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What Is
Wrong With Descartes' Philosophy?
It is from the views of Descartes that
most of the metaphysical systems of the last three
centuries begin, trying to improve upon them, or to
overcome what they regard as difficulties in the
Cartesian system.
Background study: The
Philosophy of René Descartes
René
Descartes is responsible for the
predominance of the problem of human knowledge in
modern philosophy. Many of the systems of
philosophy and theories of knowledge which have
arisen in the last three centuries can trace their
lineage directly to the influence of the questions
Descartes raised and the method he employed in
answering them. He promulgated the principle of
"science without presuppositions" and thereby
introduced a new epoch in science and philosophy.
It will, therefore, not be amiss to analyze his
fundamental ideas and evaluate his method.
As his starting point Descartes begins with the
contention that we rely entirely too much on
traditional doctrines and spontaneous convictions,
so that our supposed knowledge of truth rest mostly
on unproved presuppositions. This makes it
difficult for us to distinguish between truth and
error, since we do not know what is true knowledge
and what is unwarranted belief. Hence, he would
tear down the whole edifice of knowledge and
rebuilt it from the foundation, and he would not
begin to build until he had reached the one and
ultimate truth which the bedrock of human
knowledge.
Methodic
Doubt
Being a mathematician, Descartes felt convinced
that he could deduce all truth from a single
fundamental principle. As the instrument of his
search for truth he used a universal methodic
doubt. His own words will best reveal his line
of thought.
- I. In order to seek
truth, it is necessary once in the course of our
life, to doubt, as far as possible, of all
things.
-
- As we were at one time
children, and as we formed various judgments
regarding the objects presented to our senses,
when as yet we had not the entire use of our
reason, numerous prejudices stand in the way of
our arriving at the knowledge of truth; and of
these it seems impossible for us to rid
ourselves, unless we undertake, once in our
lifetime, to doubt of all those things in which
we may discover even the smallest suspicion of
uncertainty.
-
- II. We ought also to
consider as false all that is
doubtful.
-
- Moreover, it will be
useful likewise to esteem as false the things of
which we shall be able to doubt, that we may
with greater clearness discover what possesses
most certainty and is easiest to
know.
-
- III. We ought not
meanwhile to make use of doubt in the conduct of
life...
-
- IV. Why we may doubt
of sensible things.
-
- Accordingly, since we
now only design to apply ourselves to the
investigation of truth, we will doubt, first,
whether of all the things that have ever fallen
under our senses, or which we have ever
imagined, any one really exists; in the first
place, because we know by experience that the
senses sometimes err, and it would be imprudent
to trust too much to what has even once deceived
us; secondly, because in dreams we perpetually
seem to perceive or imagine innumerable objects
which have no existence. And to one who has thus
resolved upon a general doubt, there appear no
marks by which he can with certainty distinguish
sleep from the waking state.
-
- V. Why we may also
doubt of mathematical
demonstrations.
-
- We will also doubt of
the other things we have before held as most
certain, even of the demonstrations of
mathematics, and of their principles which we
have hitherto deemed self-evident; in the first
place, because we have sometimes seen men fall
into error in such matters, and admit as
absolutely certain and self-evident what to us
appeared false, but chiefly because we have
learned that God who created us is all-powerful;
for we do not yet know whether perhaps it was
His will to create us so that we are always
deceived, even in the things we know best: since
this does not appear more impossible than our
being occasionally deceived, which, however, as
observation teaches us, is the case. And if we
suppose that an all-powerful God is not the
author of our being, and that we exist of
ourselves or by some other means, still, the
less powerful we suppose our author to be, the
greater reason will we have for believing that
we are not so perfect as that we may not be
continually deceived...
-
- VII. We cannot doubt
of our existence while we doubt, and this is the
first knowledge we acquire when we philosophize
in order.
-
- While we thus reject
all of which we can entertain the smallest
doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we
easily indeed suppose that there is neither God,
nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves have
neither hands nor feet, not, finally, a body;
but we cannot in the same way suppose that we
are not while we doubt of the truth of these
things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving
that what thinks does not exist at the very
moment when it thinks. Accordingly, the
knowledge, "I think, therefore, I am," is
the first and most certain that occurs to one
who philosophizes orderly. (1)
This is indeed a most radical procedure, a
veritable revolution of method. Descartes applied
the method of universal doubt to "all things,"
attempting to empty the mind completely of all
traditional views, preconceived ideas, and
spontaneous convictions without exception. Nothing
is allowed to remain, no matter how seemingly clear
and evident. Even the simplest arithmetical and
geometrical problem is not permitted to stand, like
"2+3=5" and "a square has but four sides." As he
expresses himself: "How do I know that I am not
also deceived each time I add together two and
three, or number the sides of a square, or form
some judgment still more simple, if more simple
indeed can be imagined?" (2)
Not only the whole physical world, our own body,
sense-perception, and the internal states of our
consciousness, are thus drawn into universal doubt,
but also the trustworthiness of our cognitive
faculties and the fundamental laws of
thinking, like the principle of sufficient
reason and the principle of contradiction. This a
most important feature of his method that must not
be overlooked.
