Is
Anyone Ever Perfectly Virtuous
or Completely Happy?
by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D.
Perfect moral virtue, philosophically
considered, is an ideal always to be aimed at, but
seldom if ever to be attained. Our moral characters
are blemished by this flaw or that. Individuals who
have morally good characters are morally virtuous
to a degree that is measured by the frequency with
which they commit acts that are not virtuous. That
frequency may not be so great that it breaks the
habit of virtuous conduct, but it can be great
enough to weaken an individual's moral fiber.
The result is a degree of moral virtue that only
approximates the ideal aimed at. Accordingly,
individuals may have moral virtue in varying
degrees, some more, some less, but rarely if ever
is the ideal of perfection attained.
Another consequence is the incompleteness of the
happiness achieved. The more virtuous a person is,
the more that individual has it in his power to
make a good life for himself or herself. However,
variations in degree of moral virtue are not the
only factor in determining how nearly individuals
can approximate the ideal of complete happiness in
their earthly lives. The other factor consists in
the degree of good fortune with which the
individual is blessed. Some are more fortunate,
some less. The more fortunate a person is, the more
he will come into possession of all those real
goods that are not wholly within his own power to
obtain.
Reference to good fortune and misfortune leads
us to another factor that flaws our happiness and
renders it incomplete. Almost all of us at one time
or another, and even perhaps on several occasions,
meet with the misfortune of having to make a tragic
choice. Circumstances beyond our control confront
us with alternatives that permit us no good choice.
Whichever alternative we choose results in our
voluntarily taking evil unto ourselves. This occurs
when we must choose between one love and another,
between love and duty, between conflicting duties
or between conflicting kinds of law to both of
which we owe loyalty, and between justice and
expediency.
One of our greatest debts to the ancient Greeks
is their discovery of human tragedy, so clearly
exemplified in two plays by Sophocles,
Antigone and Oedipus Rex. Modern
exemplifications of it exist in the classical
French tragedies of Racine and Corneille and also
in one short story told by Herman Melville,
Billy Budd. But let no one suppose that
tragedy befalls only these fictional heroes and
heroines. The rest of us also experience it through
tricks of fate, played on us by outrageous
fortune.
Tragedy befalls only the morally virtuous who
are already on the way toward making good lives for
themselves. It does not occur in the lives of fools
or knaves, villains or criminals. They have ruined
their own lives. There is nothing left for
misfortune to ruin.
We could not speak of degrees of moral virtue
were it not one and the same personal perfection
for all human beings. Nor could we speak of degrees
of happiness did not a good human life comprise the
same real goods for all human beings. Only in the
purely psychological meaning of the word
happiness does what makes one man happy make
another miserable. Only in that meaning of the term
are there as many different states of happiness as
there are different individuals.
The felt contentment or satisfaction that is
called happiness psychologically depends on our
individually differing wants as well as on the
extent to which they are fulfilled or frustrated.
In contrast, the whole good life that is called
happiness ethically depends on the fulfillment of
our common human needs as well as upon the extent
to which they are fulfilled by the attainment of
the real goods that we seek.
So far as its enrichment by all real goods is
concerned, one person's happiness or good life is
the same as another's, differing only in the extent
to which their common human needs are fulfilled.
However, there may be another source of difference
between one person's happiness and another's. While
remaining the same with respect to the real goods
that everyone needs, it may differ with respect to
the apparent goods that individuals want. The
things that appear good to one person because he or
she wants them will obviously differ from the
things that appear good to another person. That
individual's wants are different.
Of all such apparent goods, some may also be
real goods, needed as well as wanted. Some may be
merely apparent goods, not needed but nevertheless
innocuous in the sense that wanting and getting
them does not interfere with or impede our
attaining the real goods all of us need. And some
may be noxious rather than innocuous. Wanting these
and getting them can defeat our pursuit of
happiness. Apparent goods that are detrimental to
the pursuit of happiness cannot, of course, play
any part in differentiating one person's happiness
from another's. But in addition to being enriched
by all the same real goods, in varying degrees, one
person's happiness may also differ from another's
by the different innocuous apparent goods that
still further enrich the happiness of each.
One further question remains concerning the
degree to which individuals approximate the ideal
of complete happiness on earth. As almost everyone
is subject to the occurrence of tragedy in their
lives, so almost everyone is also subject to
misfortunes, some more dire than others. An early
death, enslavement, the agony of poverty carried to
the extreme of destitution, imprisonment in
solitary confinement, these things can completely
frustrate a person's pursuit of happiness. They
result in the misery that is the very opposite of
happiness. However, misfortunes may not completely
frustrate, but merely impede, an individual's
effort to make a good life for himself or herself.
Under what conditions are we best able to overcome
such misfortunes and still save our lives from the
wreckage of bad luck?
The stronger our moral virtue, the more likely
are we to be able to make good lives for ourselves
in spite of these misfortunes. The other side of
the same picture is that hard luck and adversity,
when the misfortunes do not cause irrep-arable
damage or destructive deprivations, may result in
the strengthening of moral virtue. Being blessed by
benign conditions and the affluence of unmitigated
good fortune usually has exactly the opposite
effect. It is more difficult to develop moral
virtue under such conditions than it is under
adversity, when that is not crippling or totally
destructive.
You probably do not need to be reminded that
success in the pursuit of happiness depends on two
factors, not one, each necessary, neither
sufficient by itself. But you may be interested in
examining Aristotle's one sentence definition of
happiness. It summarizes the point compactly and
succinctly. In reporting it below, I have added in
brackets words not in the original, but which make
its intent clearer.
- Happiness consists in a complete life
[well-lived because it is] lived in
accordance with [moral] virtue, and
accompanied by a moderate possession of
[wealth and other] external goods.
I never tire of reiterating the importance of
understanding that moral virtue by itself is not
enough to make a life good. Were it sufficient by
itself, there would be no point whatsoever in all
the political, social, and economic reforms that
have brought about progress in the external
condition of human life.
If morally virtuous persons can live well and
become happy in spite of dire poverty; in spite of
being enslaved; in spite of being compelled by
circumstances to lead two- or three-part lives,
with insufficient time for leisure; in spite of an
unhealthy environment; in spite of being
disfranchised and treated as nonparticipating
subjects of government rather than as citizens with
a voice in their own government, then the social,
political, and economic reforms that eliminate
these conditions and replace them with better ones
make no contribution to human happiness.
Precisely because being morally virtuous is not
enough for success in the pursuit of happiness, it
is better to live in a full-fledged state than in a
small village, in a society that has all the
advantages peculiar to a political community;
better to live under the peace of civil government
than under the violence of anarchy; better to live
under constitutional government than under
despotism, no matter how benev-olent; better to
live in a democratic republic and in a
capital-intensive socialist (but not communist)
economy than under a less just political
institution and under less favorable economic
arrangements.
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