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The Great Idea of Dialectic, by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D. (Continued)
A theory of dialectic is, like a theory of science or of art, a philosophical theory. If the dialectician has a conception of dialectic itself, in addition to having and using a certain method, he does so in virtue of being a philosopher, not a dialectician. On the other hand, his conception of dialectic must square with the principles and objectives of his method. We have already seen that his method commits him to certain philosophical positions -- about truth, human reason, the laws of thought, language and meaning. It also commits him to a certain theory of dialectic. If theories of dialectic are philosophical theories, and if the dialectical method we have been describing is applicable to the diversity of philosophical theories about any subject, then it should be applicable to the apparently conflicting theories of dialectic which are to be found in the discussion of that subject. But the fact that the method commits its user to one of these theories would seem to impair, if not destroy, the neutrality he is obligated to preserve. Here is a case, therefore, where prudence might recommend not venturing on the unfeasible -- a dialectically neutral treatment of dialectic. Let us, however, risk the imprudence and see what can be said about the diverse theories of dialectic. The most likely hypothesis is that these theories only appear to be in conflict but are actually in nonagreement rather than disagreement. In the name of dialectic, they are really treating three different things and therefore cannot disagree. This does not exclude the possibility that those who are talking about the same theory of dialectic may disagree among themselves. To apply the foregoing hypothesis in detail to the whole discussion of dialectic would require us to do extensive research. But, perhaps, that is not necessary for our present purposes. It may suffice to sketch the general outlines of the hypothesis from such acquaintance as we already have with the historic discussion of dialectic.[12] Our hypothesis is that the word dialectic is used in the literature by three distinct groups of theories. Each group of theories may include diverse and even conflicting conceptions of dialectic, but we are immediately concerned with the subject that each group of theories is considering. How shall these three subjects, each called "dialectic," be identified? We can identify one by saying that certain authors who use the word dialectic have in mind the process of philosophical inquiry itself together with the kind of knowledge in which such inquiry results. Let us refer to the subject thus identified as "noetic dialectic," because all conceptions of this subject regard it as a unique way of knowing reality. Plato's conception of dialectic, in those passages in The Republic in which he identifies dialectic with philosophy as knowledge of the ultimate realities, is the archetypical representative of this group of theories.[13] We can identify a second by saying that certain authors who use the word dialectic have in mind the fundamental laws that govern all processes of development in nature and history, such laws as the unity of opposites, the transformation of quantity into quality, and the negation of the negation. Let us refer to the subject thus identified as "regulative dialectic," because all conceptions of this dialectic regard it, not only as a way of knowing reality, but also as the way reality itself behaves according to the dialectical principles that regulate its processes.[14] Hegel's conception of dialectic is, in one sense, the leading representative of this group of theories, though it must be added at once that the Marxist conception, while following that of Hegel, is also its leading opponent.[15] We can identify a third subject by saying that certain authors who use the word dialectic have in mind a method auxiliary to philosophy by which men think about things, not as they are in themselves, but as they are reflected in human thought. Let us refer to the subject thus identified as "reflexive dialectic," because all conceptions of this dialectic regard it, not as a way of knowing reality directly nor as the regulation of reality itself, but as an independent discipline, separate from philosophy, which deals reflexively with all the things that philosophy deals with directly. It deals with them only as they appear in the context of diverse philosophical theories or doctrines. Aristotle's statement that "dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know" is typical of this group of theories.[16] The conception of dialectic set forth in this article clearly belongs to the third group of theories. Dialectic, as we have been treating it, is not identical with philosophy as knowledge of reality, nor is it even one of the methods of conducting philosophical inquiry. It could hardly be mistaken for the inner logic of reality itself, whose laws regulate all developments in nature, history, and thought. It might, however, be thought to resemble logic insofar as the science or art of logic also deals with thought; but unlike formal logic, it is not a science of the forms of thought; and unlike the art of logic, it is not a method of correct thinking. It is none of these. It is simply a method of dealing with what men have actually thought on the wide variety of fundamental subjects about which they manifestly differ in their views. Before we consider how this conception of dialectic relates to Aristotle's conception of the same