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Index:
Adler
on Exegetical Reading
Scriptural interpretation calls for a special
mode of interpretation--the kind of interpretation
that the faithful give to scriptures they look upon
as sacred. The assumption underlying the way in
which Muslims read the Koran, Jews the Old
Testament, and Christians the New Testament is that
the text they are reading contains truths which
they should make the most strenuous effort to
discover by patient and careful exegesis. Such a
reading is called "exegetical" because it tries "to
lead out of" the text the truth assumed to be in
it.
There is a long tradition of commentary on
secular writings as well, in which the approach to
the text being interpreted is analogous to the
approach of the faithful to sacred texts. Medieval
commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle --
by Arabic Jewish, and Christian teachers -- can be
cited as examples of this method of reading a text
for the purpose of discovering the truth it is
supposed to contain. Modern examples are to be
found in the extensive commentaries on the writings
of Immanuel Kant or Karl Marx.
With some variation in style, what is common to
all these examples of exegetical reading, whether
of secular texts or of texts regarded as sacred, is
a method of interpretation that concentrates on the
meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, and on
the relation between one element in the discourse
and another, while paying little or no attention to
contextual considerations or to psychological and
sociological factors that may or may not have been
responsible for the genesis of the texts being
interpreted. An exegetical reading is concerned
with philological aspects of the text, with the
biography of its author, or with the historical
circumstances under which it appeared only to the
extent that these considerations contribute to an
understanding of the text, not as affecting
judgments about the truth of what is being
said.
In sharp contrast to the exegetical method of
reading a text is another method of commentary,
which was called "the higher criticism" when, in
the nineteenth century, it was first applied to the
Old and the New Testaments. This method of
interpretation is widely prevalent today. It makes
little or no effort to get at the truth that the
text being commented on may contain; it may almost
be said to have no concern with the truth or
falsity of what is being said in the document under
consideration. Instead, the truth with which it is
concerned is the truth about the document in
question. To this end, it concentrates on the
historical circumstances, the sociological
influences, and the psychological motivations that
are thought to have determined its content.
These two methods of interpreting and commenting
on the written word are thus seen to differ
radically with respect to the truth with which they
are concerned -- the one with the truth in the
document, the other with the truth about the
document.
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Adler
on Eternity
This word has two meanings that should never be
forgotten. Most individuals use the word in common
speech to refer to time without beginning or
everlasting or endless time. In this meaning of the
word, God cannot be said to be eternal, for God is
not in time and so, is not subject to change or
mutability that characterizes all things in
time.
The second meaning of eternal is to have being
outside of time. Eternal being is beyond our
capacity to imagine or conceive in terms that are
positive. Our only sense of the eternal in this
meaning of the term is negative -- the negation of
time. Even if we think we can imagine God, we
cannot imagine His eternity.
The eternal is like the immaterial in that it
can be grasped by us only in negative terms --
"what it is not". Most individuals use the word
"spiritual" as a synonym for "immaterial" but they
forget that the only meaning they can attach to
that word is negative, not positive. The spiritual
is simply that which is not material. So, too, the
eternal is simply that which is not in time. The
eternal is the "immutable."
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Adler
on Conceiving and Defining
God
We must ask about God's nature before we ask
about God's existence. We must have some meaning
for the term "God." We must use that word "God"
with some definite significance before there's any
way we can reasonably inquire whether the thing we
are naming and signifying by the word "God"
actually exists. For certainly if what God is is
unknown to us and unknowable to us, then the word
"God" can have no meaning and there could be no
sense to the question, "Does God exist?"
I want you to note something here. It is
possible to give the word "God" very definite
meaning in our minds without begging the question
whether God exists. No matter how we conceive God,
how definite our conception is, that still leaves
quite open the question whether the thing we are
conceiving, the object of our conception really
actually exists outside our minds and independently
of our thinking.
Now when we ask the question, "What does the
word 'God' mean," how do we think of God? What is
our conception of God? Three basic possibilities
occur. And I think that these three possibilities
are quite exhaustive.
First, it is possible for us to think of God as
totally, I emphasize the word "totally", as totally
unlike anything else we know, totally unlike
anything else we know. But if we think of God this
way then we can have no definite conception of God.
For if God is totally unlike anything else we know,
we have no way of going to the things we know to
our understanding of God. That is, we can have no
carry over. We can attach no meanings to any of our
settled meanings and understanding. Hence if we
take this possibility, we eliminate any further
inquiry into the existence of God.
Now we can go to the opposite extreme. We can go
to the opposite extreme and think of God as
essentially like, as essentially like everything
else we know. Most of the things we know in the
world, most of the things in our experience are
corporeal, finite, mutable, sensible, imperfect,
changing in time. Now if we say that God is
essentially like all the things we know from our
experience, we must be saying of God that God too
is finite and corporeal and mutable and
imperfect.
Now what are the consequences of thinking of God
this way? Well, if we think of God this way, then
first of all, God's existence should be as knowable
to us as any of the other things we know that are
finite and corporeal and mutable and physical and
sensible. But clearly this is not the case.
Everyone, everyone understands no matter what else
he knows or what else he thinks that God's
existence is not as known to us or as knowable to
us as all the things in the world that are
experienced. Moreover, moreover this attribution to
God of finiteness and corporeality and mutability,
these characteristics that are common with all the
things of our experience violates, I think,
anyone's sense of the notion of divinity. And it
certainly violates the conception of divinity that
is to be found in any of the western religions.
Now there is a third possibility, a middle
ground between these extremes. I started out you
know by saying at one extreme one could take the
position that God is totally unlike any of the
things in our experience. At the other extreme you
could take the position that God is essentially
like. Now then the middle ground would be to say
that God is both like and unlike, both like and
unlike the things we know, the things of our
ordinary, everyday experience.
Now when you say this you've got to ask two
further questions. How is God unlike the things in
our experience and how is God like the things of
our experience? The answers are God is unlike the
things of our experience, the things we know in our
daily experience in those respects in which we
recognize them to be the very opposite of divine.
That is, the things we must say negatively of God
are these: we must say that God is not finite as
the things of our experience are, that God is not
corporeal as the things of our experience are, that
God is not mutable as the things of our experience
are, that God is not imperfect as the things of our
experience are. In other words, all of these
negative attributions must be made if this is the
way in which we must understand God as being unlike
the things of our experience.
How then is God like the things of our
experience? Here we must say that God is like them
only in that respect which must be common to
whatever is, which must be common to whatever is.
Now whatever is, has being. And therefore we must
say of God if we're going to say that God is like
the things of our experience in any respect, that
God at least has being and whatever properties
belong to a thing in so far as it has being, only
in this respect are we entitled to say that God is
like the things of our experience.
Now this leads us, I think, to a profound
understanding of how we must conceive God. For
perfectly as the purpose appears if not to all of
us that we must not only conceive God as a being, I
don't mean an existent one yet because all I've
talked about is a being, possible being or an
actual being, either way; if we conceive God as a
being, we are only conceiving God if we conceive of
God as a supreme being. And when we say that we
conceive of God as a supreme being or as the
Supreme Being, some things follow almost at once
from this.
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