|
Deism
and Theism
by John Laird
Certainly it may be argued that a creative God,
in the more usual sense of creation, is volitional
as well as intelligent, that mere intelligence may
be as much of an abstraction and as little of a
concrete reality in heaven as it is on earth, and
that there would be a shocking lack of intelligence
if an orderly world were created for any other
purpose than the bringing of beauty or of moral
excellence or of some other great value into
existence. If so, it might very justly be inferred
that the philosophy of a bolder and more opulent
theism is more readily defensible than the
precarious because over-cautious doctrines of a
spare, unadventurous deism.
From this point of view the appearance of
anthropomorphism may be simply another way of
saying that man, in the finer part of him, is made
in God's image and a little lower than the angels,
or, more modestly, that God is less inadequately
portrayed when he is represented as akin to man's
nobler attributes than when all such resemblance is
denied. Anthropomorphism itself, some would say, is
defensible, and theism is the stronger for
employing such conceptions.
However that may be, it is preposterous to
assert either that mere deism is the sum of
"natural" theology, or that there can be no
philosophical grounds for a theism that exceeds
mere deism. My plea for the recognition of deism in
natural theology is not conceived in any such
spirit, and I am anxious to say that it is not. On
the other hand, the deist's caution, even if it is
mistaken, should not be summarily condemned. His
reluctance to wander blithely and almost carelessly
on the resilient turf of familiar Christian
apologetics is reasoned and may not be
unreasonable. Deists may be illiberal and
short-sighted in their views, and their opponents
may be better cosmologists than they are; but even
a narrow cosmology may be better than a perfunctory
cosmology. If cosmology is an embarrassment to
theism, such a theism is self-condemned.
Deism, to be brief, is a species of
philosophical theism. It is a cosmological theory
of the origin and stability of the universe,
conceived upon principles that philosophical theism
may rightly decide to incorporate. It is bad policy
on the part of a theist to neglect what deists
assert through distaste for what more deists deny.
If deists draw their boundaries in the wrong
places, their mistake, as regards the philosophy of
it, has to be shown by philosophical argument to be
a mistake. It has also to be shown that there are
no similar boundaries in any other place for
example, regarding God's "personality"; and the
notion that there are such boundaries, to certain
apologists, is an idea almost as distasteful as
mere deism itself. Frontiers are obscured but not
removed by raising a dust in their
neighborhood.
Excerpted from Theism and
Cosmology, by John Laird
|
|