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Human
Equality
by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D.
We have already observed what it means to say of
any two objects under consideration that they are
equal. It means that one of them is neither more
nor less than another in an explicitly indicated
respect.
To omit mentioning one or another respect in
which two things are thought to be equal is to
speak so unclearly and so inadequately that the
statement cannot be either affirmed or denied, for
the two things being considered may be equal in one
respect and unequal in another.
Is there then any respect in which all human
beings, without a single exception, can be declared
equal? Yes, there is only one. It is that they are
all human, all members of one species, called *Homo
sapiens*, and all having the same natural and
thereby the same specific attributes that
differentiate them from the members of all other
species. In all other respects, any two human
beings may be found unequal, one having more of a
certain human attribute than another, either as the
result of native endowment or of individual
attainment.
When this is understood, it will be seen that
there is no conflict or contradiction between
saying (1) that all human beings are equal in
respect of their common humanity, and (2) that all
human beings are also unequal, one with another, in
a wide variety of respects in which they differ as
individual members of the human species.
Their equality lies in the fact that humans all
belong to the same species, possessing the traits
common to members of that species. Their inequality
lies in their individual differences as members of
that species. All being human, they are all
persons, not things; and as persons they all
equally have the dignity that inheres in their
being persons. But each is not only a person, each
is also a uniquely individual person.
Is it a self-evident truth that human equality
exists as a matter of fact? What, as a matter of
fact, are we asserting when we say that all human
beings are equal in respect to their common
humanity?
The Declaration asserts that all men are
created equal. Lincoln, in the opening words
of the Gettysburg Address, speaks of this nation
being dedicated to that proposition. But that
proposition is not self-evident, because it is not
undeniable that God exists or that God created
mankind along with other living organisms and
everything else in the cosmos. These things may be
true. They may be believed. But they can also be
and have been disbelieved and denied; it is quite
possible to think the opposite.
We can make the proposition self-evident by
dropping the word "created" and rephrasing the
statement as follows: All men are by nature equal.
This reiterates what has already been said: Human
equality consists in the fact that no human being
is more or less human than another because all have
the same specific nature by virtue of belonging to
one and the same species. If they all have the same
nature, then it cannot be denied that, in respect
of having that nature, they are all equal; no one
has more or less than another.
For a truth to be self-evident it must be beyond
the shadow of a doubt. It must be undeniable simply
because its opposite is impossible for us to think.
Does any doubt lurk here that might make us
reluctant to affirm human equality as a
self-evident truth?
Yes, remarkable as it may seem, a doubt about
the existence of human nature has appeared for the
first time in our own century. It Is not questioned
that other species of animals have specific
natures, each thereby having a set of common
attributes that differentiate them. But in certain
quarters of twentieth-century science and
philosophy there has arisen the doubt -- more than
doubt, the denial-that the same can be said of the
human species. It has been paradoxically said, for
example, that "the nature of man is to have no
nature. "
I have attempted in another book to expose the
error in this view. Here I must be content simply
to define that mistake without explaining how it
came to be made.
The error consists in failing to recognize that
the specifying or differentiating traits that
constitute human nature are all potentialities or
capacities for development. In different subgroups
of the human race these potentialities or
capacities receive different developments by the
different ways in which the members of that
subgroup are nurtured.
If one looks only to the widely differing
nurtured developments of the common human
potentialities or capacities, one will find no
common set of traits in all human subgroups. It is
only in the sameness of these potentialities or
capacities that one can discern the common traits
that constitute the human nature underlying all
these divergent developments.
What has just been said of the human species
cannot be said of any other species of living
organism. The twentieth-century doubters or deniers
of human nature should say not that there is no
human nature, but that human nature is radically
different from the natures of other animal
species.
Another point remains to be clarified about the
Declaration's assertion of human equality. The
words used are not "all human beings are
created equal," but rather "all men." To
what does that word "men" refer?
We are sensitive today to the connotation of
masculinity in the word "men." Knowing that many
signers of the Declaration owned blacks as chattel
slaves, we are also sensitive to the unexpressed
adjective "white" in the eighteenth-century use of
the word "men."
Such sensitivities lead many to charge the
signers of the Declaration with hypocrisy if they
pretended to assert that, when they said "all men,"
they meant "all human beings," not "all white
males."
In the nineteenth century, Abraham Lincoln was
confronted with such interpretations of the
Declaration on the part of Senator Stephen Douglas,
with whom he debated, and on the part of Chief
justice Roger Taney in the Dred Scott decision,
with which he took issue. Lincoln insisted that the
language of the Declaration should be interpreted
as including all human beings without regard to sex
or color or other traits that differentiate one
group of human beings from another.
In a speech he delivered in Springfield,
Illinois, in 1857, Lincoln pointed out that when it
is understood that all human beings are equal not
only in their common humanity but also in having by
virtue of their common humanity the same human
rights, it should not be thought that the signers
of the Declaration were asserting "the obvious
untruth that all were then actually enjoying that
equality, nor yet that they [the signers]
were about to confer it immediately upon them. In
fact, they had no power to confer such a boon. They
meant simply to declare the right, so that the
enforcement of it might follow as fast as
circumstances should permit."
In the same speech, Lincoln goes on to say
- The assertion that "all men are created
equal" was of no practical use in effecting our
separation from Great Britain; and it was placed
in the Declaration not for that but for its
future use.
That reference to "its future use" turns our
attention to the political significance of the
truth concerning human equality. Human equality --
the personal equality of men as men, or of human
beings as human -- is by no means the only equality
with which we are concerned in our social lives. We
are concerned with what, in contradistinction to
personal equality, might be called
circumstantial equality that is, equality of
conditions or results, equality of opportunity, and
equality of treatment.
There is one very important difference between
personal and circumstantial equality. Personal
equality is either a fact or it is not. We say that
human beings are equal as persons, not that
they should or ought to be equal in that
respect. With regard to circumstantial equality, we
can speak both descriptively and prescriptively. On
the one hand, we can say that in a given society at
a certain time, all human beings are or are
not politically or economically equal; and
on the other hand, we can also say that whether or
not they are, they should or ought to be. Under
certain circumstances, they may not in fact be
treated as equals, but those circumstances should
be altered because they ought to be treated as
equals.
The descriptive truth that, as a matter of fact,
all human beings are by nature equal as persons
underlies all prescriptions calling, as a matter of
right, for equality of conditions, equality of
opportunity, and equality of treatment.
That all human beings have the right to equal
status as citizens with suffrage, that all have the
right to equal treatment under the law, that all
have the right to equal educational opportunity,
that all have the right to a certain equality of
economic conditions (to be haves rather than
have-nots), together with all the prescriptive
statements to which these rights lead, concerning
what a 'just society ought to do about establishing
circumstantial equality in these respects-these
have their foundation in the truth that all human
beings are by nature equal.
If that were not true, it would be impossible,
in my judgment, to justify the demands for
political and economic equality as ideals to be
achieved. In the last 150 years, these demands have
at last become dominant in our social life.
Egalite together with liberte were
fighting words in the French revolution. Liberty
was one of the ideals mentioned in the Preamble to
the Constitution, but not equality. In this country
that must await a later epoch.
From Chapter 7 of "We
Hold These Truths" (1987).
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