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How to
Think About Love
Max Weismann interviews Mortimer
Adler
Part 2: Love as
Friendship
Weismann: I
would like now to develop a fuller understanding of
this kind of love: love between friends, love
between parents and children, love of country, or
of truth, or of God.
To recap: we have discussed the contrast between
two kinds of love: sexual or erotic love on the one
hand, and fraternal or friendly love on the
other.
These two kinds of love are often fused. In
order to examine the second kind of love in
complete separation from all elements of sexuality
or erotic desire, you proposed that we consider it
in an imaginary world -- a world in which there was
no sex, but everything else would be the same. In
such a world, there would be desires on the one
hand -- desires like hunger -- and, on the other
hand, there would be love -- parental love, the
love of friends, the love of patriots for their
country, and love of God.
Not only would love and desire be quite
separate, but they would be sharply opposed to one
another: as liking is to wanting, as giving is to
getting. We have here impulses tending in quite
opposite directions: the impulses of love being
generous and benevolent, the impulses of desire
being selfish and acquisitive.
I would like our discussion to center on the
love which is fraternal or friendly, the brotherly
love or friendship which is not rooted in
acquisitive or selfish desires.
But before we start, there's one thing I have to
know, and so does everyone else probably. In which
world are we going to carry on this discussion --
the real world, or your imaginary world without
sex?
Adler: Let's
start off where we all are -- in the real world.
When it becomes necessary to move into the
imaginary world without sex, I'll give you notice
-- in plenty of time to get your imagination
working in tune with mine.
I will start with Aristotle's analysis of the
reasons why men associate with one another. Men
value things in three ways: as useful, as
pleasant or sources of pleasure, and as
excellent, or as intrinsically admirable or
honorable. Examples of these kinds of associations
are: 1) associations based on utility (business
relationships, political alliances, marriages of
convenience); 2) associations based on pleasure
(sexual attachments, infatuations, perhaps also the
conviviality of bon vivants); and 3) associations
based on the excellence of the persons involved
(friendships arising from mutual admiration and
respect).
Weismann: Is
my understanding of Aristotle's thesis correct in
that only the third type of human relationship --
based on mutual admiration of personal excellence
-- is genuinely love? The first is not love at all,
and the second is not love either, unless it is
somehow joined with the third, but the third,
without any trace of either the first or the
second, is love -- true love?
Adler: That
is correct. The first two are imitations or
counterfeits of love; they resemble love insofar as
they do involve some mutuality or reciprocation.
There is no mutuality in ordinary desire: the
hungry man wants to eat the food, but the food does
not reciprocate -- it doesn't want to be eaten. But
this resemblance, while present, is superficial,
because the mutuality is based on something outside
the persons involved. It is a quid pro quo
relationship -- a fair exchange of favors; each
serves the other in some way, or each gives the
other some pleasure.
As a result of this, those kinds of
relationships are highly precarious and unstable.
Love is more permanent; as Shakespeare says in one
of his Sonnets, "Love is not love that alters
when it alteration finds."
Most important of all, desire is the root
of relationships based on utility or pleasure --
desire for money, fame, or power, desire for bodily
pleasure of one sort or another. In sharp contrast,
in relationships based on the excellence of the
persons involved, love is fundamental and is
the root or source of whatever desire comes to
exist.
Weismann:
You said at the beginning that love differs from
desire as giving differs from getting. Now you
speak of love as being the root or source of some
desire. Do you mean a desire to give as contrasted
with a desire to get?
Adler: That
is precisely what I mean. The desire to give, or
perhaps it would be better to say the benevolent
wish or impulse, the impulse of goodwill toward the
person loved, is the very essence of loving. Loving
someone may involve more than goodwill toward them
-- wishing to benefit them or give to them, but it
must involve at least that. If it doesn't, it isn't
love at all.
Weismann:
Wait a minute. Let's look at this point a little
more closely. As soon as you say "goodwill," a
question comes to mind. Is the loving will the only
form of goodwill? Isn't the just will also a form
of goodwill to other men? If so, what is the
difference between love and justice -- between the
good will of loving and the goodwill of being
just?
Adler: That
is a most important distinction, and I'm glad you
raised it. The answer is that love consists in
giving without getting in return; in giving
what is not owed, what is not due the
other. That's why true love is never based, as
associations for utility or pleasure are, on a fair
exchange. We love even when our love is not
requited. That's why we say: "It is better to have
loved and lost, than never to have loved at
all."
