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Index:
Adler
on the Social Contract
"Human beings and some other nonhuman animals
are gregarious and are naturally impelled to
associate with one another. But while man is not
the only social animal, humans are the only
political animals. Because they have intellects and
free will, they voluntarily constitute the
societies in which they live--their domestic,
tribal, and political associations. All animal
societies or groupings are instinctively
determined, and thus they are all purely natural
societies, differing from species to species but
everywhere the same in the same species. Only human
societies are both natural and conventional,
natural by natural need, not by instinctive
determination. Motivated by natural need, they are
conventionally instituted by reason and free will;
and so, within the same species, they differ at
different times and places.
The most important of the modern philosophical
mistakes about society is to be found in the theory
of the social contract as the conventional origin
of the state or civil society. It rests on two
myths.
One is the myth that goes by the name of "the
state of nature." This phrase, when used by Hobbes,
Locke, or Rousseau in their slightly varying
accounts of the origin of civil society, signifies
a condition of human life on earth in which
individuals live in isolation from one another and
live anarchically with complete autonomy.
What is called a "state of nature" is utterly
mythical and never existed on earth. This should be
manifest to everyone in the light of the
incontrovertible fact that the human species could
not have survived without the existence of families
for the preservation of infants unable to take care
of themselves.
The second myth, inseparable from the first, is
the fiction that human beings, dissatisfied with
the precariousness and brutality of living in a
state of nature, decided to put up with it no
longer and to agree upon certain conventions and
rules for living together under some form of
government that replaced anarchy and eliminated
their isolation and autonomy.
Of the three modern exponents of this social
contract theory, Rousseau at least concedes that
the social contract and the state of nature have no
historical reality, but only constitute a
hypothesis to explain how civil society came into
existence. That might take the curse off the theory
if the hypothesis were necessary for explanatory
purposes. But it is not. The origin of the state
can be satisfactorily explained without any
recourse to such fictions as the social contract
and the state of nature. Therein lies the
philosophical mistake that needs correction."
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Adler
on Faith and the Will to
Believe
Belief in any religious community that has an
articulated creed, the first words uttered when the
creed is recited are "I believe." The various
things thereupon recited are the articles of
religious faith. That is the primary meaning of the
word "belief." It stands for things affirmed that
lie beyond all philosophical knowledge or opinion,
as well as beyond science and history.
The demonstration of God's existence, if it is
valid philosophical knowledge, is said to be a
preamble to faith rather than an article of faith.
In the three great religions of the West--Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam--the first article of faith
is that sacred scripture is the revealed word of
God.
There are, of course, beliefs that are not
religious faith. William James tells us about
things he cannot affirm as knowledge but which he
does affirm by exercising his will to believe.
Unable to resolve the issue about the freedom of
the will, a matter that troubled him greatly, he
derived great comfort from willfully believing that
human beings had freedom of choice.
To affirm this freedom, in his view, was beyond
all evidence and reason. Others similarly settle
for belief in God, or in the immortality of the
soul, by exercising what James called the will to
believe. Such affirmations tend to be stronger and
firmer convictions than the knowledge we have or
the opinions we hold by empirical evidence and
rational argument.
The element that is common to religious faith
and nonreligious belief is its voluntary aspect.
Both involve an exercise of the will. Being willing
to believe is what distinguishes both religious and
nonreligious faith from knowledge and right
opinion. The will moves the reason to affirm what
reason cannot establish by its own power.
When religious faith is thought of as a divine
gift, the will is moved by God to affirm what lies
beyond the natural powers of the mind to
acknowledge. The will is supernaturally moved. For
those who have a faith that is not religious, the
factors that move the will are natural, not
supernatural.
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Adler
on Wisdom
In our common speech we call a man wise either
because he shows good judgment in the practical
affairs of life, or because he has deep insight
into the ultimate principles and causes of things.
The term *wisdom* has both moral and intellectual
significance for us today, as it has had throughout
our tradition.
The ancient Greeks conceive of two kinds of
wisdom -practical wisdom, or *prudence,* and
speculative or philosophical wisdom. They consider
a man practically wise if he judges situations
correctly and chooses the means best suited to
secure his objectives. Aristotle, however, insists
that the objectives must be morally good. In his
view, practical wisdom is linked with moral
virtue.
The Greeks consider a man philosophically wise
if he understands the first principles or causes of
things. Wisdom in this sense is the highest form of
knowledge. It is the culmination of man's pursuit
of truth. It gives him the peace that accompanies
perfect fulfillment. Plotinus states that wisdom
brings perfect repose, for it is the knowledge for
which our mind has sought. And Samuel Johnson notes
the "the philosophically wise man" has no needs,
for he is complete.
Our religious tradition places a high value on
wisdom. The Greeks consider it a divine attribute.
Socrates says that God alone is wise and the man
can love or seek wisdom but he cannot possess it.
