The only standard we have for
judging all of our social, economic, and political
institutions and arrangements as just or unjust, as
good or bad, as better or worse, derives from our
conception of the good life for man on earth, and
from our conviction that, given certain external
conditions, it is possible for men to make good
lives for themselves by their own efforts.
Mortimer J. Adler
Four questions to ask yourself when you
are making up your mind about a book
By Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D.
Let us suppose that you are reading a good book,
and hence a relatively intelligible one. And let us
suppose that you are finally able to say "I
understand." If in addition to understanding the
book, you agree thoroughly with what the author
says, the work is over. The reading is completely
done. You have been enlightened -- and convinced or
persuaded.
Hence it is clear that we have additional steps
to consider only in the case of disagreement or
suspended judgment.
The meaning of agreement and disagreement
deserves a moment's further consideration. The
reader who comes to terms with an author, and
grasps his propositions and arguments, is en
rapport with the author's mind. In fact, the
whole process of interpretation is directed toward
a meeting of minds through the medium of language.
Understanding a book can be described as a kind of
agreement between writer and reader. They agree
about the use of language to express ideas. Because
of that agreement, the reader is able to see
through the author's language to the ideas he is
trying to express.
If the reader understands a book, then how can
he disagree with it? Critical reading demands that
he make up his own mind. But his mind and the
author's have become as one through his success in
understanding the book. What mind has he left to
make up independently?
There are some people who make the error which
causes this apparent difficulty. They fail to
distinguish between two senses of "agreement." In
consequence, they wrongly suppose that where there
is understanding between men, disagreement is
impossible.
The error is corrected as soon as we remember
that the author is making judgments about the world
in which we live. He claims to be giving us
theoretic knowledge about the way things exist and
behave, or practical knowledge about what should be
done. Obviously he can be either right or wrong.
His claim is justified only to the extent that he
speaks truly, or says what is probable in the light
of evidence.
If you say, for instance, that "all men are
equal," I may take you to mean that all men are
equally endowed at birth with intelligence,
strength and other abilities. In the light of the
facts as I know them, I disagree with you. I think
you are wrong. But suppose I have misunderstood
you. Suppose you meant by these words that all
men should have equal political rights. Because
I misapprehended your meaning, my disagreement was
irrelevant. Now suppose the mistake corrected. Two
alternatives still remain. I agree or disagree, but
now if I disagree, there is a real issue between
us. I understand your political position, but hold
a contrary one.
Agreement about the use of words is the
absolutely indispensable condition for genuine
agreement or disagreement about the facts being
discussed. It is because of, not in spite of, your
meeting the author's mind through a sound
interpretation of his book, that you are able to
make up your own mind as concurring in or
dissenting from the position he has taken.
What seems to me now like many years ago, I
wrote a book called Dialectic. It was my
first book, and wrong in many ways, but at least it
was not as pretentious as its title. It was about
the art of intelligent conversation, the etiquette
of controversy.
Since men are animals as well as rational, it is
necessary to acknowledge the emotions you bring to
a dispute, or those which arise in the course of
it. Otherwise you are likely to be giving vent to
feelings, not stating reasons. You may even think
you have reasons, when all you have are
feelings.
Furthermore, you must make your own assumptions
explicit. You must know what your prejudices --
that is, your pre-judgments -- are. Otherwise you
are not likely to admit that your opponent may be
equally entitled to different assumptions. Good
controversy should not be a quarrel about
assumptions. If an author, for example, explicitly
asks you to take something for granted, the fact
that the opposite can also be taken for granted
should not prevent you from honoring his
request.
Finally, I suggested that an attempt at
impartiality is a good antidote for the blindness
that is inevitable in partisanship. Controversy
without partisanship is, of course, impossible. But
to be sure that there is more light in it, and less
heat, each of the disputants should at least try to
take the other fellow's point of view.
I still think that these three conditions are
the sine qua non of intelligent and
profitable conversation. They are obviously
applicable to reading, in so far as that is a kind
of conversation between reader and author. Each of
them contains sound advice for readers who are
willing to respect the decencies of
disagreement.
But I have grown older since I wrote
Dialectic. And I am a little less optimistic
about what can be expected of human beings. I am
sorry to say that most of my disillusionment arises
from a knowledge of my own defects. I have so
frequently violated all of my own rules about good
intellectual manners in controversy. I have so
often caught myself attacking a book rather
than criticizing it, knocking straw men
over, as if mine were any better than the
author's.
