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On
Evolution
by Pierre Lecomte du Noüy
If we accept the idea of evolution, we must
recognize the fact that, on an average,
since the beginning of the world it has followed an
ascending path, always oriented in the same
direction. The objection has been made that many
transformations of animals did not constitute a
progress; the exaggerated development of the
antlers of a certain Cervidae, for instance. This
is true, and that is the reason why we suggest the
hypothesis of a finality comparable to gravitation
in the above analogy, that is to say, a
"telefinality" directing evolution as a whole.
There is no doubt that there have been trials of
all sorts, sometimes successful and sometimes
unsuccessful. If we imagine a goal to be attained,
acting like gravitation, once the start was given,
all possible combinations had to be tried and their
interest or their value proved b their reaction to
the environment. If the new forms were badly
adapted, incapable of serving as a starting point
for a new stage of evolution, if they were
surpassed by other strains, they disappeared
progressively, or vegetated, cut off from the
principal effort. The fate of the species itself
thus becomes a secondary issue. What matters is the
fate of the species considered as a link in
evolution as a whole. Prodigies of adaptation
were hardly more important than extraordinary
performances in the circus. Adaptation and natural
selection are no longer identified with evolution.
The latter is differentiated from the former by its
distant goal, which dominates all the species.
In this hypothesis, and in opposition to what
Darwin thought, the survival of the fittest can no
longer be considered as the origin of the
evolving strain, and the fittest of a certain line
can eventually give birth to a species destined to
disappear or vegetate if the external conditions
(climate, etc.), are modified or if other
individuals, more apt from the final teleologic
point of view, displace them.
Let us make this point quite clear: the
properties or qualities of living organisms are
not attributed to special principles as was
done by the old vitalist doctrines, but it is
simply assumed that a goal must be attained, by
means of the most varied methods, in conformity
with the physio-chemical laws and the ordinary
biological laws. Nature often has recourse to
chance, to probabilities, in living beings. Fish
lay hundreds of thousands of eggs, as if they knew
that, owing to the conditions under which these
eggs will hatch, ninety per cent of them are
destined to be destroyed.
We can no more consider evolutive
transformations separately than we can consider
physiological functions separately, if we aim to
understand the evolution of living beings or the
psychology of man.
In brief, evolution should be considered as a
global phenomenon, irreversibly progressive,
resulting from the combined activity of elementary
mechanisms such as adaptation (Lamarck), natural
selection (Darwin), and sudden mutations (Naudin --
de Vries). Evolution begins with amorphous living
matter or beings such as the Coenocytes, still
without cell structure, and ends in thinking Man,
endowed with a conscience. It is concerned
only with the principal line thus defined.
It represents only those living beings which
constitute this unique line zigzagging
intelligently through the colossal number of living
forms.
Evolution, we repeat, is comprehensible only if
we admit that it is dominated by a finality, a
precise and distant goal. If we do not accept the
reality of this orienting pole, not only are we
forced to recognize that evolution is rigorously
incompatible with our laws of matter, as we
demonstrated above, but -- and this is serious --
that the appearance of moral and spiritual ideas
remains an absolute mystery. Mystery for mystery,
it seems wiser, more logical and more intelligent
to choose the one which explains, thus satisfying
our need to comprehend; the one which opens the
doors to hope, rather than the one which closes
those doors and explains nothing.
Adaptation, natural selection, mutations are, on
the contrary, mechanisms which have contributed to
the slow edification of evolution without being
themselves always progressive. Strictly
speaking these mechanisms are not determining
factors in general evolution, any more than the
mason is a determining factor in the cathedral on
which he works. The mason represents, in himself, a
very complex element obeying physico-chemical,
biological, human, social laws. His sole contact
with the cathedral is his trowel, and from the
point of view of the architect, he is only a
trowel. His private life, his intimate tragedies,
his illnesses are immaterial. For the bishop, who
will the cathedral, the architect himself is but a
means. The same is true of the processes lumped
together under the generic name of "Mechanisms of
Evolution." Each one contributes materially,
statistically, to evolution, but the laws which
they obey are not really identical with those of
evolution which dominate and correlate them. In a
similar way, the laws which govern the movements of
particles in an atom are special and differ from
those which govern the chemical properties of the
atoms themselves. The latter are, as far as our
actual science is concerned, without qualitative or
quantitative relation to our psychological
activity. To extrapolate and predict that such a
relation will be discovered some day is not
substantiated by facts, and entirely
hypothetical.
Indeed, man must beware more of scientific
extrapolations than of moral ones, because his
scientific experience has been much shorter than
his psychological experience. New facts are
frequently found in science which compel him to
revise completely his former concepts. The history
of science is made up of such revolutions: the
atomic theory, the kinetic theory, the granular
theories of electricity, energy, and light,
radioactivity, relativity have successively
transformed our point of view from top to bottom.
The future of science is always at the mercy of new
discoveries and new theories. The science of matter
is not two hundred years old, while the science of
man is over five thousand years old. Empirical
psychology was highly advanced at the time of the
third Egyptian dynasty, and great philosophers
twenty-six hundred years ago displayed a knowledge
of man which has not been surpassed, but only
confirmed today. Therefore, it can be reasonably
assumed that moral extrapolations are much safer
than scientific ones, even though they cannot be
expressed mathematically.
Excerpted from Human
Destiny, by Pierre Lecomte du
Noüy
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