The Book of Proverbs extols wisdom as an eternal
principle that sustains and guides the physical
order and human life.
The Bible also praises as wisdom the prudent and
righteous conduct of everyday affairs, and the
astute and just decrees of rulers. Here again
wisdom is both a kind of knowledge and an aspect of
moral character. But here God is the teacher, and
wisdom is attained by listening to his
teaching--not by intellectual inquiry alone.
"The fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom," says the Bible. In this context, *fear*
means hearkening to God's word. Aquinas explains
that this is a filial, not a servile, fear--a true
respect for the divine law, not dread of
punishment. It rests on faith in God's revelation
of His will to man. And it ends in wisdom, the
perfection of the intellect that accompanies
perfect love. For Spinoza, wisdom is a form of
love, "the intellectual love of God."
How do we attain wisdom? Wisdom is the ultimate
aim of learning. Such learning is a long process,
which involves a lifetime of thoughtful inquiry and
wide experience. Book learning and good schooling
help, but they are not enough to form this supreme
virtue of mind and character.
Yet experience and age alone are not the sole
passports to wisdom. Some men remain foolish all
their life long. Indeed, few men sustain the effort
and have the devotion that are required to become
wise. These few men teach the rest of us what
wisdom is and what it means to be wise.
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Adler
on Capitalism and Socialism: Two Faces of the Same
Coin
The words "capitalism" and "socialism" are of
recent origin in everyday speech -- as recent as
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The words
are generally misused by most individuals. One
flagrant misuse occurs when no distinction is made
between socialism and communism. Then the latter is
used to designate state capitalism as contrasted
with private-property capitalism.
The former Soviet Union and the countries
controlled by it (what was then East Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary) were
all capitalist countries in the descriptive sense.
That is, they were all "capital-intensive
economies" in the same way that the Western
constitutional democracies are.
The difference between these two kinds of
capital economies was that in the eastern bloc,
state capitalism prevailed. As prescribed by the
Marxists-Leninist doctrine, the private ownership
of capital was abolished. All capital, agricultural
as well as industrial, was owned by the state and
was administered by the Communist Party. The
political result was a totalitarian state -- no
private economy and no private institutions. The
economic aspect of the Western democracies involved
the private ownership of capital and market
economy.
Let us consider constitutional democracy as an
ideal that the various countries in the West, as
well as India and Japan in the Far East,
approximate in different degrees. The ideal
approximated can be stated as a society in which
all adult human beings are political haves; all who
have reached the age of consent are citizens with
suffrage and have political liberty. They are
governed with their own consent and have a voice in
their own government. Citizens in public office
have more political responsibilities to discharge
and so have more power than ordinary citizens, but
are equal as citizens.
The economic counter part of this political
ideal is socialism. Socialism is an ideal, as
democracy is, and it is approximated in varying
degrees. As an ideal it is the economic face of
political democracy. The ideal is approximated in a
society in which all mature citizens are economic
as well as political "haves." It is a society with
no economic "have-nots" -- no one deprived of a
decent livelihood, to which every human being has a
natural right.
In the same way that all citizens are "political
haves," they are all "economic haves." That is why
democracy and socialism are two faces of the same
coin. Among the economic haves, some will have more
and some less in terms of the contribution they
make to the economy. But all are equal at the
baseline in which all have enough to live a decent
human life.
The mistake made by Marx and Lenin was thinking
that abolishing the private ownership of capital
was an indispensable step in the direction of the
socialism ideal. On the contrary, private ownership
of capital and a market economy are indispensable
means to the socialism ideal. They are required for
the production of enough wealth to distribute so
that everyone's rights to a decent livelihood can
be realized.
Though Marx and Lenin had the socialist ideal in
mind, they took the wrong steps to realize it. They
ended up with a totalitarian state in a failing,
nonprosperous economy.
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Adler
on the Purpose of Life
Let us begin by asking the purpose of the
question about the purpose of life. What do men
have in mind when they ask this question? Asking it
is a peculiarly human phenomenon. Other creatures
just exist and go on unquestioningly to pursue
their natural ends -- to be a tree or a bird. It is
man's peculiar misery or glory that he perennially
poses the question of the purpose of his own
existence.
What, then, are men who ask this question trying
to discover? Are they asking about the destiny
appointed by God for man to achieve through his
earthly existence? Does man have an ultimate goal
beyond the sphere of his temporal experience? And
if so, what must he do to attain it? The Christian
doctrine of the Kingdom of God as man's ultimate
destiny is one of the answers to the question.
Or are men asking whether human life can be made
significant on earth by achieving all the
perfections of which it is capable? In the
philosophy of Aristotle, each kind of creature
tends toward the perfection of its own nature.
Thus, for man, the goal -- the purpose -- of life
is to achieve the virtues that constitute
happiness.