Descartes' universal methodic doubt is not
merely simulated for the sake of an unprejudiced
search after truth; it is a real, genuine
doubt. "As I desired to give my attention
solely to the search after truth, I thought...that
I ought to reject as absolutely false all in regard
to which I could suppose the least ground for
doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that
there remained aught in my belief that was wholly
indubitable." (3)
Mark the words: "to reject as
absolutely
false." He does not intend to hold his mind in
a state of suspended judgment, or merely to leave
his spontaneous convictions aside for the time
being, in order to investigate their possible
validity, which would be methodic doubt as
generally understood; he is convinced that he ought
"to reject them as absolutely false," and he
actually carries out his plan, so that he really
rejects everything down to the one indubitable
fact: "Cogito, ergo sum -- I think,
therefore I exist."
This is more than mere doubt, because a doubt
presupposes a suspended judgment due to the absence
of all reasons for and against a proposition
(negative doubt) or reasons of more or less equal
value for an against it (positive doubt). Descartes
"supposes, for a time, that all these opinions are
entirely false and imaginary," (4) and he "will
continue always in this track until he shall find
something that is certain, or at least, if he can
do nothing more, until he shall know with certainty
that there is nothing certain." (5) He assumes
the attitude that all spontaneous convictions and
laws of thought are errors.
It makes little difference whether Descartes
could and did, actually and really, doubt
everything without exception; or whether he merely
thought he could and did. The fact is, he did thus
doubt everything in principle. He was, of
course, not a skeptic, since his purpose was to
arrive at the ultimate base of certainty and truth
and to rebuild on this indubitable foundation the
edifice of knowledge. He compared himself to
Archimedes. "Archimedes, that he might transport
the entire globe from the place it occupied to
another, demanded only a point that was firm and
immovable; so also, I shall be entitled to
entertain the highest expectations, if I am
fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is
certain and indubitable." (6) Descartes was
fortunate enough to discover his firm and immovable
fulcrum: his own existence -- "I think, therefore I
am." He had now his fulcrum; what would be his
lever?
It would have to be the trustworthiness of
his reasoning powers. But how could he
establish this, seeing that this also was involved
in universal doubt and destroyed with all other
spontaneous convictions? Descartes hit upon an
ingenious idea. He would demonstrate the existence
of an infinitely perfect Being, who must have given
man faculties which are trustworthy and capable of
discovering truth. The only thing absolutely
certain so far for Descartes was his own existence;
and from this fact alone he would be obliged to
deduce God's existence.
Here is his line of thought:
- We have in our mind the idea of God as an
infinitely perfect Being.
- But an infinitely perfect Being must have
existence, otherwise it would not be infinitely
perfect.
- Ergo, God exists. (7)
This is an a priori or ontological
argument.
Descartes attempts to prove God's existence a
posteriori, by means of an argument from
causality:
- We have the idea of God in our mind.
- Since this idea represents an infinitely
perfect Being, we, as finite beings, cannot have
originated such an idea in virtue of our own
powers.
- This idea being beyond our mental capacity,
it could have originated only from a Being who
possesses such infinite perfection.
- Ergo, God exists. (8)
Having proved to his own satisfaction that God
exists, Descartes proceeds to show that He is the
creator of man. (9) But the infinitely perfect God
cannot be a deceiver; consequently, He cannot have
given man deceptive powers of knowledge, and man's
faculties are thus shown to be trustworthy,
"provided we separate what there is of clear and
distinct in the knowledge from what is obscure and
confused." (10) In the light of this criterion of
"clear and distinct" knowledge all previous doubts
about the world, sense-perception, and intellection
must vanish. Skepticism is defeated, and valid
knowledge is possible.
The Failure
of Descartes' Method
Descartes' fundamental purpose was laudable; he
desired to defend human knowledge against the
attacks of skeptics. Generally speaking, he was
justified in demanding that the investigation into
the nature and limits of knowledge exclude
preconceived ideas, traditional doctrines, and
unwarranted presuppositions as evidence and proof,
since the validity of all spontaneous convictions
was at stake.
