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We have collective ideas or images and give them common names, so that we merely designate or "label" the individuals with the same name; but there are no universals ideas in the intellect which correspond to these universal names. Nominalism is the reverse of ultra-realism (Plato); it denies the universal altogether. The essences or natures are not extra-mentally universal, nor are our ideas intra-mentally universal. Our ideas are as individual as the things we perceive with our senses. Nominalism proper is the outgrowth of sensism, empiricism, and materialism, in as much as these theories assert that intellectual knowledge is only a refined sense-knowledge. Since the senses can perceive nothing but the individuals in the sense-world, our intellect can fashion ideas only of individual things; hence, our ideas are really singular, not universal. We indeed have "general images" of a dog, of a man, of a tree, of a fish, and our so-called universal ideas express such "general images"; but strictly "universal" ideas which would represent a common element or attribute as one-in-many, are nonexistent in the mind. This theory is upheld by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Wilhelm Wundt, August Comte, and many others up to our present day. Since many neo-realists and critical realists are materialists, identifying mind with brain, their theory is more or less nominalistic. While the theories propounded by these thinkers differ on many points, they all agree in considering our intellectual knowledge as nothing more than a mere piecing together of sense-images to which we give a common name or "label." The intellect possesses no higher power of "abstraction," enabling it to grasp the essences underlying the external phenomena of things and expressing them in universal ideas. Modern empiricists consider our intellectual knowledge to be nothing more than a refined sort of sense-knowledge; this being so, it is obvious that our ideas cannot really be "universal," representisng a content which is strictly "one-in-many," but must be as individual in character as the sense-image itself. At best, we can have "general images" or "composite images," a product of several singular sense-images fused together into a vague, indefinite representation, something like the composite photograph resulting from a number of superimposed plates. The only thing that is strictly universal is the "name," or "word," and that is used merely as a "label" to designate a number of objects grouped according to some arbitrary pattern. Thus names or words, nominalists say, designate and represent "individuals" or a "collection of individuals," but never represent anything which is mentally applicable to a class as a whole and to each individual belonging to that class. But in this they are wrong. A little reflection will prove this. Names and words are "signs" and have a "meaning"; they are signs of "ideas" and they derive their meaning from the "content" of the ideas for which they stand. And since the ideas stand for things, names and words are also used to designate things. Now, if we can show that names and words are used to designate something which is conceived by the intellect as being "one-common-to-many," we thereby prove that we really have "universal" ideas. And that is precisely what takes place. We have names which stand for "singular" objects: "Peter is a man," "homer was a poet," "Plato was a philosopher." Here the subjects represent a single thing. Other names stand for collective objects: "The library is large," "the army marches on," "the herd is scattered," "the nation is in revolt," "the city is celebrating." Here the subjects represent a number of individuals taken together "as a group," but the statements do not apply to the individual members of the group. We have, however, many names and words which apply to a "class" and "to each member" of the class. Take the word "man." By "man" we mean a "rational animal." This word represents the class as a class "and" the individual human beings belonging to the class. If we say "Man is mortal," just what do we mean? We mean that "all men" taken together as a class "are mortal" and "each individual man" taken separately "is mortal." So, too, when science states that "The living cell has immanent action," it does not mean that a single cell or a mere collection of cells, but "all cells" as a class and as individuals "have immanent action." Again, zoology tells us that "the horse is a mammal." The word "horse" here does not designate a single animal like Roy Roger's Trigger, nor a collection of animals like a herd, but the whole class of horses and each member of that class. Such statements show plainly that these subjects have a content which are conceived as "one-common-to-many." And since words and names stand for ideas, our "ideas" have a content which is conceived as "one-common-to-many." That, however, is what is meant by a "universal idea." We have, then, ideas which are not merely singular or collective, but truly universal. Nominalists admit the universality of our names and words, but deny the universality of the ideas for which they stand. The argument that the name gives rise to the class has been refuted by one philosopher in this manner: The contention is that the grouping of things into classes is not in any way determined by the properties of the things themselves, but is due to names. The name gives rise to a class of things, and it is not the class of thing that attracts a name to itself. A rejoinder at once suggests itself, which, in spite of its seeming to be almost ironical, is nevertheless very much to the point.   If the grouping of things into classes is determined by names -- understanding by a name not a universal element but something created afresh in every single act of utterance -- how is it that a name is never associated with groups of 'heterogeneous' things, such as tiger, coffee pot, candle, and birch tree, but always with groups of 'homogeneous' objects -- homogeneous not merely in the sense of being connected with one and the same word?   The only answer is that we associate with a name not anything which we choose, but only things which 'resemble' one another. This, however, means that the name merely assists in the final crystallization of a general idea, and that the essential condition of things being grouped into classes is the 'resemblance' between them. The fact is, that the intellect recognizes this resemblance of objects among themselves, groups the "many" into "one" idea, which is now universal, and uses a word or name to designate the idea. Only because we have universal "ideas," have we also universal "names." If nominalism were correct, we should have no universal names, since we have no universal ideas. To have universal names without universal ideas for which they stand, is contradictory. But we have universal names; consequently, we have universal ideas. Nominalism must be rejected, because it maintains that names and words can have a universal significance without deriving this significance from the only source from which it can be derived, namely, from the universal ideas of which they are the signs. The significance of any sign depends on the significance of the thing signified. Hence, the "universal" significance of the "name" depends on the "universal" significance of the "idea." And this is why ideas are thus universal, and nominalism is false. Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book... Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Magazine... Main Page & Index
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