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CLASSICAL ESSAY |
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by Friedrich Schleiermacher
The intuition of the true and perfectly existent, in other words, of the eternal and unalterable, with which, as we have seen, every exposition of Plato's philosophy commenced, has its opposite pole in the equally general, and, to common thought and being, no less original and underived, intuition of the imperfectly existent, ever flowing and mutable, which yet holds bound under its form all action and thought as they can be apprehended in actual, tangible reality. Therefore the highest and most general problem of philosophy is exclusively this -- to apprehend and fix the essential in that fleeting chaos, to display it as the essential and good therein, and so, drawing forth to the full light of consciousness the apparent contradiction between those two intuitions, to reconcile it at the same time. This harmonizing process necessarily resolves itself into two factors, upon whose different relation to each other rests the difference of the methods. Setting out from the intuition of the perfectly existent to advance in the exposition up to the semblance, and thus, simultaneously with its solution, for the first time to awaken and explain the consciousness of this contradiction; this is, in relation to philosophy, the immediate way of proceeding. On the other hand, starting from the consciousness of the contradiction as a thing given to advance to the primary intuition as the means of its solution, and to lead up by force of the very necessity of such a mean toward it, this is the method which we have named the indirect or mediate, and which, being for many reasons especially suited to one who commences on ethical ground, is here placed by Plato in the center, as the true mean of connection and progressive formation from the original intuition, his elementary starting post, to the constructive exposition, the goal of his systematic conclusion. Now the relation which, in the sphere of nature, being and semblance or sensation bear to one another in this antithesis, is the same as that which in ethics exists between good and pleasure or feeling. Therefore the principal object for the second part of Plato's works, and their common problem, will be to show, that science and art cannot be discovered, but only a deceitful semblance of both must be ever predominant, so long as these two are exchanged with each other -- being with appearance, and good with pleasure. And advances are made to the solution of this problem naturally in a twofold way, yet without holding each course entirely apart in different writings: on the one hand, namely, that which hitherto had passed for science and art is laid bare in its utter worthlessness; on the other, attempts are made, from the very position of knowing and acknowledging that antithesis to develop rightly the essence of science and art and their fundamental outlines. The Gorgias stands at the head of this class, because it rather limits itself as preparatory to the former task, then ventures upon the latter; and starting entirely from the ethical side, attacks at both ends the confusion existing herein, fixing on its inmost spirit, as the root, and it is openly displayed, as the fruits. The remaining dialogues observe this general distinction: they partly go farther back in the observation of the scientific in mere seeming, partly farther forward in the idea of true science, and partly contain other later consequences of what is here first advanced in preparation. From this point, then, we observe a natural connection between the two main positions demonstrated to the interlocutors with Socrates in this dialogue. The first, that their pretensions to this possession of an art properly so called in their art of speaking are entirely unfounded; and the second, that they are involved in a profound mistake in their confusion of the good with the pleasant. And, from the same point likewise, the particular manner in which each is proved, and the arrangement of the whole, may be explained. For when it is the good that is under consideration, and the ethical object is predominant, truth must be considered more in reference to art than science, if, that is, unity is to be preserved in the work generally. And, moreover, it is art in its most general and comprehensive form that is here discussed, for the dialogue embraces everything connected with it, from its greatest object, the state, to its least, the embellishment of sensuous existence. Only, as his custom is, Plato is most fond of using the greater form as the scheme and representation of the general, and the less, on the other hand, as an example and illustration of the greater; that no one may lose himself, contrary to Plato's purpose, in the object of the latter, which can never be anything but a particular.
Excerpted from Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato, by Friedrich Schleiermacher |
Friedrich
Schleiermacher: Pioneer of Modern
Theology
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