But when he proposed to approach the problem in
an attitude of universal real doubt,
discarding even the capability of the human mind to
know truth and refusing to accept such essential
principles as the principle of contradiction and
the principle of sufficient reason, he made the
solution of the problem impossible for himself.
Here are a few considerations which compel us to
reject his system.
Descartes began his inquiry by doubting
all knowledge without exception; he was even
willing to accept it as "entirely false."
This being the case, what about the idea of
God as an all-perfect Being, since he admits
that he discovered this idea in his own mind?
According to his own principle of universal
doubt, he simply cannot know whether
this idea of God is correct or incorrect; as a
matter of fact, according to this principle, he
should consider it as "entirely false," until
proved otherwise. But if his idea of God as an
all-perfect Being may be incorrect, he cannot
logically deduce from this idea God's existence and
veracity.
Since the very
idea of God is doubtful, these other things must
remain doubtful, and the trustworthiness of man's
faculties must also remain doubtful. Descartes
cannot escape his own real
doubt.
Irrespective of the intrinsic value of the
proofs with which Descartes attempts to demonstrate
God's existence, we must not overlook the fact that
he uses a process of reasoning to make this
demonstration. Since his very reason and the
process of reasoning is as yet of doubtful
validity, how can be validly demonstrate God's
existence and veracity? The trustworthiness of
Descartes' reasoning powers is supposed to flow as
a necessary consequence from the infinite
perfection of God; and God's infinite perfect is
made certain to him by means of a proof developed
by these very reasoning powers, before he
has proved that these reasoning powers are valid
and trustworthy: he thereby gratuitously
assumes
the very thing
beforehand
which he intends to prove
afterwards.
(A logical fallacy called Begging the Question, or
a circular argument.)
Descartes unconsciously accepts the
trustworthiness of his faculties in attempting to
demonstrate the existence and infinite perfection
of God, and that is an illegitimate procedure;
because a doubtfully valid faculty can produce
only a doubtfully valid argument, and a doubtfully
valid argument can only lead to a doubtfully valid
conclusion.
The whole argument for God's existence and
veracity is thus nullified by his doubtful reason
and reasoning process; and, since he proves the
reliability of his reason and reasoning process by
means of God's veracity, which (according to his
supposition) must be doubtful, the proof for the
trustworthiness of his own powers is nullified and
can never be established beyond doubt.
His attempt,
therefore, to vindicate the validity of human
knowledge failed essentially, because, by rejecting
the reliability of his own powers to discover and
know truth, he made it impossible for himself to
extricate himself from the net of his own universal
doubt.
Moreover, there are glaring
inconsistencies in his procedure. He claims to
reject everything, even the principle of
contradiction and the principle of sufficient
reason. But he does not. He surreptitiously
assumes the truth of these principles and
uses them continually.
As obvious a fact as the "Cogito, ergo sum" is
really based on the validity and truth of the
principle of contradiction. This principle asserts
that it is impossible for something to be and not
to be at the same time. Descartes becomes certain
of his own existence by the very fact of his
"thinking" or "doubting." True. But why? Because he
perceives clearly that it is impossible to "think
and not think," to "exist and not exist" at the
same time. If Descartes were consistent and really
doubted the principle of contradiction, he would
have to affirm that it could be possible for
a being to "think and not think," to "exist and not
exist" at the same time. But, then, according to
his own supposition, he could not be sure after all
that the ultimate fact of his existence is certain,
and his famous "Cogito, ergo sum" has no real
objective value.
Only by granting
the validity and truth of the principle of
contradiction beforehand, can his existence be
established as an objective fact; and that is
exactly, though inconsistently, what Descartes
does.
The same line of reasoning applies to his
proofs for God's existence and infinite
perfection. Notwithstanding his proofs, his
rejection of the principle of contradiction will
forever invalidate his arguments, because, as long
as this principle is not established and accepted,
he could never be sure whether it would not be
possible for God to "exist and not exists," to "be
infinitely perfect and not infinitely perfect" at
the same time.
Similarly, he would always be compelled to
remain in doubt whether God could not be "veracious
and not veracious," "deceiving and not deceiving,"
unless the principle of contradiction were taken as
granted before he begins to prove God's
existence. Unwittingly Descartes does accept
this principle of contradiction throughout his
demonstrations, but that is an inexcusable
inconsistency.
So, too, Descartes conducts his inquiry under
the supposition that he has doubted the principle
of sufficient and the principle of causality. But
he does not hesitate to use these principles
before he has established their validity.
Consider his a posteriori argument for the
existence and infinite perfection of God.
