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On
Pleasure
by Epicurus
We must consider that of desires some are
natural, others vain, and of the natural some are
necessary and others merely natural; and of the
necessary some are necessary for happiness, others
for the repose of the body, and others for very
life. The right understanding of these facts
enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the
health of the body and (the soul's) freedom from
disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of
blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we
always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And
when this is once secured for us, all the tempest
of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature
has not to wander as though in search of something
that is missing, and to look for some other thing
by which he can fulfill the good of the soul and
the good of the body. For it is then that we have
need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the
absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel
pain), we no longer need pleasure. And for this
cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the
blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the
first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin
every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure
we return again, using the feeling as the standard
by which we judge every good.
And since pleasure is the first good and natural
to us, for this very reason we do not choose every
pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many
pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as
the result of them: and similarly we think many
pains better than pleasures, since a greater
pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for
a long time. Every pleasure then because of its
natural kinship to us is good, yet not every
pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also
is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to
be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the
consideration of advantages and disadvantages we
must form our judgment on all these matters. For
the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and
conversely the bad as good.
And again independence of desire we think a
great good -- not that we may at all times enjoy
but a few things, but that, if we do not possess
many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine
persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in
luxury who least need it, and that all that is
natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is
superfluous is hard. And so plain savors bring us a
pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the
pain due to want is removed; and bread and water
produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs
them puts them to his lips. To grow accustomed
therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us
health to the full, and makes a man alert for the
needful employments of life, and when after long
intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better
towards them, and fits us to be fearless of
fortune.
When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is
the end, we do not mean the pleasures of
profligates and those that consist in sensuality,
as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or
disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom
from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.
For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings,
nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of
fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which
produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning,
searching out the motives for all choice and
avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which
are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.
Of all this the beginning and the greatest good
is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious
thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are
sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us
that it is not possible to live pleasantly without
living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor
again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and
justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues
are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and
the pleasant life is inseparable from them.
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