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The
Moral Life
by Borden Parker Bowne
That was not first which was spiritual, but that
which was natural, and afterward that which was
spiritual. But the spiritual is not something apart
from the natural, as a kind of detached movement;
it is rather the natural itself, rising toward its
ideal form through the free activity of the moral
person. The natural can be understood only through
the spiritual, to which it points; and the
spiritual gets contents only through the natural,
in which it roots.
As a consequence, the field of ethics is life
itself, and, immediately, the life that now is. And
our moral task is to make this life, so far as
possible, an expression of rational good-will. In
this work we have a double guide. Internally, we
have a growing moral ideal; externally, we have a
growing insight into the tendencies of conduct.
Neither of these can be deduced from the other, and
both are alike necessary.
For life has two poles. It demands for its
perfection both outward fortune and happiness and
inward worth and peace. A conditioned life like
ours cannot reach an ideal form, unless it be in
harmony both with its objective environment and
with its subjective ideals. Either of these
elements, when viewed apart from the other, is an
abstraction of theory, and a source of confusion,
if not a mischief. If we consider only the inner
worth and peace, ethics runs to leaves. If we
consider only the outer fortune and happiness,
ethics runs to weeds. There is no need to ask which
factor is first, as both should be first, last and
always.
The moral life finds its chief field in the
service of the common good. Neither virtue nor
happiness is attainable as a direct abstract aim.
It is a commonplace that happiness eludes direct
pursuit; and it is equally true, though less
generally recognized, that virtue is alike elusive.
Our nature acts spontaneously and normally only
when we are taken out of ourselves and our
attention is directed to our normal objects. The
man who is seeking to do as he would be done by,
and to love his neighbor as himself, is in a much
better way than the man who is engaged in
self-culture and the pursuit of virtue.
The greatest need in ethics is the impartial and
unselfish will to do right. With this will, most
questions would settle themselves; and, without it,
all theory is worthless. The selfish will is the
great source not only of wars and fightings, but
also of dishonest casuistry and tampering with
truth and righteousness. One bent on doing wrong
never lacks an excuse; and one seeking to do right
can commonly find the way.
Presupposing this will to do right, the great
need in ethical theory is to renounce abstractions,
as virtue, pleasure, happiness, and come into
contact with reality. Most of the theoretical
contentions of the world would vanish if brought
out of their abstraction. Mr. Mill did once suggest
that two and two might make five, but he prudently
located the possibility in another planet. That is,
it was a purely verbal doubt, which neither he nor
any one else ever dreamed of tolerating in concrete
experience. Ethics, in particular, has suffered
from this verbalism; and all the more because it is
a practical science, which has to do with life
rather than speculation. Concrete relations and
duties have been overlooked in the name of various
abstractions -- all of them thin and bloodless, and
admitting of endless verbal manipulation. It is in
this region of abstractions that most ethical
debate has been carried on. Hence its sterility of
anything but mischief. As Mr. Mill's doubt did not
touch practical arithmetic, so the doubts of the
ethical schools vanish before concrete matter. The
men of good will who are desirous of leading a
helpful and worthy human life will generally agree
in the great outlines, and also in the details, of
duty, whatever their ethical philosophy. And even
the tedious vaporers about the indifference of vice
and virtue succeed in believing their own whims
only so long as they keep clear of the concrete. A
blindness more than Judicial can easily be induced
concerning the facts of human life by bringing in a
few such terms as sin and plunging into the
labyrinths of theological controversy. So great is
the deceit of words! Hence the importance of
rescuing ethics from its abstractions and bringing
it into contact with life.
The great need of ethical practice, next to the
good will, is the serious and thoughtful
application of intellect to the problems of life
and conduct. As error arises less from wilful lying
than from indifference to truth, so misconduct and
social evils in general arise less from a will to
do wrong than from an indifference to doing right.
As of old, the "people do not consider;" and in the
ignorance thus engendered terrible things are done
or ignored. There is really moral life enough to
make vast and beneficent reforms, if the people
would only consider. And until they do consider we
must worry along in the old way, with an embryonic
conscience, drugged by custom and warped into
artificiality, while life is directed not by wise
and serious reflection, but by conflicting passion
and selfishness. We shall escape from this
condition only as we control the mechanical
drifting of thoughtlessness, and advance beyond the
narrowness of the conventional conscience, and
devote all our good will and all our intellect to
the rationalization and moralization of life.
We shall also do well to remember that
righteousness is nothing which can be achieved once
for all, whether for the individual or for the
community. The living will to do right must be ever
present in both, forever reaffirming itself and
adjusting itself to new conditions. The tacit dream
of the half-way righteous in both fields is that
some stage may be reached where the will may be
relaxed, and given a vacation. But this dream also
must be dismissed. Both individual and social
righteousness are likely long to remain militant.
As we are now constituted, righteousness cannot be
so stored away in habits as to dispense with the
continuous devotion of the living will. Especially
is this devotion demanded in social righteousness.
Here the error is perennial of thinking that
justice and wisdom may be so stored up in laws and
constitutions as to run of themselves, while the
citizens are left free to go to their farms and
merchandise. This is one of the most pernicious
practical errors of our time. Social righteousness
may be expressed in laws, but it lives only in the
moral vigilance of the people.
In a very important sense the respectable class
is the dangerous class in the community. By its
example it degrades the social conception of the
meaning of life, and thus materializes, vulgarizes,
and brutalizes the public thought. Also, by its
indifference to public duties, it constitutes
itself the guilty accomplice of all the enemies of
society. By this same indifference, too, it becomes
the great breeder of social enemies; for only where
the carcass is are the vultures gathered together.
The ease with which self-styled good people ignore
public duties and become criminal accomplices in
the worst crimes against humanity is one of the
humorous features of our ethical life.
In the application of principles to life there
will long be a neutral frontier on the borders of
the moral life, where consequences and tendencies
have not so clearly declared themselves as to
exclude differences of opinion among men of good
will. Here men will differ in judgment rather than
in morals. It is very common to exaggerate this
difference into a moral one; and then the humorous
spectacle is presented of friends who ignore the
common enemy and waste their strength in mutual
belaborings. This is one of the great obstacles to
any valuable reform.
Finally, in reducing principles to practice we
must be on our guard against an abstract and
impracticable idealism. Even in the personal life
conscience may be a measureless calamity, unless
restrained by a certain indefinable good sense.
Many principles look fair and even ideal when
considered in abstraction from life, which cannot,
however, be applied to life without the most
hideous or disastrous results. Here is the
perennial oversight of off-hand reformers and
socialistic quacks. Ethics when divorced from
practical wisdom prevents the attainment of its own
ends. The abstract ethics of the closet must be
replaced by the ethics of life, if we would not see
ethics lose itself in barren contentions and
tedious verbal disputes.
Excerpted from The Principles
of Ethics, by Borden Parker Bowne
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Representative
Essays of Borden Parker
Bowne,
by
Borden Parker Bowne
Essence
of Religion,
by
Borden Parker
Bowne
Personalism
and the Problems of Philosophy: An Appreciation of
the Works of Borden Parker
Bowne,
by
Ralph T. Flewelling
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