I am still naïve enough, however, to think
that conversation and critical reading can be well
disciplined. Only now, twelve years later, I am
going to substitute for the rules of
Dialectic a set of prescriptions which may
be easier to follow. They indicate the four ways in
which a book can be adversely
criticized.
The four points can be briefly summarized by
conceiving the reader as conversing with the
author, as talking back. After he has said, "I
understand, but I disagree," he can make the
following remarks. (1) "You are uninformed."
(2) "You are misinformed." (3) "You are
illogical, your reasoning is not cogent." (4)
"Your analysis is incomplete."
These may not be exhaustive, though I think they
are. In any case, they are certainly the principal
points a reader who disagrees can make. They are
somewhat independent. Making one of these remarks
does not prevent your making another. Each and all
can be made, because the defects they refer to are
not mutually exclusive.
But, I should add, the reader cannot make any of
these remarks without being definite and precise
about the respect in which the author is uninformed
or misinformed or illogical. A book cannot be
uninformed or misinformed about everything.
It cannot be totally illogical. Furthermore, the
reader who makes any of these remarks must not only
support his point. He must give reasons for saying
what he does.
The first three remarks are somewhat different
from the fourth, as you will presently see. Let us
consider each of them briefly.
(1) To say that an author is uninformed
is to say that he lacks some piece of knowledge
which is relevant to the problem he is
trying to solve. Notice here that unless the
knowledge, if possessed by the author, would have
been relevant, there is no point in making this
remark. To support the remark you must be able
yourself to state the knowledge which the author
lacks and show how it is relevant, how it makes a
difference.
A few illustrations here must suffice. Darwin
lacked the knowledge of genetics which the work of
Mendel and later experimentalists now provides. His
ignorance of the mechanism of inheritance is one of
the major defects in The Origin of Species.
Gibbon lacked certain facts which later historical
research has shown to have a bearing on the fall of
Rome. Usually, in science and history, the lack of
information is discovered by later researches.
Improved techniques of observation and prolonged
investigation make this the way things happen for
the most part. But in philosophy it may happen
otherwise. There is just as likely to be loss as
gain with the passage of time. David Hume lacked
knowledge of the distinction between ideas and
images, which had been well established by earlier
philosophers.
(2) To say that an author is misinformed
is to say that he asserts what is not the case. His
error here may be due to lack of knowledge, but the
error is more than that. Whatever its cause, it
consists of assertions contrary to fact. The author
is proposing as true or more probable what is in
fact false or less probable. He is claiming to have
knowledge he doesn't possess. To support the remark
you must be able to argue the truth or greater
probability of a position contrary to his.
For example, in a political treatise, Spinoza
appears to say that democracy is a more primitive
type of government than monarchy. This is contrary
to well-ascertained facts of political history.
Spinoza's error in this respect has a bearing on
his argument. Aristotle was misinformed about the
role which the male factor played in animal
reproduction, and consequently came to
unsupportable conclusions about the processes of
procreation. Thomas Aquinas erroneously supposed
that the heavenly bodies only changed in position,
that they were otherwise unalterable. Modern
astrophysics corrects this error and thereby
improves on ancient and medieval astronomy. But
here is an error which has limited relevance.
Making it does not affect St. Thomas's metaphysical
account of the nature of all corporeal things as
composed of matter and form.
These first two points of criticism are somewhat
related. Lack of information, as we have seen, may
be the cause of erroneous assertions. Further,
whenever a man is misinformed, he is also
uninformed of the truth. But it makes a difference
whether the defect be simply negative, or positive
as well. Lack of relevant knowledge makes it
impossible to solve certain problems or support
certain conclusions. Erroneous suppositions,
however, lead to wrong conclusions and untenable
solutions. Taken together, these two points charge
an author with defects in his premises. He needs
more knowledge than he has.
(3) To say that an author is illogical is
to say that he has committed a fallacy in
reasoning. In general, fallacies are of two sorts.
There is the non sequitur, which means that
what is offered as a conclusion simply does not
follow from the grounds proposed. And there is the
occurrence of inconsistency, which means
that two things the author has tried to say are
incompatible. To make either of these criticisms,
the reader must be able to show the precise respect
in which the author's argument lacks cogency. One
is concerned with this defect only to the extent
that the major conclusions are affected by it. A
book may lack cogency in irrelevant respects.
