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On
Concepts
by Al-Farabi
I. Knowledge is divided into (a) generally
accepted concepts (concepts of the sun, moon,
intellect, and the soul), and (b) those concepts
that require verification (such as making certain
that the heaven consists of spheres, one in the
other; or that the world has been created in
time).
It is necessary for every concept to have a
prior concept. The concluding concept may be
established without connecting it to a concept
preceding it. This is true of being: the necessary
and the possible. These concepts do not require one
to previously perceive that something comprises
them. These three are rather distinct, correct
concepts, innate to understanding. If someone
desires to verbally clarify these concepts, then
this is only a stimulus to understanding; but they
cannot be clarified beyond the clarity of the
concepts themselves.
II. It is impossible for us to understand the
verifications of concepts without previously having
understood other things. For instance, if we wish
to know that the world has been created in time,
then we must have the prior certainty that the
world is composite. However, all that is composite
has also been originated in time; consequently we
know also that the world has been originated in
time. Without doubt, this verification ultimately
ends in another which then does not require another
to precede it for confirmation.
These, then, are the basic principles that are
clearly present in the intellect: of two sides of
an opposite, one must always be true, the other
false; the whole is greater than any part of it.
Logic is the science by which we get acquainted
with these methods so that they assist us in our
concepts of things and guide us to their
verification. The two methods mentioned here aid us
in distinguishing between complete and deficient
concepts, between the certain and those only
approximately certain; as well as the preponderant
opinion and the doubtful one. By doing this we
become aware of all the aspects of the complete
concept as well as the certain verification of
those that do not contain any doubt.
III. Thus we maintain: All that there is is
divided into two categories. In the first category
it is unnecessary to cogitate the nature of the
things, since they are of a possible existence. If
we reflect on the nature of the second category of
things, we find that their being is a necessary one
and we say accordingly, it is of necessary
existence. It is not absurd to postdate that some
things of possible existence are not present; for
in order for a thing to exist, it must have a
cause; however, if it becomes a necessary being,
then it attains necessary existence through
something other than that which it itself is. From
this it follows that it is necessary for it to
belong to that which naturally always has a
possible existence and became a necessary being
only by virtue of something else. This possibility
either never ceases or it takes place at a
particular time. The possibility cannot move
forever as cause and effect, as it were, in a
circle; instead it must end in something necessary
to itself. The latter would be that which would be
present at first. ^
IV. However, if we postulate that which is
necessary as not present, then we state an
absurdity. For its being has no cause, and
furthermore, it cannot have its being by virtue of
something else. It is the first cause of the being
of things, and its being must of necessity be the
prime being. We are compelled to imagine the same
in every way free of want. Its being is thus
complete. Moreover, its being must of necessity be
the most perfect one, free from causes, i.e.,
matter, form, creation, and the final goal.
Excerpted from The Main
Problems of Abu Nasr Al-Farabi
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Al-Farabi,
Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works
and Influence, by Majid Fakhry
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