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Logical
Positivism & the Analytic Movement
SOME MAJOR
PHILOSOPHERS
Moritz
Schlick
(1882-1936)
Born in Berlin, Schlick (picture)
studied physics at Heidelberg, Lausanne, and
Berlin, taught at Rostock and Kiel, and from 1922
was professor of inductive sciences at Vienna. As a
philosopher, he was one of the leaders of the
Vienna Circle of logical positivists.
When, in 1936 a lunatic murdered Professor
Schlick, many of the numerous admirers of the
assassinated scholar considered it a particularly
tragic irony that this nonsensical misdeed put an
end to a life that was devoted to the inquiry into
the meaning of life.
Schlick's aim was not the construction of a
system of ideas or thoughts but the investigation
of the way of philosophizing that satisfies the
demands of the most scrupulous scientific
conscience. This task involved skill in seeing
through wrongly set problems and in surveying the
consequences of wrong approaches to them, and
Schlick himself was never afraid of abandoning
previously elaborated views when, in the course of
his development, he recognized their falsehood.
The principal results of Schlick's thinking are:
a distinct demarcation between experience which is
immediate and knowledge which is no vision but
rather calculation and organization by means of
concepts and symbols, and, furthermore, a new
foundation of empiricism, which leans upon Berkeley
and Hume but profits from modern logic. Reality is
defined as happening in time. Every Real has a
definite place in time. The task of science is to
obtain knowledge of reality, and the true
achievements of science can neither be destroyed
nor altered by philosophy. But the aim of
philosophy is to interpret these achievements
correctly and to expound their deepest meaning.
Schlick was fundamentally a man who preferred
aesthetic contemplation to exact science. But as a
thinker he was convinced of the unique
philosophical significance of natural science, and
he branded it as a grave mistake to believe that
the arts and cultural sciences are in any way
equivalent to natural science.
In The Radical
Academy
Elsewhere On The
Internet
Hans
Reichenbach
(1891-1953)
Reichenbach (picture)
was born in Hamburg, Germany, and became a
professor of philosophy at Berlin (1926-1933),
Istanbul (1933-1938), and Los Angeles (from 1938).
He was an early associate of the Vienna School of
logical positivists, and with Rudolph Carnap
founded the journal Erkenntnis in 1930
(which reappeared in 1975 in the United
States).
Reichenbach belongs to a generation of
scientists who began to study after most of their
teachers had already abandoned the concepts of
classical physics; thus they were able to start
with ideas and modes of thought found by their
predecessors after much hardship, trial and error.
Reichenbach, however, has actively participated in
the further advance of science and philosophy. His
contributions have been discussed by the greatest
contemporary scientists and philosophers with
respect if not with general consent, and are
recognized either as real contributions or at least
as working hypotheses or useful suggestions.
At first, Reichenbach was preoccupied with the
clarification of the concepts of space and time,
their relations, and the way of assimilating one to
another. As a theorist of knowledge, Reichenbach
comes in his own way closer to the methods of the
Vienna Circle, but he even more vigorously insists
that all our knowledge is only probable. The
doctrine of probability, advanced by R. von Mises
and Reichenbach, is based on the concept of
"frequency," a statistical concept. Every
definition of induction is involved in this
doctrine. Induction is described as a process of
predicting future events with the aid of
propositions of probability which serve as
instruments of indication. Reichenbach objects to
classical logic that it classifies propositions
according to their truth or falsity instead of
lower or higher degrees of probability. He holds
that true logic is probability logic, and has
presented his views in Doctrine of
Probability (1935) and Experience and
Prediction (1938).
In his Elements of Symbolic Logic (1947),
Reichenbach acknowledges classical logic as the
"mother of all logics" and admits that it can be
carried through in the sense of approximation, even
if refined analysis demands probability logic.