He contends that the idea of God as an
all-perfect Being could not have originated in our
mind, because such an idea would exceed the
causality of the human mind, the latter being less
perfect than the contents of the idea itself;
consequently, this idea had to be produced in us by
God Himself (and this proves that God exists as an
infinitely perfect Being), otherwise there would be
no sufficient reason for the presence of such an
idea in our mind.
This line of reasoning shows plainly that
Descartes uses the principles of sufficient reason
and causality in demonstrating God's existence,
although he doubts their
validity.
Now, if he lets these principles stand as
doubtful, his entire demonstration is vitiated and
nullified by doubt; and if he accepts them as valid
prior to establishing their validity, he acts
contrary to his fundamental doubt and is
inconsistent: in either
case he makes the demonstration of God's existence
impossible.
His actual procedure in all the arguments he
makes is such, however, that he presupposes
the validity of the laws of thought; and that is
for him a glaring inconsistency, since his
universal methodic doubt will not permit him
to accept their validity before he has proved the
existence and veracity of God.
Finally, Descartes' universal methodic doubt
leads logically to
universal skepticism. No certitude
can ever be attained in a system where the very
foundations of human reason are completely
destroyed. When he rejects as doubtful and even
as "absolutely false" all in regard to which he
could imagine the least ground for doubt, he saws
off the very limb upon which he is seated.
If the nature of
his mind and the laws of thought are called into
real doubt (not to speak of considering them to be
"absolutely false"), then all acts and facts of
consciousness, all ideas, judgments, and
inferences, can no longer be
trusted.
But how can the mind attempt to validate its own
trustworthiness except by means of these things? If
Descartes mistrusts the simple judgments of "2+3=5"
and "A square has four sides," how can he trust his
faculties in making the far more complicated
arguments with which he tries to prove God's
existence and infinite perfection?
Conclusion
The effort of Descartes to find his way back to
certitude by means of the roundabout detour of the
existence and veracity of God, shows the desperate
plight in which he had placed himself by his
universal doubt. The steps he takes in retracing
his way are these:
- His own existence;
- The existence and infinite perfection of
God;
- God's absolute veracity;
- His creation by God;
- The trustworthiness of his faculties, due to
the veracity of God who created him;
- The truth and validity of all those
spontaneous convictions of his mind which are
"clear and distinct."
But we have seen that Descartes could not
consistently prove God's existence, since he could
only do so by means of a reasoning process which,
according to his own principles, was essentially
doubtful in its validity, and even "absolutely
false." The only thing of which he could ever be
certain was his own existence; and this, too,
strictly speaking, Descartes should have doubted,
because he had doubted the principle of
contradiction and the testimony of his own
consciousness. Our modern Archimedes had indeed
found his fulcrum, namely his own existence; but
now he could not move the world, because he had
thrown away his lever.
Descartes, if he had been consistent, should
have embraced universal skepticism, because his
universal doubt left him no other choice: he had no
way of retracing his course. He was like a mariner
who scuttles his boat and swims to a rock in
mid-ocean. The rock is the solitary fact of his own
existence. True, he had found a solid point. But it
is a lonely and desolate spot; and he is marooned
on it forever, doomed to die of mental starvation,
surrounded by an unbridgeable ocean of doubt.
The Cartesian universal methodic doubt,
therefore, is not a proper approach to the problem
of human knowledge. It is in reality only a
variation of universal skepticism, and as such it
is absurd. We will have to make our approach in a
different fashion.
The necessary conclusion to be drawn from the
above critical examination of universal skepticism
is obvious:
Complete doubt
cannot be the proper approach to the problem of
human knowledge. It would be fatal. Starting with
complete doubt, we can no more reach a solution of
the problem of human knowledge than a bird can fly
with amputated wings.
Another important conclusion is this:
Any theory of
knowledge which leads logically to universal
skepticism is intrinsically
false.
Nothing could be plainer. There must be an
essential flaw in a theory which, if consistently
carried out to its logical conclusions, ends in the
absurdity of skepticism.
Return
to Adventures in Philosophy: Modern Philosophy -
Descartes
References:
1. Taken from: "The Principles of
Philosophy"; "Meditations on First Philosophy";
"Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the
Reason."
2. Meditations, I.
3. Discourse, IV.
4. Meditations, I, toward the
close.
5. Loc. cit., II, beginning.
6. Loc. cit., II, beginning.
7. Principles of Philosophy, Part I,
XVIII.
8. Ibid., Part I, XVIII.
9. Ibid., Part I, XX.
10. Ibid., Part I, XXIX, and XXX.
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