|
Soul-Life
by Rudolph Hermann Lotze
It is a strange and yet an intelligible pride
that our scientific illuminati take in requiring
for the explanatory reconstruction of reality in
thought no other postulates than an original store
of matter and force, and the unshaken authority of
a group of universal and immutable laws of Nature.
Strange, because after all these are no trifling
postulates, and because it might be expected to be
more in accordance with the comprehensive spirit of
the human reason to acknowledge the unity of a
creative cause than to have imposed on it as the
starling-point of all explanation the promiscuous
variety of merely actually existent things and
notions. And yet intelligible, for in return for
this single sacrifice the finite understanding may
now enjoy the satisfaction of never again being
overpowered by the transcendent significance and
beauty of any single phenomenon; however wondrous
and profound may appear to it any work of Nature,
those universal laws, which are to it perfectly
transparent, give it the means of warding off a
disagreeable impression, and, while proving how
perfectly it understands that even this phenomenon
is but an incidental result of a well-known order
of Nature, it succeeds in drawing within the limits
of its own finitude what to the unprejudiced mind
is conceivable only as a product of infinite
wisdom.
These tendencies and habits of scientific
culture it will be hard to shake, especially by the
arguments usually brought to bear on them by the
believers in a higher, intelligent guidance of the
course of Nature. For however distinctly unbiased
observation may suggest this belief, so that it may
seem alike foolish and tedious to attempt to
understand the order of Nature without it, the
supporters of the mechanical conception can always
with justice reply that nevertheless in the
explanation of details their road is always entered
by those who on the whole believe unquestioningly
in the government of an intelligent working power.
They, too, are not content till, for each result
ordained by this power, they have one by one traced
out the efficient means through whose necessary and
blind causal connection the required effect must be
brought about. Even they will never seriously
believe that within Nature as it lies patent to our
senses, this purposive power makes new beginnings
of working, such as, if traced further back, would
not always prove to be the necessary results of a
prior state of things. While thus even to those who
hold the more religious view, the course of events
is again converted into the unbroken chain of
mechanical sequence, from the scientific point of
view the latter alone is conspicuous, and the idea
of free action on the part of an intelligent force,
to which no sphere of action can be assigned, is
readily dropped. Science might be able to allow
that the origin of the whole, whose internal
relations alone form the subject of its
investigations, may be attributed to a Divine
Wisdom, but it would demand facts that, within the
sphere of experience, made a continuous dependence
of the creation on the preserving providence of its
author a necessary condition of explanation. Too
ingenuous and self-confident, the believers in this
living interference of reason "working towards an
end bring forward only the fair aspects of life,
and for the time forget its shadows; in their
admiration of the wondrous harmony of organized
bodies, and of their careful adaptation to the ends
of mental life, they do not think of the bitter
persistence with which this same organized life
transmits ugliness and disease from generation to
generation, or of the manifold hindrances that come
in the way of the attainment even of modest human
aims. How little, then, can this conception of the
universe -- to which the presence of evil is, if
not an insoluble, at least an unsolved problem --
hope by its assaults to overcome a habit of mind
that finds numberless special confirmations in
observation, and is inaccessible to any feeling of
the universal deficiency under which we suppose it
to labor!
And is it compelled to make even the
acknowledgment which it will perhaps make, that
this world of blind necessity came forth at least
primarily from the wisdom of a supreme creator?
Doubtless it can reply that even the purposiveness
of the present fabric, as it now is, could
certainly have been evolved from the confusion of
an original chaos under the sway of universal laws.
For all that was brought together by a planless
vortex, in unmeaning aggregation and without the
internal equilibrium of constituents and forces
that might have secured to it a longer existence in
the struggle with the onward-sweeping course of
external Nature: all this has long since perished.
Along with and after numberless unsuccessful
attempts at formation, which perhaps filled
primeval times in a rapid alternation of rise and
decay Nature gradually shrank into a narrower
channel, and only those select creatures were
preserved on which a happy combination of their
constituent parts had bestowed the power of
withstanding the pressure of surrounding stimuli,
and of propagating their kind throughout an
indefinite period. However little we may probably
esteem this theory, we could yet hardly snatch it
from those whom it satisfies, and we ourselves
cannot wholly disallow the charm that scientific
ingenuity will always find in the attempt to evolve
from the formless chaos of whirling motions the
necessity of a gradual sifting, and the spontaneous
formation of permanent forms of succession of
phenomena.