In The Radical
Academy
Elsewhere On The
Internet
Rudolf
Carnap
(1891-1970)
Rudolf Carnap was a German-American philosopher
who was one of the members of the Vienna Circle, a
group associated with logical positivism. After
teaching at the universities of Vienna and Prague,
he accepted a position at the University of Chicago
in 1935. From 1952 he was at the Institute for
Advanced Study, Princeton, and in the philosophy
department of the University of California at Los
Angeles.
Regarding his thought...
- In many of his works, Carnap constructs
model languages that employ the notation of
symbolic logic;
- In discussing these languages, he claims to
be explicating various philosophical concepts
and solving certain philosophical problems;
- He views the latter essentially as problems
of syntax and semantics;
- The metaphysician is seen as a poet who
strives to clothe his poetry in the language of
reason;
- In one of his most influential books, The
Logical Syntax of Language (1934; Eng.
trans., 1937), he characterizes philosophy as a
branch of logic;
- In his view, propositions that seem to be
about kinds of entities, such as numbers and
qualities, are actually linguistic
utterances;
- Thus "Five is not a thing but a number" must
be translated as "the word 'five' is not a
thing-word but a numerical expression."
Elsewhere On the
Internet
Bertrand
Russell
(1872-1970)
Bertrand Russell (picture)
was one of the most influential philosophical
thinkers of the 20th century. Orphaned at three, he
was reared by his puritanically religious but
politically liberal paternal grandmother. He
rebelled early against her rigid moral views, but
her otherwise progressive beliefs influenced his
later social thinking.
Some Highlights of His Very Interesting
Life
- Russell was educated at Trinity College
(1890-94), Cambridge University, and remained
there as a fellow (1895-1901) and lecturer
(1910-16) until he was dismissed because of his
active defense of unpopular causes such as
socialism and his opposition to World War
I.
- In 1918 he was imprisoned for his radical
pacifism.
- Russell traveled, wrote, and lectured widely
in Great Britain and the United States in the
interwar period.
- During the 1930s he modified his commitment
to pacifism to acknowledge the necessity to
oppose Nazi Germany.
- Reelected a fellow at Trinity in 1944,
Russell resumed his pacifist stance in the
postwar years and was especially vigorous in his
denunciation of nuclear weapons.
- He founded the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (1958) and the Committee of 100
(1960) as his advocacy of civil disobedience
became progressively stronger in the antinuclear
movement.
- As a further outlet for his political views
he participated (1964) in the organization of
the Who Killed Kennedy Committee, questioning
the findings of the Warren Commission concerning
the assassination of U.S. president John F.
Kennedy.
- Together with Jean Paul Sartre, he organized
(1967) the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in
Stockholm, which was directed against the U.S.
military effort in Vietnam.
- In addition to his political involvements,
Russell took an active interest in moral,
educational, and religious issues. His religious
views, as set forth in his book Why I Am Not
a Christian (1927), were considered
controversial by many.
- In 1931, Russell and his second wife (he
married four times) founded the experimental
Beacon Hill School, which influenced the
founding of similarly progressive schools in
England and the United States.
Throughout his life Russell was a prolific and
highly regarded writer in many fields, ranging from
logic and mathematics to politics to short works of
fiction. In 1950 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for
literature. His private life was characterized by
many disappointments and unsuccessful personal
relationships, however. He scorned easy popularity
with either right or left and exhibited an
unbreakable faith in the power of human reason.
Russell remained active and wrote extensively until
his death at the age of 97. The most interesting
account of his life is contained in his
autobiography (3 vols., 1967- 69). He outlined his
intellectual history in My Philosophical
Development (1959).
Although he had many preoccupations, Russell's
primary contribution lay in philosophy, most
particularly in logic and the theory of
knowledge:
- His early philosophical views grew out of a
concern to establish a vigorous logical
foundation for mathematics, a concern that
produced Principles of Mathematics
(1903). Building on the work of Gottlob Frege,
Giuseppe Peano, and others, Russell argued that
arithmetic could be constructed from purely
logical notions and the concepts of "class" and
"successor."
