world.
If it is thus clear that an eternal motion
exists in the "here," and if it is impossible that
there is an eternal motion, leaving out of account
the circular and spatial one -- this has been
discussed in natural science -- then it is evident
that this demonstration yields the necessity of an
eternal, spatial motion existing in the "here."
However, this is in no manner ascertainable by
sensual perception, if you except the motion of the
heavenly body. The motion of this body must,
therefore, be the eternal motion of which we are in
search. The mover of this body is at the same time
the eternal mover whose existence has become
intelligible through former discussions. The
existence of an eternal, continuous motion with
respect to time has likewise been proved; for,
time, as has been demonstrated, is one of the
accidents of motion. Time cannot be slowly
composed, not even by him who is raised above time.
The reason for this lies in what follows: Let us
admit that time arises by degrees; then it would
exist after it was nonexistent previously, indeed
already prior to its existence. The earlier and the
later are, however, two designations for parts of
time. Therefore, time would have to exist before
there was any. Furthermore, if time were something
that originates, then it would happen that time
which might be a present time did not precede a
particular thing. However, it is quite impossible
to imagine that no past preceded a particular thing
which is in actuality and exists in a "present"
moment, let alone that we could imagine such a
state of affairs were we to reflect on the real
nature of time. An error in these ideas can occur
only when we think of time in terms of a line; for,
in so far as the line possesses spatial motion --
this exists in actuality -- it is by necessity
finite, not to mention the fact that one cannot
even imagine infinity in connection with it. Now,
if you should imagine time in this sense as a
straight line, it is impossible for it to be
infinite. This type of error belongs to those that
fall under the topic of spatial motion and
substitution. Farabi has composed long
dissertations concerning this problem with respect
to things that exist and change.
This being so, and it being evident that time
forms an eternal continuum, it follows inevitably
upon an eternal motion which is continuous and
uniform; for a motion which in the proper sense of
the word is uniform, is the continuous motion. If,
now, there exists in the "here" an eternal motion,
it follows that there must also be present an
eternal mover who is ever the same; for, if there
were many moving principles existing, the motion
would not be one and the same, nor would it be
continuous. Now, that this first mover cannot be of
a material nature, has become intelligible by
virtue of the fact that his motion, which takes
place in time, proceeds "without end. However,
every mover that exists in some matter must have
quantity adhering to him, that is, must possess a
body. Every potentiality, however, which has its
seat in something quantitative, is divisible,
corresponding to the divisibility of quantity. It
follows likewise in the determination of finiteness
and infinity, as has been demonstrated in natural
science, be it that one presupposes this
potentiality as blended with the body or only as
"engraved" upon it. Of such nature are heat in fire
and cold in water. This potentiality is in some
sort of necessary internal dependence on the
hyle, that is to say, a dependence
absolutely necessary for its existence. Thus with
respect to the psychic principle. Since, now, in
essence, form is material, no material force can
exist which, as moving principle, is infinite. All
this was demonstrated in natural science. . . .
Excerpted from The
Metaphysics of Averroes
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Averroes:
His Life, Work, by Majid Fakhry
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