subject, let us first examine the three subjects that we have just identified. They are clearly distinct. In this respect, they are like man-made law, natural law, and divine law. Just as those who discuss only man-made law are simply in nonagreement with those who discuss only divine law, so those who consider only noetic dialectic or only regulative dialectic are in nonagreement with those who consider only reflexive dialectic. But in the case of law, there is disagreement as to whether there is only one kind of law or more. Some, for example, hold that manmade law is the only law, and deny that "natural law" is law or a kind of law, while others affirm that natural law and man-made law are both law, though of different kinds. Is there a similar disagreement about dialectic and its kinds? There does not seem to be. Unlike theories of law, no theory of dialectic holds, for example, that regulative and reflexive dialectic are two kinds of dialectic. No author can be construed as asserting that some two or all three of these subjects, all bearing the name "dialectic," must belong to one general class as kinds. Hence no issue about kinds of dialectic can be constructed. In the absence of controversy about dialectic in general and in the absence of disagreement about its kinds, exponents of the three major types of theory are simply in nonagreement. Each is concerned with a different subject. Yet all bear the same name. A question arises, therefore, about the name itself. Does it connote any elements that are common to the three distinct subjects? Any generic characterization of dialectic would probably mention at least two things as common to noetic, regulative, and reflexive dialectic: (1) some principle whereby a diversity is unified or opposites are reconciled;[17] and (2) the assumption that dialectic effects or facilitates the achievement of truth. But no one claims that this, or any other, generic characterization of dialectic identifies a general class, of which noetic, regulative, and reflexive dialectic are kinds. On the other hand, no proponent of a particular theory of dialectic would accept the two points stated above as sufficiently precise to identify the dialectic he is trying to define. What significance, then, does such a generic characterization have? The answer would seem to be that it throws light on what is at least the nominal agreement that exists among those who discuss dialectic. It explains how they all happen to use one word to designate the different subjects they are writing about. Thus used, that word is not as plainly equivocal as is the word bull when it is used to refer to an animal and a proclamation. Some threads of common meaning connect the three uses of the word. But the word may have some systematic ambiguity even though there is no controversy about dialectic in general nor about its kinds at least between exponents of one major theory and exponents of another.[18] This fact has critical significance for the theory of dialectic set forth in these pages. It means that there is no need to defend the dialectic with which we have been concerned against theories of noetic or regulative dialectic, for they on their part do not deny the possibility or validity of a reflexive dialectic. It also means that we can apply our own dialectical method to different theories of dialectic in the same way that we can to other problems, for the fact that the method commits its user to one of these theories does not impair its neutrality. The theory of reflexive dialectic does not challenge the validity of the other theories of dialectic since these deal with different subjects. The hypothesis that exponents of the three major types of theory are simply in nonagreement is not prejudicial to the sense or truth of any of them.[19] One problem remains, which we mentioned earlier but postponed. It is the problem of the relation between the conception of dialectic set forth in this article and Aristotle's conception of the same subject. The identification of that subject as a reflexive dialectic -- a method of considering the content of thought itself -- is acceptable to both theories. But do they, considering this same subject, (i) conceive it differently? If they do, (ii) must we regard them as offering incompatible definitions of dialectic? And if we have to construct a definitional issue, (iii) can we do so in a neutral manner? The embarrassment of the third question can be avoided if the two conceptions of reflexive dialectic are not incompatible. It is certainly possible for them to be different without being incompatible, for one may simply be more complete and precise than the other. The more adequate conception can then be regarded as including rather than rejecting the less adequate conception. Unless the exponents of the less adequate conception insisted upon its adequacy as stated, no issue would arise between them and the exponents of the more adequate conception, for they would see that both held the same one, the latter in an improved form. Let us, then, compare the two conceptions -- the Aristotelian conception and the conception presented in this article. Because both regard dialectic as reflexive, both are concerned with the diversity of views that men hold on any subject. Since both conceive dialectic as a method of dealing, not with reality itself, but with the subjects of human thought, it is inevitable that both should be concerned with conflicts of opinion, apparent or real; for the realm of thought is the place where all contraries coexist. Finally, both agree that dialectic, while not itself a method of philosophical inquiry or a way of knowing reality, is auxiliary to philosophy and serves the philosopher in his pursuit of truth about the reality or nature of things.