- In Principia Mathematica (3 vols.,
1910-13), written with Alfred North Whitehead,
this program was carried out in detail. Even
when disagreeing with Russell, contemporary
logicians and philosophers of mathematics
acknowledge Principia to be the most
important treatise on logic of the 20th
century.
Russell used the rigorous methods of formal
logic for a wide variety of problems.
- His "theory of descriptions" in particular
has been called a model of philosophical
reasoning.
- The argument concerns the meaning of
referring to nonexistent objects, such as "the
present king of France."
- Russell's solution is to say that the
logical form of the statement is obscured by its
grammatical form and that analysis displays a
description coupled with a false assertion of
existence.
Russell was seriously concerned with the
application of logical analysis to epistemological
questions and attacked this problem by trying to
break down human knowledge into minimum statements
that were verifiable by empirical observation,
reason, and logic:
- He was deeply convinced that all facts,
objects, and relations were logically
independent, both of one another and of our
ability to know them, and that all knowledge is
dependent on sense experience.
- With G. E. Moore, his former pupil Ludwig
Wittgenstein, and others, Russell helped guide
postwar British philosophy in a more positivist
direction, focusing on the logical analysis of
philosophical propositions and on the language
of everyday life.
- Russell's basic position, which he first
formulated in Our Knowledge of the External
World (1914), is referred to as logical
atomism, by which he meant that all propositions
(statements about experienced reality) can be
broken down into the logically irreducible
subpropositions and terms that constitute
them.
- By combining and recombining these logically
independent and discrete terms, we can describe
reality as something that occurs at the point of
such combinations, called the point event.
- Another aspect of this argument showed that
the logical and grammatical meaning of sentences
do not always coincide; Russell insisted that
the logical meaning should take precedence.
Difficulties of analysis led Russell to give up
many of the characteristic theses of logical
atomism, and with his Analysis of Mind
(1921) and Analysis of Matter (1926) he
shifted to what has been called neutral monism:
- In this phase Russell combines a stringent
empiricism with an optimistic view of the
progress of science that leads to the conception
of philosophy as a piecemeal analysis of the
findings of science.
- His examination of the bases of scientific
method culminated in Human Knowledge, Its
Scope and Limits (1948).
Throughout his life Russell acknowledged
difficulties in his positions and was ready to
admit criticisms and modify his views. While
ranging over an immense field, Russell demonstrated
an openness to ideas, an aversion to dogma, and a
rigor in analysis that more than justify his
position, with Moore and Wittgenstein, as a
fountainhead of 20th-century English and American
philosophy.
In The Radical
Academy
Elsewhere On the
Internet
Alfred
J. Ayer
(1910-1989)
Sir Alfred Ayer was an English philosopher
instrumental in introducing the ideas of logical
positivism into English philosophy with his book
Language, Truth, and Logic (1936).
Influenced by the thought of Bertrand Russell,
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the earlier empiricism of
George Berkeley, Ayer held that philosophy's
essential concern is the analysis of language
rather than the construction of systems of
metaphysics. He denied that metaphysical statements
can be meaningful and regarded theology and the
value statements of ethics and aesthetics as merely
expressions of emotion.
Ayer's later work, primarily concerned with
epistemology and philosophical methodology,
reflected more of the traditional emphases of
British empiricism, but with a linguistic approach
to problems:
- The Foundations of Empirical
Knowledge (1940) is concerned with questions
of knowledge of the external world.
- The Problem of Knowledge (1956)
considers various kinds of skepticism and
emphasizes a reliance on common sense.
Other works include:
- The Origins of Pragmatism
(1968);
- Russell and Moore and the Analytic
Heritage (1971);
- Part of My Life (1977);
- More of My Life (1984);
- Wittgenstein (1985), and
- Thomas Paine (1988).
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