As against these theological and philosophical
ideas of human destiny, our question may arise from
a conviction of the purposelessness of the physical
universe as a whole. We look out on the world
around us and see nothing but a whirl of atoms in a
meaningless void. Whether we see the physical world
as chaotic and "chancy" or as an orderly cosmos,
human life may still seem meaningless and
valueless. The pattern of material events is no
answer to the questing human heart and mind. All of
science remains silent when man asks, "What am I
doing here? Where did I come from? Where am I
going? What is the purpose of my life?"
Many modern thinkers, faced with these urgent
and disturbing questions, reject the traditional
theological and philosophical views of the purpose
and meaning of human life. They assert that men can
and must set their own goals, and find meaning in
the creation and transformation of their own
nature. In their view, a man who is truly human
must live for some transcendent goal that he sets
himself. If he does not do this, he must be
engulfed in overwhelming despair at the
meaninglessness of life.
I think we will all agree that the question is
urgent and that it demands an answer and a life
which is in accord with the answer. On the other
hand, to answer the question requires us to take a
comprehensive view of God, the universe, and man.
An understanding of man and his nature is
necessary, but it is not enough for a solution to
the problem of the meaning of human existence. We
must also understand the place of man in the
universe and in relation to all the beings that
there are. And we must see him in relation to the
ultimate power that governs the universe and all
that is in it. Man is not alone in the universe,
and we cannot understand him apart from the rest of
things.
This sounds like a long-term program and it is
-- as long as life itself. It requires the study of
theology and metaphysics, as well as of psychology
and ethics. It requires the experience and wisdom
which can be acquired only after much living and
much effort.
This is what is so disturbing about the
question. It is urgent, it calls for an immediate
answer, and yet it demands the patient and careful
reflection of a lifetime. But "that's life," as the
popular saying has it. It has never been easy to be
a human being.
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Adler
on the Conflict Between Reason and
Emotion
Dear Dr. Adler,
We are advised to be governed by reason and
not to let our emotions run away with us. At the
same time we are told not to suppress our emotions,
lest we become mentally ill. Which is it to be? Are
we to give our emotions free play or hold them in
check? How do we corrdinate reason and
emotion?
Emotion, as the term indicates, moves us. Fear,
anger, love, and joy stir us inwardly and usually
move us to act outwardly. This intensity,
excitement, and drive to action contrasts sharply
with the detachment, balance, and calmness
associated with reason. The great writers in our
tradition discuss this contrast and advance
different theories of the proper roles in human
life to be played by reason and emotion. They
express three main views: (1) reason should govern
emotion; (2) reason should get rid of emotion; and
(3) emotion should rule over reason.
Aristotle and Plato held the first view. For
them, reason is the specifically human faculty
which judges rightly what is good and directs man
to the right goals. They hold that emotion, too, is
a part of man's nature and a necessary component of
moral virtue and action. Emotion is good, in this
view, when it is properly subordinated to reason
and employed by it in the service of good ends.
Indeed, for Aristotle, such cardinal moral virtues
as temperance and courage are habitual emotional
attitudes or responses which carry out the commands
of reason.
The second view, held mainly by Stoic
philosophers like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, is
that we should try to suppress our emotions and
eventually be rid of them. The ideal is a state of
complete detachment or indifference -- literally
apathy -- toward whatever might might excite and
disturb us. Nothing must be allowed to shake the
even tenor of our judgment or our inner calm. We
should be "stoical" even when faced with the death
of loved ones, our own sufferings, the attitude of
the world toward us, public or private
catastrophes. The Stoics aim at freedom from the
passions, not their control and inclusion with the
moral life.
In modern times, Immanuel Kant voices a somewhat
similar view. He holds that the truly good will
must be utterly unaffected by the passions. Duty
alone is the rationally justifiable motive of moral
action. Inclination and delight are irrelevant in
the moral sphere.
The third view, that emotion should be supreme,
is mainly a modern position. The German Romantic
philosophers of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries -- stress the primacy of
emotion, imagination, and intuition in the
attainment of knowledge and the fulfillment of
life. They hold that analytical reason is
inadequate and misleading in man's quest to attain
the depths of existence.
Sigmund Freud's view does not fit any of the
three basic positions. Like the Greeks, he holds
that the emotions should be controlled in order to
achieve the goals of life. But his thinking is
essentially biological rather than moral.
Adjustment of emotional demands to the actual
conditions of life, he says, "promises greater
security and success" than unbridled indulgence.
The suppression of emotion, on the other hand,
results in abnormal mental states or neuroses.
Freud counsels us to try to make the best possible
adjustment of instinctive emotional impulses to the
realities of nature and society. We must avoid both
emotional indulgence and suppression. Freud's ideal
is a wholeness and balance that withstands
emotional storms within and social pressures
without.
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