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The Joy
of Learning
by Mortimer Adler, Ph.D.
In one way, the joy of learning is as simple to
explain as the joy of eating; and in another way,
it is as complex -- perhaps more complex. The
simple sense in which we enjoy eating is that it
satisfies a fundamental appetite in us. At frequent
intervals we are hungry and when we are, we
experience the pleasure of satisfying our desire
for food. So, too, if Aristotle is right, as I
think he is, we have a fundamental appetite for
knowledge, and the satisfaction of our desire to
know gives us great pleasure. But that is certainly
not all there is to it&emdash;either in the case of
eating or in the case of learning. A large book
could be written about the joys -- notice that I
said "joy" in the plural this time -- the joys of
eating, a complex set of gustatory pleasures which
we derive from savoring a wide variety of tasty
edibles. The joys of learning are also plural and
just as diversified or varied.
I am not going to write the large book that
could be written about them, but I am going to try
in this short essay to tell you autobiographically
about the many different pleasures I have enjoyed
either as a result of learning or in the process of
learning. The particular joys or pleasures that I
am going to describe and illustrate with stories
from my own life are only some of the pleasures or
satisfactions that learning affords. They are the
pleasures or satisfactions experienced by a person
who is temperamentally and by intellectual bent and
training a philosopher. I wanted to be a
philosopher when I was a very young man and I have
spent most of my life trying to be one. But if I
had wanted to be a scientist, or a historian, or a
mathematician, or a lawyer, or a physician, and if
I had devoted my life to learning in one or another
of those fields of knowledge, I would probably have
a different set of pleasures to describe and to
tell autobiographical stories about.
Be that as it may, the first of the joys of
learning that I remember vividly from my youth is
one that is probably common to the experience of
learning in every field of knowledge. It is the joy
of being able to remember what one has learned. I
took great pleasure, when I was a boy in elementary
school, in being able to remember -- and to recite
to myself out loud -- the dates in American history
that I had learned and the names of the capital
cities of the states in the USA. A little later,
after I had been "dropped out" of high school and
gone to work on The New York Sun, I bought,
out of the four dollars a week that I was then
earning at the age of fifteen, a history of
philosophy by Frank Thilly (I still have that book
on my shelves). I was fascinated by the
speculations of the ancient philosophers -- or
physicists -- who lived in the Greek colonies
before Socrates walked the streets of Athens; and I
derived great pleasure from being able to recite to
my self the names of these early Greek thinkers --
from Thales to Democritus and Leucippus --
remembering as well the contribution each one of
them had made to the study of nature.
Still later, when I was in college, I
experienced this same pleasure in a number of ways.
I took a course in the medical school in
neuroanatomy and thought it great sport to be able
to recite the names of the twelve cranial nerves. I
began to read the Summa Theologica of St.
Thomas Aquinas and could recite the names of the
nine hierarchies of angels, and the names of the
four cardinal virtues, the five intellectual
virtues, and the three theological virtues. When I
was a senior in Columbia College, one of my
classmates, Edward Roche Hardy, was an infant
prodigy -- he was twelve or thirteen, and I was all
of nineteen. This rankled me and, on one occasion,
in the presence of fellow students. I challenged
him to summarize the intellectual history of
Western civilization within the time it would take
to walk from 120th Street on Riverside Drive down
to Grant's Tomb. The report of the competition,
which appeared in the college newspaper, awarded me
the victory: I had succeeded in outlining the
intellectual history of the West -- from the
Egyptians, Babylonians, and Greeks down to American
pragmatism with William James and John Dewey -- in
22 minutes flat.
The pleasures of remembering and outlining whole
fields of knowledge have recurred again and again
in my life. Twenty years ago, outlining the
intellectual content of the great books, I took
pleasure in remembering and reciting the names of
the 102 great ideas, about each of which I wrote an
essay in the Syntopicon. Still more
recently, outlining the whole of human knowledge as
the basis for planning and editing the new
Britannica, I enjoyed reciting the names of the ten
major parts in the circle of learning, and I could
even re member the titles of most of the 42
subdivisions of those ten parts, but not, of
course, the titles of the more than 200 sections
that the outline contains.
I will have more to say later about the pleasure
I get from outlining, but I wish to turn now to
another joy of learning -- the pleasure derived
from a sudden clarifying insight. The Institute for
Philosophical Research opened its doors in 1952 and
started to work on the idea of freedom. We
floundered in the darkness for months, not knowing
how to give an orderly and clear account of the
basic issues about human freedom in the vast body
of writings about that subject. Suddenly, one day,
I had a "brainstorm." As clearly as one sees
everything for miles when a fog lifts and the sun
shines on the sea, I saw at once that there are
only three ways in which men possess freedom
(either naturally, circumstantially, or by the
acquisition of knowledge and virtue), and that the
kind of freedom they possess differs according to
the way in which they come to possess it. This
single vision, gained in a moment of insight,
controlled the researches of the Institute staff in
the next five years and produced the two large
volumes I wrote on The Idea of Freedom.
I could give many other examples of the same
intense joy that one experiences when a momentary
flash of insight disperses the fog in which one has
been stumbling and fumbling. But I am just going to
mention two that were closely associated with
editorial work I have done for Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc.
When Mr. Hutchins and I undertook to edit the
Great Books of the Western World, I took on
the additional assignment of indexing their content
by reference to the basic ideas that the great
books discuss. Books have been indexed by their own
authors for many centuries, but no one had ever
created a single index for 434 works by 74
different authors. Since no one had ever done it
before, I naturally did not know how to do it when
I first started. The work that I did with a large
staff during the first two years had to be thrown
away; it just was not doing the job. Then,
suddenly, I saw that the indexing had to be done to
topics expressed in fairly elaborate phrases, not
just by reference to single words as in ordinary
indices. That worked. The problem was solved -- and
the Syntopicon was finished six years
later.
