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The Way
of Truth
by Parmenides
Come now, I will tell thee -- and do thou
hearken to my saying and carry it away -- the only
two ways of search that can be thought of. The
first, namely, that It is, and that it is
impossible for anything not to be, is the way of
conviction, for truth is its companion. The other,
namely, that It is not, and that something must
needs not be, that, I tell thee, is a wholly
untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is not
-- that is impossible -- nor utter it; for it is
the same thing that can be thought and that can
be.
It needs must be that what can be thought and
spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and
it is not possible for what is nothing to be. This
is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee back from
this first way of inquiry, and from this other
also, upon which mortals knowing naught wander in
two minds; for hesitation guides the wandering
thought in their breasts, so that they are borne
along stupefied like men deaf and blind.
Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same thing
and not the same is and is not, and all things
travel in opposite directions!
For this shall never be proved, that the things
that are not are; and do thou restrain thy thought
from this way of inquiry. Nor let habit force thee
to cast a wandering eye upon this devious track, or
to turn thither thy resounding ear or thy tongue;
but do thou judge the subtle refutation of their
discourse uttered by me. One path only is left for
us to speak of, namely, that It is. In it are very
many tokens that what is, is uncreated and
indestructible, alone, complete, immovable and
without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for
now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what
kind of origin for it will you look for? In what
way and from what source could it have drawn its
increase? I shall not let thee say nor think that
it came from what is not; for it can neither be
thought nor uttered that what is not is. And, if it
came from nothing, what need could have made it
arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it
either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the
force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself
from that which in any way is. Wherefore, Justice
does not loose her fetters and let anything come
into being or pass away, but holds it fast.
"Is it or is it not?" Surely it is adjudged, as
it needs must be, that we are to set aside the one
way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true
way), and that the other path is real and true.
How, then, can what is be going to be in the
future? Or how could it come into being? If it came
into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to
be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and
passing away not to be heard of.
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and
there is no more of it in one place than in
another, to hinder it from holding together, nor
less of it, but everything is full of what is.
Wherefore all holds together; for what is, is in
contact with what is.
Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty
chains, without beginning and without end; since
coming into being and passing away have been driven
afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the
same, and it rests in the self-same place; abiding
in itself. And thus it remaineth constant in its
place; for hard necessity keeps it in the bonds of
the limit that holds it fast on every side.
Wherefore it is not permitted to what is to be
infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if
it were infinite, it would stand in need of
everything.
Look steadfastly with thy mind at things afar as
if they were at hand. You cannot cut off what
anywhere is from holding fast to what is anywhere;
neither is it scattered abroad throughout the
universe, nor does it come together.
It is the same thing that can be thought and for
the sake of which the thought exists; for you
cannot find thought without something that is, to
which it is betrothed. And there is not, and never
shall be, any time other than that which is
present, since fate has chained it so as to be
whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things are
but the names which mortals have given, believing
them to be true -- coming into being and passing
away, being and not being, change of place and
alteration of bright color.
Where, then, it has its farthest boundary, it is
complete on every side, equally poised from the
centre in every direction, like the mass of a
rounded sphere; for it cannot be greater or smaller
in one place than in another. For there is nothing
which is not that could keep it from reaching out
equally, nor is it possible that there should be
more of what is in this place and less in that,
since it is all inviolable. For, since it is equal
in all directions, it is equally confined within
limits.
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World
of Parmenides,
by
Karl Raimund Popper
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