[20] How, then, do they differ? The difference between the two conceptions must be said to lie in how they further specify the purpose of the dialectical method and its use. Is the method to be used (1) by a participant in discussion, and for the sake of getting at the doctrinal truth of the matter under consideration, or (2) by an observer of discussion, and for the sake of getting at the dialectical truth about the controversy that such discussion involves? The dialectical method proposed in this article clearly takes the second alternative. Its primary aim, in constructing the controversy that is implicit in a diversity of views, is to get at the dialectical, not the doctrinal, truth about the subject under discussion.[21] Because this is its aim, detachment from all competing doctrines and neutrality with respect to them are essential to its proper use. Such detachment and neutrality are usually better maintained by an observer of discussion than by a participant in it. To be different, the Aristotelian conception of dialectic would have to take the first alternative, and this in fact it appears to do. If that alternative makes the dialectical method essentially polemical and partisan, then the two conceptions are not only different but are also clearly opposed; for, on this hypothesis, they would attribute contrary properties to a reflexive dialectic. One and the same method cannot be both essentially neutral and polemical; it cannot be simultaneously used for nonpartisan and partisan purposes. The hypothesis stated above must be rejected. It violates what is common to the two conceptions, however else they differ; namely, that dialectic is auxiliary to the philosopher in his pursuit of truth. Thus, no theory of reflexive dialectic can consistently conceive such dialectic as purely polemical and wholly partisan. Insofar as a method is purely polemical in its aim and partisan in its use, it may assist its user stubbornly to maintain the truth he claims for his own doctrine; it may help him to win forensic victories over his opponents; but far from assisting him in getting at the doctrinal truth about things, it will probably prevent him from doing so if any part of the truth resides in some doctrine other than his own. A philosopher's loyalty is to the truth no matter where it resides, not to the claims of truth he has made for his own doctrine. If the ultimate objective of a particular individual is to maintain the truth of his own doctrine at all costs, then he is no philosopher. Hence it follows that a method which is polemical and partisan, in the extreme sense indicated above, does not meet the first requirement of any theory of reflexive dialectic. Polemic defeats rather than promotes the ultimate objectives of philosophical inquiry. Indulgence in polemics on all sides degrades discussion and prevents fruitful debate from ever emerging when men appear to differ. These things being so, we return to the question of how Aristotle's conception of the dialectical method differs from the one set forth in this article. We have already pointed out that Aristotle conceives the method with which he is concerned as an instrument to be used by a participant in discussion, and with the primary aim of getting at the doctrinal truth about matters on which there is an apparent or real difference of opinion. If the participant is a philosopher, not a sophist or a merely disputatious person seeking a forensic triumph, his being a participant will not make his use of the method purely polemical and partisan.[22] He will try as a philosopher to temper his partisanship with some effort at fairness and impartiality in his treatment of conflicting views. Nevertheless, he remains a partisan of the particular doctrine to which he is attached. Detachment from all conflicting doctrines is not, therefore, essential to his use of dialectic; nor, in Aristotle's conception, need the philosopher as dialectician attempt to achieve such a thoroughgoing neutrality. His primary aim is not to get at the dialectical truth about a controversy but rather at the doctrinal truth about the matters in dispute, and though he may try to defend the truth of his own doctrine, he remains hospitable to whatever elements of truth can be found elsewhere.[23] As used by the philosopher for doctrinal, but not polemical, purposes, dialectic, according to Aristotle, is critical or exploratory. The philosopher uses it to explore, from the point of view of his own doctrine, the diversity of views on whatever subject he is treating. He uses it critically to examine and weigh divergent opinions, in order to take from them whatever truth he can find and thus perfect the truth of his own doctrine. Aristotle himself exemplifies such use of dialectic when he undertakes "to call into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion on this subject, in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors."[24] The difference between the two conceptions being clear, one question remains. Are the two theories of reflexive dialectic opposed? Do they advance incompatible definitions of one and the same subject? Only if the two theories exclude one another are we faced with the embarrassing question of whether we can use our own method to construct in a thoroughly neutral manner the resultant issue about the definition of dialectic. In the light of what has been said, two hypotheses suggest themselves, on neither of which are we faced with that embarrassing question. The first hypothesis is that each of the theories defines a distinct kind of reflexive dialectic. The second hypothesis is that there is only one kind of reflexive dialectic, of which one of the two theories offers a more explicit and adequate conception than the other. Let us consider these two hypotheses in turn. On the first hypothesis, the two kinds of reflexive dialectic would be distinguished by their primary aim and use. To name the kind of dialectic with which Aristotle is concerned, we can use the key word in Aristotle's description of it -- "critical." In contrast, "constructive" is the key word in the description we have given of the other kind of reflexive dialectic. A critical dialectic deals with the diversity of views from the point of view of a doctrine that itself contributes to the diversity; a constructive dialectic deals with diversity without attachment to any particular point of view. Whereas the primary aim of one is to get at doctrinal truth, though it may incidentally uncover some dialectical truth, the primary aim of the other is to discover dialectical truth, while at the same time indirectly serving the philosopher's main quest of doctrinal truth. Complete neutrality is, therefore, not essential to the one as it is to the other.[25] On this hypothesis, the two conceptions, each of a different kind of dialectic, are not opposed. They are no more incompatible than are the conceptions of human and divine law, for instance, when it is granted that these are two kinds of law. But would the proponents of these two conceptions be willing to grant that each defines a distinct kind belonging to the same general class, characterized as reflexive dialectic? There seems to be no reason why proponents of the Aristotelian theory would not admit that it defines only one of two possible kinds. We, on our part, can also accept the hypothesis that, while having certain generic features in common, a critical and a constructive dialectic are distinct kinds, differentiated by their primary objectives and by the way in which they are used. Yet we have one reason for favoring a different hypothesis. This other hypothesis lays greater emphasis on what is common to the two theories. Both regard the dialectical method as auxiliary to the philosophical pursuit of truth about the nature of things. Its ultimate purpose is to assist the philosopher in ascertaining the doctrinal truth about any matter under consideration. Now if dialectic is not itself a method of philosophical inquiry, which both theories admit, then perhaps it can be said that its primary objective should be to get at dialectical truth through the construction of the controversy that is implicit in a diversity of views about a particular subject. For this primary purpose, complete neutrality is essential, whether the method is used by a dialectical observer or by a philosophical participant in the discussion. To be a dialectician, in other words, the philosophical participant must become, for a time at least, as detached and impartial as he could be if he were merely an observer. According to this hypothesis, the theory of the dialectical method as essentially constructive and neutral offers the more explicit and adequate conception of what a reflexive dialectic should be. Insofar as the procedure is seen as critical rather than constructive, and insofar as impartiality is recommended rather than made obligatory, the conception of the method fails to make explicit and definite what is essential to dialectic as auxiliary to philosophy. A critical method, used directly for doctrinal purposes, is not a distinct kind of reflexive dialectic. It represents only a stage in the development of a constructive method, used directly for dialectical purposes and only indirectly for the attainment of doctrinal truth. This hypothesis about the relation of the two theories seems to us preferable for the basic reason that dialectical rather than doctrinal truth should be the immediate and primary objective of a method which is admittedly dialectical rather than philosophical, because it is not itself a method of philosophical inquiry but only auxiliary to such inquiry. That reason, we think, justifies us in regarding the traditional statement of the Aristotelian theory as an inadequate conception of the method. It is inadequate to the extent that it fails to describe the procedure as constructive, fails to insist upon neutrality as essential, and fails to define the aim as the discovery of dialectical truth, first for its own sake, and ultimately for the sake of promoting the pursuit of doctrinal truth. If proponents of the Aristotelian theory were to grant its inadequacy in these respects, then we would have no reason to reject the Aristotelian conception as false.[26] We would simply take the position that our more adequate conception includes their less adequate conception and improves upon it by making explicit and precise what should be said in a true definition of reflexive dialectic. The most important consequence of having achieved the more adequate statement is the present formulation of the method itself as a method of constructing controversies with complete neutrality. Yet the truth of the conception that underlies the method by no means guarantees its workability or its production of the results at which it aims. These must be independently judged. Endnotes 12. We can, in other words, do something like what we have done in the case of law. Though we have referred to the discussion of law as an "imaginary discussion," its main lines were obviously drawn from the actual discussion of that subject. We called it "imaginary" to indicate that the dialectical hypothesis we presented was merely a sketch based on our general acquaintance with the historic discussion of law, and not a detailed working out of the hypothesis in the light of data supplied by protracted research. 