More recently, when I undertook to outline the
whole of human knowledge as the basis for producing
a totally new Britannica -- another job that had
never been done before -- I was stumped for months.
Once again, the work of a large staff seemed to be
getting nowhere. One evening, I came home from the
office in despair, telling my wife that I thought
the job could not be done. I gave her all the
reasons why it seemed impossible to me (which, by
the way, is one of the best ways to stimulate one's
own mind to come up with the solution to an
apparently insoluble problem). I went up to my
study and promptly fell asleep. Hours later,
awaking from a deep and dreamless sleep, I had the
solution in the form of a single insight -- the
distinction between the role that titles play in an
analytical table of contents and the role played by
the particular subjects listed under those
organizing titles. All I needed was that single
insight in order to direct the work of my many
associates in the production of the Outline of
Knowledge and Guide to the Britannica,
which is the Table of Contents of the new Fifteenth
Edition.
Sudden insights such as these are among the most
intense joys of learning. But there are other
pleasures or satisfactions that are almost equally
intense. As everyone knows, philosophers are prone
to argument. I have spent many hours of my life
arguing with my intellectual friends or colleagues,
disputing this or that philosophical point, often
with more heat than light. The pleasure of learning
does not come from arguing itself. That is often
painful. Nor from winning an argument. What can
anyone learn from winning an argument, except that
he is right, of which he was convinced in the first
place? No, the great pleasure of learning that one
derives from arguing comes only when one loses the
argument and thereby realizes that an opinion that
one had been stubbornly defending was wrong. And
this experience is especially pleasurable when one
loses an argument to a student who resists being
taught an error.
I learned some truths about the superiority of
democracy to other forms of government, about the
necessity of world government for world peace, and
about the difficulty of demonstrating God's
existence, in the course of arguments in which I
stubbornly defended errors on these various
subjects. Losing the argument resulted not only in
my acknowledging the error I had made, but also in
learning the truth which corrected that error. That
is learning the hard way, and precisely because it
is the hard way, the joy of learning that way is so
very great.
Closely connected with the pleasure that comes
from learning the truth by losing an argument is
the pleasure of being able to put down on paper a
rigorous demonstration of the truth one has
learned. I have not been able to do that with many
of the truths I have learned, but I can vividly
remember the few instances in which I have
experienced that pleasure.
In the course of teaching the great books with
Mr. Hutchins at the University of Chicago, we were
reading Aristotle's Politics with our
students. I expressed the view that Aristotle's
opinion of democracy as the worst of the three good
forms of government was wrong. Challenged by the
students, I under took to prove the very opposite
-- that democracy is, of all forms of government,
the most just, the only completely just form. It
took me some time and effort to produce the
demonstration, but I eventually came up with a
first draft of a proof that had almost mathematical
rigor. I perfected it in papers that I subsequently
delivered at various philosophical association
meetings; and defended it against criticisms and
objections which appeared in the philosophical
journals. I was finally and firmly convinced that
the demonstration could and would stand up against
all criticisms or objections. There are few
pleasures as satisfying as the one you derive from
the conviction that you have been able to prove
something -- and make the proof stick!
I subsequently wrote a book on The Theory of
Democracy, at the heart of which the proof lies;
and the direction taken by my most recent book,
The Common Sense of Politics, was controlled
by that proof. Without going into all the
autobiographical details, just let me say that I
had the same experience of pleasure in being able
to prove that world government is necessary for
world peace -- the central thesis of a book of mine
entitled How To Think About War and Peace. I
hope some day that I will feel the joy of being
able to prove the existence of God, or at least of
being able to prove that God's existence cannot be
rigorously demonstrated. I have been working on
this for the last forty years and I am going to
keep at it until I can accomplish one or the other
of the proofs just mentioned.
Finally, I come to the pleasure which is for me
the supreme joy of learning. I have already touched
on it, but now I want to describe it more fully. It
began for me when I was a small boy in the seventh
grade. I had a teacher (I can remember him clearly
to this day; his name was Mr. Duke, and he had one
glass eye), a teacher who taught me how to
construct outlines. For some reason which I do not
fully understand, I developed a passion for
outlining, and became extremely proficient at it.
This ability has stayed with me all my life. All
the lectures I have given were written in outline
form. Most of the books I have written were first
completely written in outline form be fore I turned
them into ordinary expositions in which one
paragraph follows another, without the structural
elegance of an outline, in which every element
occupies a special numbered position and is either
supraordinate to, subordinate to, or coordinate
with every other element. Once or twice I insisted
upon keeping what I had written in outline form and
compelled my publisher to bring the book out in
that form, but I soon discovered that most people
did not get as much pleasure from reading outlines
(in fact, most people cannot read outlines) as I
got from writing them.
What is the pleasure that I get from outlining?
It is certainly a pleasure that involves learning.
It is the pleasure of putting things neatly in
order, relating one thing to another in the most
perspicuous fashion, and, as a result, seeing a
clearly defined structure which embraces everything
that should be covered. In my more delirious or
fanatical moments, I have compared the joy of
outlining with the joy that God must have
experienced in creating the universe. Where,
before, there was nothing but chaos, now there is a
cosmos -- an intelligible structure which fits
everything into its proper place.
I have lived a very fortunate life. The two
biggest jobs I was ever asked to undertake and was
paid to do -- producing the Syntopicon for
Great Books of the Western World, and
producing the Outline of Knowledge for the new
Britannica -- were jobs that allowed me to indulge
my passion for outlining and gave me the greatest
joy that is associated with learning.
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