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On
Revelation
by Judah Halevi
Our intellect which, a priori, is only
theoretical, being sunk in matter, cannot penetrate
to the true knowledge of things, except by the
grace of God, by special faculties which He has
placed in the senses. There is no difference
between my perception and thine that this
circumscribed disc, giving forth light and heat is
the sun. Should even these characteristics be
denied by reason, this does no harm, because we can
derive it from argument for our purposes. Thus also
a sharp-eyed person, looking for a camel, can be
assisted by a weak-eyed and squinting one who tells
him that he has seen two cranes at a certain place.
The sharp-eyed person then knows that the other has
only seen a camel, and the weakness of his eyes
made him believe that it was a crane, and his
squint that there were two cranes. In this way the
sharp-eyed person can make use of the evidence of
the weak-eyed one, whilst he excuses his faulty
description by his faulty sight. A similar relation
prevails between senses and imagination on one side
and reason on the other. The Creator was as wise in
arranging this relation between the exterior senses
and the things perceived, as He was in fixing the
relation between the abstract sense and the
uncorporeal substratum. To the chosen among His
creatures He has given an inner eye which sees
things as they really are, without any alteration.
Reason is thus in a position to come to a
conclusion regarding the true spirit of these
things. He to whom this eye has been given is
clear-sighted indeed. Other people, who appear to
him as blind, he guides on their way. It is
possible that this eye is the power of imagination
as long as it is under the control of the
intellect. It beholds, then, a grand and awful
sight which reveals unmistakable truths among the
whole of this species and those sights. By this I
mean all the prophets. For they witnessed things
which are described to the other in the same manner
as we do with things we have seen. We testify to
the sweetness of honey and the bitterness of the
colocynth; and if any one contradicts us, we say
that he has failed to grasp a fact of natural
history. Those prophets without doubt saw the
divine world with the inner eye; they beheld a
sight which harmonized with their natural
imagination. Whatever they wrote down, they endowed
with attributes as if they had seen them in
corporeal form. Those attributes are true as far as
regards what is sought by inspiration, imagination,
and feeling; they are untrue as regards the reality
sought by reason.
Excerpted from The Book of
the Chazars, by Judah Halevi
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The
Cambridge
Companion
to
Medieval Jewish
Philosophy,
by
Daniel H. Frank
Every
Person's Guide to
Jewish
Philosophy and
Philosophers,
by
Ronald H. Isaacs
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