13. See The Republic, Book VI (511), Book VII (532-34). [GBWW, Vol. 7, pp. 387c, 397a-98c.] Other dialogues emphasize the method or process of knowing rather than the knowing itself; see the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus [GBWW, Vol. 7]. Plato's identification of the philosopher with the dialectician gives rise to one conception of philosophy and its method of inquiry. According to an interesting analysis by Richard McKeon, the dialectical philosopher, in Plato's sense of "dialectical," is in method and character only one of four types, the others being characterized by other methods, which he calls "logistic," "problematic," and "operational," For McKeon's description of the dialectical philosopher, see his essay "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," in Ethics 65, 1 (October 1954): pp. 1-33; for his classification of the four types of philosophy and philosophical method, see his Thought, Action, and Passion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 85-88, and his Freedom and History (New York: Noonday Press, 1952). 14. For Hegel, the real is the rational and the rational the real. Consequently, for Hegel, dialectic is at once the inner logic of both mind and reality; the laws of dialectic regulate the development of thought and the development of things. See Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Logic, chap. 6, sec. 81. "Wherever there is movement," Hegel writes, "wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge which is truly scientific." Cf. Philosophy of Right, Introduction, 31 [GBWW, Vol. 46, p. 19d], where Hegel says that his dialectic "is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically." For the full exposition of the principles of Hegel's regulative dialectic, see The Science of Logic and Phenomenology of Mind, And for Hegel's account of the history of dialectic, in which he attributes certain anticipations of his own theory to Plato and others, see the section cited above in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and also his Philosophy of History [GBWW, Vol. 46]. 15. For Marx and Engels, the dialectic of nature or of history is to be found in the laws governing the transformations of matter only. Borrowing from Hegel the conception of a regulative dialectic and its laws, but differing from Hegel about whether the laws of dialectic are laws of matter or of mind, the Marxists developed what they called a "dialectical materialism." See F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature (New York, 1940); Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York, 1934); and compare A Textbook of Marxist Philosophy, prepared by the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy and translated by A. C. Moseley (London, 1937). 16. See Metaphysics, Book IV, chap, 2, 1004b25 [GBWW, Vol. 8, p. 523d]. For Aristotle's conception of dialectic as "a process of criticism," see his Topics; especially Book I, chap. 2 [ibid., pp. 143d-44a], where he explains the usefulness of the method as auxiliary to philosophy. Kant's theory of dialectic is related to Aristotle's. In the passage from the Metaphysics quoted above, Aristotle distinguishes sophistry from philosophy as well as dialectic. "Sophistry," he writes, "is what appears to be philosophy, but is not," Kant identifies ancient dialectic with sophistry, "This art," he writes, "presented false principles in the semblance of truth, and sought, in accordance with these, to maintain things in semblance. Amongst the Greeks the dialecticians were advocates and rhetoricians who could lead the populace wherever they chose, because the populace lets itself be deluded with semblance. … In Logic, also, it was for a long time treated of under the name of the Art of Disputation, and for so long all logic and philosophy was the cultivation by certain chatter heads of the art of semblance" (Introduction to Logic [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1885], sec. ii). Kant then goes on to say that in his own Logic he proposes to introduce "a critical examination of this semblance" or sophistry under the head of dialectic. In his Critique of Pure Reason [GBWW, Vol. 42], he called this division of his Transcendental Logic a "Transcendental Dialectic." 17. As, for example, the opposition of the One and Many in Plato's dialectic, the opposition of thesis and antithesis in Hegel's dialectic, and the opposition of conflicting theories or arguments in Aristotle's dialectic or Kant's. 18. The word induction provides us with another example of the same situation. It is not completely equivocal as it is used in inductive logic and in algebra, yet those who are concerned with mathematical induction and those who are concerned with induction in the experimental sciences are simply in nonagreement, They do not think of mathematical and experimental induction as belonging to the same general class; they do not argue the question whether these two subjects are both kinds of induction. 19. A particular individual who uses the dialectical method as auxiliary to philosophy may also be a philosopher who rejects Plato's or Hegel's theory of dialectic as a false philosophical theory of knowledge or reality. But he would do so on philosophical grounds, not because he used the dialectical method. As using the method, he is not called upon to judge the philosophical truth of these other theories of dialectic. He can, therefore, remain dialectically neutral in treating them, just as he can remain dialectically neutral in treating theories of freedom with which, as an individual philosophizing about freedom, not as a dialectician, he may disagree. 