But all such attempts rest on the common
assumption that the universal sway of unchanging
laws prescribes the kind and amount of the
reciprocal actions engaged in by the several
substances of the original chaos, and thereby
compels them to withdraw from combinations in which
no equilibrium is possible, and to enter into
others in which they are at rest, or can retain a
constant mode of motion. This assumption it is
whose trustworthiness we must now test; with it
stands or falls the proud certainty of the
mechanical conception of the universe. Is this
veneration for an all-prevailing law of Nature, as
the only bond that forces the scattered elements of
the course of things into mutual active relations
and determines the character of their results,
itself a possible conception, and can it put the
finishing touch to our view of Nature, whose
perfecting in detail we ourselves have everywhere
looked to it to accomplish?
Let us suppose two elements originally in
existence, not produced by anything, not sprung
from any common source, existing from eternity as
things actual without any antecedents, but existing
so that they have no other community than that of
contemporaneous existence: how could the influence
of the one be communicated to the other, seeing
that each is as it were in a separate world, and
that between them there is nothing? How is the
efficacy of the one to make its way to the other
through this nothing, offering no means of
transmission? And if we suppose that the energy of
each element constantly diffused itself like a
separable atmosphere through a common space,
effective like the rays of light where it met with
anything on which to act, and floating idly in
vacuo where nothing presented itself, what should
we have gained? We would not understand our own
conception, either how the action could issue from
the limits of that in which it was generated; nor
how, floating for some interval of time between its
source and that which was to be its object, it
maintained itself in vacuo; nor, lastly, how, in
the end reaching the latter, it was able to exert a
transforming power over its states. For while space
would offer no obstacle to the mutual action of
that which, though separated by it, was yet united
by an inherent relation, contact in space would not
involve any necessity of reciprocal action, or
explain the possibility of it between beings each
of which in its complete self-dependence was
divided from the other by the impassable gulf of
inherent indifference. The transmission of action
from the one to the other seems simple only to him
who, looking at the question in a superficial,
commonplace way, thinks he can distinctly perceive
it in the external motions by which it is
accompanied; to any one examining it more deeply,
it becomes more and more inexplicable how the
condition of the one can contain a force compelling
the other to a change of its own internal states.
As, before, we were unable to follow our will in
its outflow into the moveable extremities, but had
to acknowledge that all volition remains confined
to the willing mind, and that the execution
following it is the work of an incomprehensible
power: in like manner all the forces which we
suppose in any form to inhere in the one element,
will be inadequate to give rise to an influence on
that in which they do not inhere. Now, can the
conception of the universal course of Nature
supplied by our previous speculations, can the idea
of a realm of eternally and universally valid laws,
fill this hiatus, and weld the brittle and isolated
fragments into the solid whole of a reciprocally
acting world?
Certainly it cannot; for how could laws exist of
themselves, as a necessity prescribing particular
results for particular cases? There can be nothing
besides being and its inherent states; and a
universal order, before that of which it is the
order has come into existence, cannot spring up
between beings as a self-existent background
holding them together, an efficient, controlling
power. If we look back on our human life, we shall
find that the laws of our social relations do not
exist beside and between us in independent reality,
are not powers to direct and control us from
without because there they are; they exist only in
the consciousness of the individuals who feel bound
by them; they receive sanction and reality only
through the actions of living persons; they are
nothing but the harmoniously and inwardly-developed
direction of many individual wills, which to the
later generalizing scrutiny of observation appears
as a highly externally-directing power because in
its common authority over many it no longer
presents itself as exclusively the product of one.
The laws of Nature may be superior to the
ordinances of the human mind; while the latter may
be gainsaid and disobeyed, the commands of the
former are unlimited and resistless; nevertheless
Nature cannot bring to pass what is
self-contradictory, or bestow independent existence
on that which can have its being only in and
through what is self-existent. We are apt to be led
astray in these speculations by a widely diffused
usage of thought and speech that exercises no
prejudicial effect on our judgment of the incidents
of daily life, in reference to which it has arisen.
