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Is the
Universe Created or Eternal?
by Gersonides
It behooves us first of all to point out the
great difficulty of this investigation, as this
will lead us to some extent to make the
investigation into this problem more complete. For
by being aware of the difficulty of a problem, we
are guided to the way which leads us to the
attainment of the truth thereof.
The fact that the philosophers who have hitherto
investigated it greatly differ from one another in
their opinions concerning it points to its
difficulty; for this proves that arguments may be
derived from the nature of existing things,
wherewith each of the conflicting views can be
either established or refuted. And it is very
difficult to investigate a problem with such a
peculiarity.
What undoubtedly points to the great difficulty
inherent in this enquiry is the fact that we have
to investigate whether all existing things were
created by God, who is blessed, after a period of
non-existence, or were never created t all. Now it
is manifest that if we desire to fathom one of the
attributes of an object, by the way of speculative
investigation, whether that object possesses that
attribute or not, it is first of all necessary that
we should know the essence of the object and its
attributes. For it is only through them that we may
attain to that which we seek to know. It is thus
evident that one who desires to investigate this
problem thoroughly must first of all know the
essence and attributes of the thing under
examination as far as it is possible for man to
perceive. This would necessitate that a man
desirous of thoroughly investigating this subject
should know the nature and the attributes of all
existing things, so that he may be able to explain
whether there is among them a thing or an attribute
which would lead us to the conclusion that the
universe was not created; or whether there is among
them a thing or an attribute which would lead us to
the conclusion that the universe was created; or
whether there is not among them a thing or an
attribute from which it could be concluded either
that the universe was created, or that it was not
created. The matter being so, a man, to whom the
knowledge of one of the existing things or of the
attributes thereof, so far as a human being can
possibly know, is inaccessible, is unable to make
as thorough an investigation of this problem as is
humanly possible. Now it is evident that to obtain
as thorough a knowledge of all existing things and
of their attributes as is humanly possible is
extremely difficult.
What makes this investigation more difficult is
the fact that the investigator must necessarily
have some knowledge of the First Cause as far as it
is possible. For this enquiry leads him to
investigate whether God, who is blessed, could
possibly have existed at first without this world,
which He afterwards brought into existence and
created, or it is necessary that the world should
have always existed with Him. It is, however,
evident from the preceding argument itself that it
is necessary for a man, desirous of making this
investigation as perfect as possible, to know of
the essence of God, who is blessed, all that can be
attained, so that he may be able to decide
accurately whether God, who is blessed, can
possibly be active at one time, and cease to be
active at another time, or whether this is
impossible. This greatly adds to the difficulty of
this investigation, since our knowledge of the
essence of the First Cause is necessarily slight,
as has become manifest from the preceding.
Another point which makes this investigation
still more difficult is the circumstance that it is
hard to know from which essences or attributes of
existing things it is possible for us to attain to
the truth of this problem. For it is necessary that
a man, desirous of making this investigation
perfect, should know this at the very outset,
otherwise he can only attain to the truth thereof
by accident.
The statement of the philosopher, as recorded by
the author of the Guide, points to the
difficulty of this investigation. It is as follows:
'As for the things concerning which we have no
argument, and which are too high for us, our
statement about them is, according to this, as
difficult as our statement whether the world is
eternal or not.' This shows that this question was
considered extremely difficult by the philosopher,
so that he was perplexed and doubtful about it,
despite the numerous arguments he mentioned to
prove that the universe is eternal. The reason for
that is undoubtedly because the philosopher assumed
that there were numerous arguments likewise to
prove that the universe was created, and that his
own arguments did not in any way establish the
truth in this matter; and this is the very truth,
as will be explained further on. Now if this
question was considered difficult by the
philosopher, despite his high rank of wisdom, how
much more difficult would it be to other men who
are lower than he on the ladder of knowledge.
And indeed we find that the opinions of the
ancients concerning this investigation are
diametrically opposed to one another. Some maintain
that the universe was created and destroyed an
endless number of times. Others hold that it was
created only once; these are divided into two
opinions: some of them think that the universe was
created out of something, as, for instance, Plato
and the later philosophers who follow his doctrine;
while others think that the universe was created
out of absolute non-existence, as for instance the
early Mutakallimites, like Yahya the grammarian,
according to what Ibn Roshd recorded of him in his
commentary on the Metaphysics. In this
theory they were followed by the Mutakallimites.
The view was also adopted by the great philosopher,
the author of the Guide, and by many of the
sages of our religion. But there are still others
who maintain that the universe is eternal. This is
the theory of the philosopher and his followers. It
is evident that the cause of their disagreement
concerning these doctrines is the variety of
objects from which they derived their proofs with
regards to the nature of existing things, or
because they were compelled by the Torah, or
because of these two causes combined.
Excerpted from Milhamot
ha-Shem, by Gersonides
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The
Jewish Philosophy
Reader,
by
Daniel H. Frank
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