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Habits
of Mind and Character
by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D.
I have mentioned two kinds of habits: habits
which are skills or arts, and moral habits -- the
habits of conduct. With respect to the first of
these I have said that they always have a mental as
well as a bodily aspect, but not all have a bodily
as well as a mental aspect; for example, the skill
of thinking logically as compared with the skill of
any sport or the skill of higher arts, such as
singing, playing a musical instrument, or painting
a picture.
With respect to moral habits, as contrasted with
skills or arts, I have said that it is more
difficult to explain how good habits are to be
distinguished from bad. I postponed doing that
until a little later. With respect to all the types
of habit, I have said that all of them are formed
by the repetition of acts. I must now point out
that this does not hold true of every type of
habit, but only of those so far mentioned. Some
habits can be formed by a single act. They are
habits of mind, and they are especially habits of
mind that have no bodily aspect, unlike most of the
habits that are skills or arts.
When these are good habits of mind, we call them
intellectual virtues. The three that I wish first
to consider are habits of insight or understanding,
habits of knowing, and habits of sound judgment
about ultimate matters, usually called
wisdom. The Greek words for these three
intellectual virtues are nous, episteme,
and sophia.
When, in the course of study or learning, I come
to understand something or gain some insight by
intuition rather than by reasoning, that
understanding or insight is mine without having to
repeat it over and over again. This is equally true
of understanding or insight that results from a
process of thinking. It is also true of knowledge
that I acquire by learning or study. Once I have
learned it, it is mine. I do not need to repeat the
acts by which I learned The only qualification to
be added here concerns the liveliness or vitality
of the habit. While a single act may be all that is
necessary to form the habit, exercising it may be
necessary to keep it alive. We do not lose these
habits by failure to exercise them, but lapses in
their exercise may result in their becoming weaker,
so that we have to take action to revive them.
Things that I once understood well may become less
clear for me when I have paid no attention to the
matter in question for a long time. I must then do
something to reactivate my understanding and
restore it to the clarity it once had. Everything
alive tends to atrophy without exercise.
The three intellectual virtues named above do
not exhaust all good habits of mind. There are two
others. One kind we have already treated
sufficiently -- all the arts or skills, whether
purely mental or both mental and bodily. The first
three intellectual virtues can all be described as
habits of knowing -- either knowing that something
is the case or knowing why it is so. The fourth
group -- the arts or skills -- can be described as
knowing how rather than as knowing that or why.
Every art and skill is knowing how to perform a
certain activity well or how to produce something
that turns out to be well made.
The fifth and last of the intellectual virtues
can also be described as knowing how, but the
know-how here concerns how to judge well and make
good decisions with regard to our conduct. This
virtue is called prudence. It is sometimes
called practical wisdom to distinguish it
from the philosophical or speculative wisdom that
consists in knowing why about the most ultimate
matters.
Like the arts or skills, prudence is a habit
formed by repeated acts of deliberating well in
order to reach sound judgments or decisions. Unlike
the arts and the other intellectual virtues,
prudence and prudence alone is concerned with the
conduct of our lives. It alone of the intellectual
virtues cannot be separated from the moral
virtues.
As we shall see, it is impossible to be morally
virtuous without being prudent, or prudent without
being morally virtuous. That is not true of any of
the other intellectual virtues. Illustrious
examples abound of great artists and excellent
performers in athletic contests who, by their
conduct, cannot be judged morally virtuous. The
same applies to great scientists and
philosophers.
It should be clear from everything that has been
said so far that the meaning of the word
virtue is completely expressed in the phrase
good habit. The Latin word from which the
English word virtue is derived gives it a slightly
different connotation, introducing the notes of
virility and strength. The Greek word arete,
which means excellence, is much nearer the mark.
Every acquired excellence, of either mind or
character, is a virtue. All habits are perfections
in the sense of developments of the nature, but
only the good habits that we call virtues are
perfections in the sense of being developments that
achieve excellence.
Turning now to the moral virtues, and
associating the one intellectual virtue of prudence
with them because it is inseparable from them, we
must ask what they are good habits of doing. The
answer is that they are good habits of desiring, as
contrasted with good habits of knowing. Desiring
has for its objects (1) the goods we aim at -- the
ends or goals we seek, and (2) the means we choose
in order to attain those ends or goals. Our
desiring may also consist in (1) acts of will on
our part, or (2) emotional impulses or drives. It
may combine both at the same time. When it does,
both mind and body are involved. Since desire is
the ultimate root and spring of all action, as
understanding, knowing, or thinking by themselves
are not, the moral virtues, as good habits of
desiring, give rise to morally good conduct. The
moral vices, as habits of desiring, result in
morally bad conduct.
Moral virtues, and also vices, are like the arts
or skills. They are habits formed by repeated acts,
morally good acts or morally bad acts. A single
good or bad action does not give an individual a
morally good or bad character, does not make him or
her a virtuous or vicious person. Not even a few
such acts do so. Only many repeated acts, all
aiming in the same direction and carried out in the
same way, will have that effect.
A person who performs a single virtuous act may
not be a virtuous person. Nor does the performance
of a single, unjust, intemperate, or cowardly act,
or even a few of them, deprive human beings of
their moral virtue. To call a particular act
virtuous is one thing; to call the individual who
performs that act virtuous is quite another.
Virtuous individuals can act unvirtuously and
vicious individuals can act virtuously, under
certain conditions. This brings us finally to the
difficult questions I have postponed answering.
Question:
What direction must the repeated acts take in order
to form the good habits that are the moral
virtues?
Answer: They
must be directed to the right ultimate end or
goal.
Question:
What is that?
Answer:
Happiness, ethically conceived as a good human
life, an expanded life, a life enriched by all the
things that are really good for a human being to be
or have.
Question:
How should this intended goal or end be
achieved?
Answer: By
choosing the right means for attaining it, means
that are not only effective for this purpose, but
that do not tend in the opposite direction.
In the light of these questions and answers, we
can now see that the moral virtues, together with
the inseparable intellectual virtue of prudence,
are habits of desiring that consist in aiming at or
in tending the right end and choosing the right
means for attaining it.
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