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On
Reason
by Denis Diderot
Doubts in religious matters, far from being
blamable -- far from being acts of impiety, ought
to be regarded as praiseworthy, when they proceed
from a man who humbly acknowledges his ignorance,
and arise from the fear of offending God by the
abuse of reason.
To admit any conformity between the reason of
man, and the eternal reason of God, and to pretend
that God demands the sacrifice of human reason, is
to maintain that God wills one thing, and intends
another thing at the same time.
When God, of whom I hold my reason, demands of
me to sacrifice it, he becomes a mere juggler that
snatches from me what he pretended to give.
If I renounce my reason, I have no longer a
guide -- I must then blindly adopt a secondary
principle, and the matter in question becomes a
supposition.
If reason be a gift of Heaven, and we can
say as much of faith, Heaven has certainly
made us two presents not only incompatible, but in
direct contradiction to each other. In order to
solve the difficulty, we are compelled to say
either that faith is a chimera, or that
reason is useless.
Pascal, Nicole and others have said, that God
will punish with eternal torments the faults of a
guilty father upon all his innocent offspring; and
that this is a proposition superior to
reason, and not in contradiction to it; but
what shall we propose as being contradictory to
reason if such blasphemy as this is not so?
Bewildered in an immense forest during the
night, and having only one small torch for my
guide, a stranger approaches and thus addresses me:
-- "Friend, blow out they light if thou wouldst
make sure of the right path." This stranger was
a priest.
If my reason be the gift of Heaven, it is the
voice of Heaven that speaks; shall I hearken to
it?
Neither merit nor demerit is applicable to the
judgment of our rational faculties, for all the
submission and good will imaginable could not
assist the blind man in the perception of
colors.
I am compelled to perceive evidence where it is,
or the want of evidence where it is not, so long as
I retain my senses; and if my judgment fail me, it
becomes a misfortune, not a sin.
The Author of Nature would not reward me for
having been a wit, surely, then, he will not
damn me for having been a fool. Nay,
more; he will not damn me even for being
wicked. Is not my own conscience a sufficient
punishment for me?
Excerpted from Thoughts on
Religion, by Denis Diderot
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