We speak of ties uniting things, of relations into
which they enter, of an order which embraces them,
finally, of laws under whose sway they respectively
stand; and we hardly notice the contradiction
contained in these notions of relations lying ready
before the things came to enter into them, of an
order waiting to receive the things ordered,
finally, of ties stretched like solid threads -- of
a material that we could not describe -- across the
abyss that divides one being from another. We do
not consider that all relations and connections
exist only in the unity of observing consciousness,
which, passing from one element to another, knits
all together by its comprehensive activity, and
that in like manner all efficacious order, all
laws, that we are fain to conceive as existing
between things independently of our knowledge, can
exist only in the unity of the One that binds them
all together. Not the empty shadow of an order of
Nature, but only the full reality of an infinite
living being of whom all finite things are inwardly
cherished parts, has power so to knit together the
multiplicity of the universe that reciprocal
actions shall make their way across the chasm that
would eternally divide the several distinct
elements from one another. For action, starting
from one being, is not lost in an abyss of nothing
lying between it and another; but as in all being
the truly existent is one and the same, so in all
reciprocal action the infinite acts only on itself,
and its activity never quits the sure foundation of
being. The energizing of one of its parts is not
confined to that and isolated from the rest; the
single state has not to travel along an
indescribable path in order to seek another element
to which it may impart itself, nor has it to exert
an equally incomprehensible force in order to
compel that indifferent other element to
participate in it. Every excitation of the
individual is an excitation of the whole Infinite,
that forms the living basis even of the
individual's existence, and every one can therefore
act upon every other which has the same living
basis; for it is this which from the unity of its
own nature causes the finite event here to be
followed by its echo there. It is not anything
finite that out of itself as finite acts upon
something else; on the contrary, every stimulation
of the individual, seeing that it affects the
eternal basis that in it as in all, forms the
essence of its finite appearance, can through this
continuity of related being -- but through this
alone -- act upon the apparently remote.
We are not constrained to this recognition of an
Infinite Substance, that instead of an
unsubstantial and unreal law unites all things by
its actual reality, merely by admiration for single
spheres of phenomena, by whose special significance
we are impressed; nay, every example of reciprocal
action however insignificant, every instance of
causality, forces us, in order to understand the
possibility of a transference of influence, to
substitute for a merely natural connection a
substantial Infinite, containing unseparated the
manifold that in phenomenal existence is separated.
We could not seek such a bond between the
constituents of the living body alone, or between
body and soul preeminently, as if we did not need
it everywhere; on the contrary, seeing that we look
on all that happens, however it may be designated,
as but the manifested internal energy of a single
Infinite Being, the later course of our
speculations will carry us further from the
resuscitated mythology that, like the ancient
sagas, allots to certain distinguished phenomena
their special genii, and leaves the remaining
work-day reality to take care of itself.
For this Universal Being is not a mere bond, a
mere indifferent bridge, having no other office
than to form a way for the passage of action from
one element to another: it is at the same time the
sovereign power that for every antecedent fixes the
form and degree of its consequent, for each
individual the sphere of its possible activity, for
every single manifestation of the latter its
particular mode. We deceive ourselves when we
imagine we can derive the modes in which things act
on one another, as self-evident results, from the
particular properties that now constitute their
nature, and from the Joint influence of the
circumstances of each occasion. Honest
consideration, on the contrary, leads us to make
the acknowledgment that the effects actually
presented to us by experience are not to be got as
necessary conclusions from these premises alone,
however we may analyze and recombine their content,
but that an unknown power, as it were, having
respect to something that we do not meet with among
these prior conditions, has annexed to their form
the particular form of the result. The Infinite is
this secret power, and that to which it has respect
in the determination of results is its own presence
in all finite elements, by which the universe
receives the unity of a being, and on account of
which the course of its events must receive the
unity of a connected manifestation of the content
of that being. Every finite thing, therefore,
possesses the capability of action only in such
amount and such quality as it is permitted by the
Infinite to contribute to the realization of the
whole.
Excerpted from
Microcosmus, by Rudolph Hermann
Lotze
|
History
of Philosophy: From the Post-Kantian Idealists to
Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, by Frederick
Copleston
|