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Understanding
and Experience
by John Duns Scotus
When the evidence or the certitude of first
principles has been had, it is evident how
certitude may be had of conclusions inferred from
them, because of the evidence of the perfect forms
of the syllogism, since the certitude of the
conclusions depends only on the certitude of the
principles and inference.
But will not the understanding err in this
knowledge of principles and conclusions, if the
senses are deceived concerning all the terms? I
reply that, with respect to the knowledge, the
understanding does not have the senses for cause,
but only for occasion, for the understanding cannot
have knowledge of simples unless it has received
that knowledge from the senses: still, having
received it, it can compound simples with each
other by its own power; and if, from the relation
of such simples, there is a combination which is
evidently true, the understanding will assent to
that combination by its own power and by the power
of the terms, not by the power of the senses by
which it receives the terms from without...
Concerning things known by experience, I say
that although experience is not had of all
singulars, but of a large number, and that although
it is not always had but in a great many cases,
still one who knows by experience knows infallibly
that it is thus, and that it is always thus, and
that it is thus in all, and he knows that by the
following proposition reposing in the soul:
whatever occurs as in a great many things from some
cause which is not free, is the natural effect of
that cause, which proposition is known to the
understanding, even though it has accepted the
terms of it from erring senses; for a cause which
is not free cannot produce as in a great many
things an effect to the opposite of which it is
ordered, or to which it is not ordered by its form;
but a casual cause is ordered to the producing of
the opposite of the casual effect or to not
producing it: therefore nothing is the casual cause
in respect to an effect produced frequently by it,
and if it is not free, it is a natural cause.
That, however, this effect occurs by such a
cause producing as in a great many cases, this must
be learned by experience.
Here is Your Guide to Medieval
Philosophy
The
Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, by A.
S. McGrade
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The
Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, by Thomas
Williams
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