We may picture the world of reality as a
deep-flowing stream, the world of appearance is its
surface, below which we cannot see. Events deep
down int he stream throw up bubbles and eddies on
the surface of the stream. These are the transfers
of energy and radiation of our common life which
affect our senses and so activate our minds; below
these lie deep waters which we can only know by
inference. These bubbles and eddies show
atomicity....
Many philosophers have regarded the world of
appearance as a kind of illusion, some sort of
creation or selection of our minds which has in
some way less existence in its own right than the
underlying world of reality. Modern physics does
not confirm this view; the phenomena are seen to be
just a part of the real world which affects our
senses, while the space and time in which they
occur have the same sort of reality as the
substratum which orders their motions....
Because we have only complete photons at our
disposal, and these form blunt probes, the world of
phenomena can never be seen clearly and distinctly,
either by us or by our instruments. Instead of
seeing clearly defined particles clearly located in
space and execution, clear-cut motions, we see only
a collection of blurs, like a badly focused lantern
side....This is enough of itself to prevent our
ever observing strict causality in the world of
phenomena.
Each blur represents the unknown entity which
the particle-picture depicts as a particle, or
perhaps a group of such entities. The blurs may be
pictured as wave-disturbances, the intensity of the
waves at any point representing the probability
that, with infinitely refined probes at our
disposal, we should find a particle at that point.
Or again, we may interpret the waves as
representatives of knowledge -- they do not give us
pictures of a particle, but of what we know as to
the position and speed of motion of the particle.
Now these waves of knowledge exhibit complete
determinism; as they roll on, they show us
knowledge growing out of knowledge and uncertainty
following uncertainty according to a strict causal
law. But this tells us nothing we do not already
know. If we had found new knowledge appearing, not
out of previous knowledge but spontaneously and of
its own accord, we should have come upon something
very startling and of profound philosophical
significance; actually what we find is merely what
was to be expected, and the problem of causality is
left much where it was.
Excerpted from Physics and
Philosophy, by James. H. Jeans