20. The Topics, that part of his Organon in which Aristotle expounds the rules of dialectic as a method to be used, also contains a great deal that does not properly belong to the art or method of dialectic at all. The analysis of definitions which Aristotle gives there, and his famous classification of the types of predicates or "predicables," belongs rather to the science of logic itself, in that division of the science which Aristotle's medieval followers called "material," as opposed to "formal," logic, The justification for treating such matters in a book ostensibly devoted to an art of disputation, and to a critical method of dealing with the conflict of opinions, may be that the arguments for opposed positions often appeal to definitions and often turn on how the disputants employ their fundamental terms or predicates. 21. The fact that its primary aim is to get at dialectical rather than doctrinal truth does not exclude all interest in the latter. On the contrary, if the discovery of dialectical truth did not ultimately serve the pursuit of doctrinal truth, the method would not be auxiliary to philosophy as a pursuit of such truth about the nature of things. But it aims at such truth indirectly, not primarily or directly. 22. "In the second chapter of Book I of the Topics [GBWW, Vol. 8, pp, 143d-44a], Aristotle distinguishes between two main uses that can be made of the art or method of dialectic. The first is the use that can be made by men generally in "casual encounters," wherein they are engaged in disputation with one another and in efforts to argue effectively or persuasively for their own views. This use of dialectic associates it with rhetoric. In fact, Aristotle declares, "rhetoric is a branch of dialectic. … Both are methods of providing arguments." (Rhetoric, Book I, chap. 2, 1356a30-34 [GBWW, Vol. 9, pp, 595d-96a].) And in another place, he says that "all men make use of both (i.e., rhetoric and dialectic); for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others." (Ibid., Book I, chap, I, 1354a3-6 [GBWW, Vol. 9, p. 593a].) This first use of dialectic -- by men generally in casual encounters -- verges on the disputatious or polemical. But it is also clearly distinct in Aristotle's mind from the use of dialectic by philosophers. Aristotle describes that second use as enabling the philosopher "to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject …to detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise." (Topics, Book I, chap. 2, 101a34-37 [GBWW, Vol. 8, p. 144a].) Aristotle's dialectic is sometimes spoken of as the art of reasoning from merely probable premises in the form of widely accepted opinions or the opinions of experts, but that applies only to the use of dialectic in casual encounters and for forensic purposes. It does not apply to dialectic as a method used by philosophers to get at the doctrinal truth about a subject. If philosophers were to engage in reasoning from accepted or expert opinion, they would be arguing from authority rather than from facts and principles. 23. This primary aim does not exclude the possibility that indirectly or incidentally the philosopher's doctrinal use of dialectic may uncover or lead to the discovery of some dialectical truths about the controversy in which he is engaged. Cf. note 21. 24. On the Soul, Book I, chap, 2, 403b22-24 [GBWW, Vol. 8, p, 633a]. 25. As we have already seen, the philosopher's doctrinal use of dialectic can and should be tempered by some effort to be impartial, or at least to avoid the unfairness and subjectivity of merely polemical criticism or refutation. In one place, Aristotle speaks of dialectic as "an art of drawing opposite conclusions impartially." (Rhetoric, Book I, chap. 1, 1355a36 [GBWW, Vol. 9, p. 594d],) Furthermore, his statement that the purpose of dialectic is "to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject" and "to detect … truth and error about the several points that arise" (loc. cit.) suggests some measure of impartiality. It is only when dialectic is used, not by the philosopher but in "casual encounters," that it is, as an art of disputation, polemical in its partisanship. Cf. note 21. 26. We can offer one reason why proponents of the Aristotelian theory should grant, in terms of that theory itself, the inadequacy of their conception of reflexive dialectic. In their view, as well as in ours, the line between a polemical misuse of the dialectical method and a proper philosophical use of it lies in the fairness and impartiality with which the philosopher, who is making a doctrinal use of dialectic, treats the doctrines of others. If he is truly a philosopher rather than a polemicist, open to the truth wherever it is found and not just a stubborn defender of the claims he makes for the truth of his own doctrine, then he is also truly a dialectician to the extent that he achieves impartiality in his treatment of whatever philosophical diversity he finds. To recommend neutrality, but not to make it obligatory, is therefore an imperfect conception of the method, It follows also that the philosopher should not use dialectic in a merely critical manner to deal with other doctrines from the point of view of his own. He should try constructively to see the controversy in which his own doctrine is included merely as one among others.
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