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The
Philosopher's View of Passion
by Arnold Geulincx
After philosophers noticed that the activities
of the mob are directed by passion, they resolved
to insist on a contrary conduct of life and tried
to act against their own passions. But, in doing
so, they became not wiser than the mob, though, in
a different, maybe more brilliant, manner, insane.
Thus they came to the same state of mind as the
mob, although sometimes by a sideways or roundabout
route.
Some of these philosophers endeavored to
extinguish all of their passions, as did the Cynics
and Stoics. That is evidently madness, for we
cannot extinguish passion without destroying our
whole body.
If there really is something that is permanently
certain, it is the certainty that passion cannot be
eliminated because it is a constituent of what is
good in human conditions. Passions are not bad.
Some of them are morally neutral, others are good
by nature, and we are obliged to tolerate them.
Just a little wiser are those philosophers who
are not prepared to extinguish all passions -- what
would be insane, impossible, inadmissible -- but to
omit or to suspend all actions which they consider
caused by passion. Plato belongs to this group.
In this regard we can discern four strata of
philosophers -- namely, first, Cynics and Stoics;
second, Platonists; and finally two schools of
mortification.
They all are acting against reason. They,
therefore, are themselves directed by passion. For,
whenever we act, we act deliberately, and our
impulse is either reason or any kind of
passion.
Excerpted from Ethica, by
Arnold Geulincx
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