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Some Important Issues in Philosophy |
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A Philosophical Interpretation of the Data of Modern Science
by Francis J. Klauder, S.D.B., Ph.D.
In this article I intend to retain a basically Thomistic approach in interpreting the data of modern science. However, at the same time I will feel free to draw from the implications of modern science a new application of some Thomistic principles and concepts. Similarly, without accepting en bloc the modern world view of Teilhard de Chardin, I will employ points of view adapted from his vision. The first thing to present is a review of relevant concepts of St. Thomas Aquinas and Teilhard de Chardin for the task at hand. Then a summary of data from modern science will be in order. Finally my proposed synthesis will follow in last place. It is well known that St. Thomas Aquinas adopted a realistic view of the material universe. However, he explains the material universe in terms of related metaphysical (suprasensible) principles. He succumbs neither to idealism nor to materialism. In regard to the individual material thing he maintains a similar balance between two extreme points of view. Rejecting in advance Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi, he holds to the reality of the individual material thing. Every material thing of the substantial order (e.g., a man, a dog, a tree, or the like) has its own singular mode of existence outside the human perceiver. Thomas calls this principle of extramental, singular existence by the same of subsistence or (in the phraseology of Cajetan) a substantial mode of existence. This principle is needed to explain not only material things but also spiritual ones. Subsistence in each thing (whether spiritual or material) is a relational principle, i.e., it implies some kind of essence (form) existing, while explicitly denoting the singularity of each thing. Thus each thing is singular and distinct while at the same time it is a member of the community of finite beings which all depend on God, the Subsisting Being. Spiritual things (which are purely spiritual forms) are essential imitations of God's infinite (spiritual) essence, as understood by His infinite intellect. They are modeled on God's ideas of Himself. They are intelligent "images" of God. Through subsistence each spirit is someone distinct from every other spirit, while essentially it is a different "species" or type of angel, who cannot be multiplied because of the absence of matter in angels. Material things are constituted by intelligible forms modeled on God's ideas and understanding of matter. Matter is not pure and simple spirit like an angel, but multipliable. Here St. Thomas postulates something more than subsistence for a full explanation of the individuation of singular things. Since the essence of a material thing must include matter, and since matter includes quantity, a material individual needs the further determination of dimensions or parts in order to be a complete, singular thing. However, when St. Thomas speaks of matter under dimensions or matter under quantity (matter with parts), he is not referring to the purely accidental and extrinsic characteristics and measurements of quantity as we usually find it. He is referring to something deeper, something intangible and suprasensitive, viz., a plurality of parts, which his commentators came to call intrinsic quantity. Such are the parts, for example, of a resurrected body which does not occupy space and exists in a manner alien to our present experience. Or again, such are the parts of the Lord's Body in the Eucharist, which is present in the manner of a spirit and beyond our comprehension. So, then, in the last analysis, a "body" does not consist in the localized, tangible and measurable parts that it may have at any given time but in the principle of plurality from which those manifested parts proceed. In the context of our present discussion, therefore, the phrases intrinsic quantity, plurality of parts, and principle of plurality are to be taken as synonymous. In a word, by these phrases we mean the radical source of "parts," taking "parts" in a deeper and applied sense, analogous to (but not identical with) the localized "parts" of daily experience. I must make it very clear from the outset that I am taking "parts" in the sense just indicated. We are so accustomed to think of "parts" in terms of localized and measured quantity that we might forget a more fundamental meaning of "parts" described as follows in the first entry under this title in Webster's dictionary -- "one of the often indefinite or unequal subdivisions into which something is or is regarded as divided and which together constitutes the whole." In a word, I am taking "part" in the basic meaning of its relationship to a whole. When I say "principle of plurality," therefore, I imply an actual whole with parts, but as yet not manifested in an outward and localized way. The "principle" or "whole," then, has actual parts which can become known to us only by their outward manifestations at any given time. But we can also speak of "potential" parts in such a "principle" since any one or several of the actual parts can be made the basis of a new "whole." This happens, for instance, in the formation of living things from living things, when there arises a new organism whole actual parts were only potentially present in the original being from which it has been derived. Neither materialistic nor idealistic, Thomistic philosophy steers a steady course between two extremes. As noted in the previous paragraphs a material thing is explained by St. Thomas in terms that are far removed from both materialism and idealism. Matter is radically neither local extension (materialism) nor perceived modes of thought (idealism), but consists of really related principles. An existing material thing (a "supposit") implies these related principles: existence, essence (intelligible form implying a plurality of parts), and the bond of unity between the two, making each thing singular and unique (subsistence). These principles, which only the mind can grasp, are nevertheless considered as objectively constituting an individual thing, of which our senses reach only the sensible appearances or manifestations. Act and Potency We should note the rich, wide and extended use that the philosophy of St. Thomas makes of the Aristotelian concepts of act and potency. These concepts, while not pointing to "things" as such, point to the real principles of being in the ontological, as distinguished from the logical order. We cannot overemphasize the objectivity of these principles with their analogous applications in the universe of being. No being, whether material or spiritual, can be actual except through the perfection of existence, which is its primary act. In respect to this perfection, every finite essence (even an angelic one) is potency. No creature, however perfect, exists of its own nature. Furthermore, St. Thomas clearly distinguishes essence from existence in every finite being and sees each individual being as a union of these two principles. Each individual is unique because of the singular and unique way that its essence exists. This unique mode of existence, proper to each thing, is call subsistence and through it St. Thomas accounts for the singularity of each being, which is always found as something distinct existing in a given nature. All being is ultimately explained by these three principles in the existential order -- existence, its singular mode, and essence. Thus St. Thomas extends the Aristotelian concepts of act and potency to the whole of existential reality, without rejecting the applications Aristotle made of the same principles to explain the essence of material reality, to be treated in the next section. In the concrete order, as distinguished from the abstract consideration of reality, St. Thomas used the word supposit to explain an actually existing, singular essence or substance. Here, too, he gave new insight to the Aristotelian understanding of substance. Substance, abstractly considered, consists of all the underlying, essential elements that are necessary for a thing. It implies an independent mode of existence (subsistence) for that thing. For St. Thomas, supposit (as distinguished from substance) not only implies but explicitly denotes such a being. Here again St. Thomas points to the existential order of singular things. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas argue that a clear distinction must be made between substance and accident, or the substantial (essential) and accidental. The intelligence alone can reach the former, even while using sense knowledge. Instead sense knowledge, though interpreted by the intelligence, reaches the merely accidental. Against the background of these principles clearly indicated by St. Thomas, Thomistic philosophers have made three analogous applications of the terms, act and potency. In the order of created being, existence is act and essence is potency. In the order of material essences, form is act and matter is potency. In the accidental order, an accident is act and substance is potency. It is important to understand the basic meaning that these concepts retain even when applied in different contexts. For our purposes at present it will be sufficient to point out the meaning of "form" and "matter" as constituting the essence of a material thing. The "form" is the principle of activity in a thing; it is an intelligible principle -- something the mind can take hold of, as it were, and grasp; hence it exists both in the thing and in the mind, thought not in the same way, abstractly in the mind, concretely in the thing. Our understanding of this "principle" will vary according to the manifestation and development of the principle itself and according to the perfection and growth of our knowledge about that principle. There is no correspondence of the "way" that it exists in the thing and the "way" that it exists in the mind. But there is a correspondence between what the thing is in reality, and what we understand by "form." The term "form" points to an objective principle. Similarly, "matter." Matter is basically the capacity to receive intelligible forms. It is a principle of passivity and multiplicity. If considered without reference to form ("primary" matter), it is unintelligible. If considered in conjunction with a form, it becomes intelligible as a principle related to form as potency to act. To speak, therefore, of "actual" matter is to speak of matter under a form. The Essence of Matter At this point we must retrace our steps somewhat and ask the questions: What, then is the essence of a material thing? St. Thomas adopted the classic answer of Hylomorphism. Abstractly and essentially considered, every material thing consists in a composition of a purely indeterminate principle (primary matter) and a substantial form (an essential "act" which makes a thing the kind of thing it is). Earlier in his career St. Thomas accepted a more radical position, one associated with the Augustinian and Franciscan school. According to this position, before a body can be a developed kind of body, it must before all else acquire the perfection of being a body in the first place. That is, a body must contain a positive principle that makes it a body, i.e., a principle of plurality which is capable of taking on different forms. Thus the principle of plurality or intrinsic quantity (which St. Thomas later considered accidental though necessary for a body) entered into the very essence of matter. The point, then, that I wish to emphasize is that, although in his final position, St. Thomas rejected such a principle of plurality (or plurality of parts) as forming the abstract essence of matter, he considered plurality of parts as an indispensable and necessary property of every material thing, entering into its very individuation as a singular being. Only individual things exist, and St. Thomas agreed with Aristotle that "primary matter" is "pure potency" which never did nor ever could exist alone. Similarly, "forms" of matter do not exist alone, but in conjunction with matter. In any case no form of matter can exist in the real world without parts and without a singular mode of existence. Original Matter The question that arises at this point is: What, then, did God create in the very beginning of time? On the one hand, we have to answer, with St. Thomas: not primary matter in the sense of "pure potency." On the other hand, whatever He created, it had to be something singular with parts. What was it? We know how St. Augustine unsuccessfully wrestled with the condition of original matter, calling it "formless matter" which St. Thomas could not accept. St. Bonaventure, however, made a significant compromise, which I believe is helpful as we try to unravel the mysterious nature of matter. St. Bonaventure, though conceding that "absolutely" formless matter is an absurdity, looked upon original matter as created with the "capacity" for forms. The very capacity for form (he said) is itself a kind of form. Original matter -- the source of the multiplicity in the world -- was essentially something multipliable by its very nature and capacity. And thus, all matter (as matter) has a "fundamental form" by which it has parts able to be multiplied. St. Bonaventure identifies this "fundamental form" with extension. Thus, the plurality of parts or intrinsic quantity, which St. Thomas considered as necessary, yet accidental to matter, enters into the very essence of matter according to St. Bonaventure. Further, to complete his understanding of matter as something with parts, Bonaventure considered it as dynamic and active. Matter is thus a dynamic principle of multiplicity. Here let us summarize. Matter, for St. Thomas, is essentially and abstractly pure potency, yet every existing material thing implies parts as necessary to it and existing under some form. St. Bonaventure considers matter as something dynamic, positive and actual, a reality whose basic constitution includes extension and potential multiplicity. For both Saints, in any case, we always find matter not only with multipliable parts, but also linked with a dynamic source of activity called its form or act. What, then, did God create in the beginning? For St. Thomas, the answer was in terms of definite kinds of beings like water, fire, air and earth. For St. Bonaventure, it was something much more radical, viz., an actually existing dynamic source of material things -- a basic form of matter with parts capable of being multiplied and capable of multiple forms. Every definite kind of thing known to us is basically a "portion" or "part" of this fundamental material, which lies beyond sensible experience.
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