It is more difficult to illustrate this third
point, because few great books make obvious slips
in reasoning. When they do occur, they are usually
elaborately concealed, and it requires a very
penetrating reader to discover them. But I can show
you a patent fallacy which I found in a recent
reading of Machiavelli's Prince:
"The chief foundations of all states, new as
well as old, are good laws. As there cannot be
good laws where the state is not well armed, it
follows that where they are well armed they have
good laws."
Now it simply doesn't follow from the
fact that good laws depend on an adequate police
force, that where the police force is
adequate, the laws will necessarily be good. I am
ignoring the highly questionable character of the
first fact. I am only interested in the non
sequitur here. Machiavelli failed to
distinguish between what are called necessary and
sufficient conditions.
In his Elements of Law, Hobbes argues in
one place that all bodies are nothing but
quantities of matter in motion. The world of
bodies, he says, has no qualities whatsoever. Then,
in another place, he argues that man is himself
nothing but a body, or a collection of atomic
bodies in motion. Yet, admitting the existence of
sensory qualities -- colors, odors, tastes, and so
forth -- he concludes that they are nothing but the
motions of atoms in the brain. This conclusion is
inconsistent with the position first taken, namely,
that the world of bodies in motion is without
qualities. What is said of all bodies in
motion must apply to any particular group of
them.
This third point of criticism is related to the
other two. An author may, of course, fail to draw
the conclusions which his evidences or principles
imply. Then his reasoning is incomplete. But we are
here concerned primarily with the case in which he
reasons poorly from good grounds.
The first three points of criticism, which we
have just considered, deal with the soundness, the
truth and accuracy, of the author's statements and
reasoning. Let us turn now to the fourth adverse
remark a reader can make. It deals with the
completeness of the author's execution of his plan
-- the adequacy with which he discharges the task
he has chosen.
Before we proceed to this fourth remark, one
thing should be observed. If you as a reader cannot
support any of these first three remarks, you are
then obligated to agree with the author as far as
he has gone. You have no freedom of will about
this. It is not your sacred privilege to decide
whether you are going to agree or disagree.
Since you have not been able to show that the
author is uninformed, misinformed or illogical on
relevant matters, you simply cannot disagree. You
must agree. You cannot say, as so many students and
others do, "I find nothing wrong with your
premises, and no errors in reasoning, but I don't
agree with your conclusions." All you can possibly
mean by saying something like this is that you
don't like the conclusions. You aren't
disagreeing. You're expressing your emotions or
prejudices. If you have been convinced, you should
admit it.
(4) To say that an author's analysis is
incomplete is to say that he hasn't solved
all the problems he started with; or that he hasn't
made as good a use of his materials as possible,
that he didn't see all their implications and
ramifications; or that he has failed to make
distinctions which are relevant to his undertaking.
It is not enough to say that a book is incomplete.
Anyone can say that of any book. Men are finite,
and so are their works, every last one. There is no
point in making this remark unless the reader can
define the inadequacy precisely, either by his own
efforts as a knower, or through the help of other
books.
Let me illustrate this point briefly. The
analysis of types of government in Aristotle's
Politics is incomplete. It doesn't consider,
naturally enough, either representative government
or the modern kind of federated state. The analysis
would have to be extended to apply to these
political phenomena. Euclid's Elements of
Geometry is an incomplete account because he
failed to consider other postulates about the
relation of parallel lines. Modern geometrical
works, making these other assumptions, supply the
deficiencies. Dewey's How We Think is an
incomplete analysis of thinking because it fails to
treat the sort of thinking which occurs in reading
or learning by instruction, in addition to the sort
which occurs in investigation and discovery.
This fourth point is strictly not a basis for
disagreement. It is critically adverse only to the
extent that it marks the limitations of the
author's achievement. A reader who agrees with a
book in part -- because he has failed to support
any of the other points of adverse criticism --
may, nevertheless, suspend judgment on the whole,
in the light of this fourth point about the book's
incompleteness.
Related books in the same field can be
critically compared by reference to these four
criteria. One is better than another in proportion
as it speaks more truth and makes fewer errors. If
we are reading for knowledge, that book is best,
obviously, which most adequately treats a given
subject-matter. One author may lack information
which another possesses; one may make erroneous
suppositions from which another is free; one may be
less cogent than another in reasoning from similar
grounds. But the profoundest comparison is made
with respect to the completeness of the analysis
which each presents. That is one of the marks of
real greatness.
Originally published in The
Commonweal, Vol. XXX, October 13, 1939, pp
548-551.