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Value
and Validity
by Nicolai Hartmann
The so-called "relativity of values" is nothing
but the historical instability of their actuality
which results in the instability of validity. That
solves the puzzle why it is so often asserted that
the values themselves are relative. For validity
has always been considered the sort of being of the
values themselves. But that has been recognized as
an error, and therefore the relativity of the
"being valuable" is untenable.
Notwithstanding all regarding the change of the
real, there remains a definite kind of independence
of the value-character itself, or of the "being
valuable" (for instance the being valuable of a
certain manner of acting in certain circumstances).
This absoluteness is very evident in the fact of
the super-temporariness of the being valuable, even
if the valuable real is only ephemeral. It is an
error to think that only the eternal could have
eternal value. Just the transient has eternal
value. Its value-character is the eternal in it.
The value of a thing is as little dependent on its
duration as the truth of a proposition is dependent
on the flash or disappearance of the insight in
human minds.
Upon this footing, a synthesis of the right
value relativism and the right value-absolutism is
possible. If both of them limit themselves strictly
to the phenomena and refrain from constructing
theories, they can complete one another
harmoniously. Relativism may be satisfied with the
historical conditionality of actuality and
"validity," which is conceded by the adversary.
Absolutism, on its part, may be satisfied with the
continuance of the "being valuable," even when it
is not actual and not "valid," and that does not
affect the facts of historical relativity.
Both of these theories not only contain a truth
but are indispensable to each other. For only the
relativity of validity demonstrates the meaning of
independent continuance, and only that meaning can
make evident what relativity really is. Moreover,
only these two theories together can clarify the
mystery of the value-consciousness.
If the perception of values is dependent on
historical circumstances, it seems to be unreliable
for that reason. Since, however, we have no other
knowledge about values, that would mean that any
kind of comprehending values is uncertain. It
therefore is important to recognize that it really
does matter that certain values are at certain
times non-valid while they are valid at other
times. This phenomenon is clarified entirely by the
historical conditionality of actuality. This
expression is completed by Scheler's notion of
"value-blindness" and the notion of "narrowness of
the value-consciousness" introduced by myself. To
understand this phenomenon, we do not need the
assumption of a deceivableness of the valuing
feelings. It is sufficient to think that all
valuing feelings are limited as far as their
contents are concerned, incapable of comprehending
all of the values, and may become seeing only in
accordance with the degree of their maturing,
though conditional upon the historical change of
the shape of life. However, the valuing feeling can
grasp values only in accordance with the laws of
its own development.
The notion of "narrowness of the
value-consciousness" needs as its complementary
notion that of the "wandering of the valuing
glance" whose horizon is inside the plane of the
values. Seen from the realm of the values this
wandering means just the same as the historical
conditionality of "validity." For it is moving in
the course of time, and is dependent on the
changing conditions of life. For at any time the
consciousness is in touch with only a sector of the
realm of values. This sector is another one at any
time. The values themselves, however, remain
motionless.
Excerpted from Das
Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart
(Actes du Huitième Congres Internationale de
Philosophie, 1934.)
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