Here's a more concrete example: when we are
sorry that someone doesn't love us as we would like
to be loved by them, we don't complain that they
are not being fair or just to us. When we ask for
love, we don't ask others to be fair to us -- but
rather to care for us, to be considerate of us.
There is a world of difference here between
demanding justice (and here we have a right to
demand) and begging or pleading for love (and here
we have no right).
Weismann: I
find this distinction between love and justice to
be of crucial importance. Could you be more
explicit?
Adler:
Though both involve goodwill toward one's neighbors
and one's fellowmen, they are quite different other
respects. Justice consists of paying our debts; it
is obligatory -- we discharge our just obligations;
fairness of us in relation to others. In contrast
love consists, not in paying our debts, but in
giving gifts; its acts are not obligatory but
gratuitous; it prompts us to show consideration
toward others. Let me give you two examples of
heroic acts of love, and you will see how they
differ from the dutiful acts of justice.
The first is the legendary Roman hero, Marcus
Curtius. He plunged himself and his horse into a
deep chasm in the Roman forum. It had been
prophesied that this chasm would not close unless
Rome's most valuable possessions were thrown into
it. So, Marcus knowing that Rome's most precious
possession was a good citizen, threw himself into
the pit and it closed on him.
Another example of heroic love is the American
hero -- Nathan Hale, who was hung as a spy during
the Revolutionary War. At the base of his statue
are engraved his last words: "My only regret is
that I have but one life to give for my
country."
Think how different human societies would be if
they were based on love rather than justice. Think
of Aristotle's penetrating remark: "When men are
friends, they have no need of justice." But no such
societies have ever existed on earth. Most
societies are those in which justice prevents
discord, rather than societies in which love
produces concord.
Weismann:
Are we now ready for a definition of love?
Adler: I
think we are. But instead of giving you my own
words just now, I am going to read you two passages
which state the definition perfectly.
The first passage is from Montaigne's essay on
friendship. He says: "In true friendship, I give
myself to my friend more than I endeavor to attract
him to me. I am not only better pleased in doing
him service than if he conferred benefit upon me;
but, moreover, had rather he should do himself good
than me."
The second passage is from Aristotle's
Ethics, Book IX, Chapter 4. Here Aristotle
defines friendship: "We define a friend as one who
wishes and does what is good for the sake of his
friend; as one who wishes his friend to exist and
to live for his own sake, which is what mothers
wish for their children; and as one who grieves
with and rejoices with his friend, and this, too,
is found in mothers most of all." Notice that
Aristotle uses a mother's love for her child as the
prime example of love or friendship.
Weismann:
Are we to understand that true love is entirely
benevolent, entirely unselfish, entirely selfless?
That the lover wants absolutely nothing for himself
-- not even to be loved in return? If you mean
that, then you are living -- or rather thinking --
in an imaginary world -- not only with sex removed,
but most of human nature, too.
Adler: No,
no, no. That would be going too far. Love can be
unselfish, in the sense of being benevolent and
generous, without being selfless. Moreover, it is
perfectly proper for the lover to wish something
good for himself, as well as for his beloved. These
two wishes go together; they are quite
compatible.
Let me explain. Proper self-love is
inseparable from the true love of another.
In fact, it is its basis and measure. It is the
second precept of charity. The mutuality of love
arises from loving in ourselves the same excellence
we love in others. Without amour-propre or
proper self-respect, true love would be
impossible.
Weismann:
Then when we love another person, we wish them
well, we wish something good for them. Hence the
question: when, in loving another, we also love
ourselves, what do we wish for ourselves -- what
good do we seek for ourselves?
Adler: We
wish to be loved, and with that we wish the joy of
love -- the joy of companionship, of being in the
presence or company of the other, ultimately, we
wish the joy of perfect union with the person we
love.
Let me summarize the three wishes of love for
you. They are: 1) to benefit the other; 2) to be
loved in return; and 3) to enjoy the closest union
with the beloved.
Weismann:
That word "union" troubles me. I cannot help asking
-- which world are we in -- the world with sex or
without it?
Adler: Let
me clarify what union means in this sense, quite
apart from sex. Hence, please move into the
imaginary world with me.
Eliminating physical contacts of all sorts, what
sort of union do we mean when we say that love
wishes the joy of perfect union? The answer is
spiritual union: through cornpassion and
sympathy, through sharing and liking the same
things, through living a common life, through
knowing and understanding each other.
The reference to knowledge helps us to
understand this point. We can possess things in two
ways, physically and spiritually; by
consuming them and by beholding them, by using them
and by knowing them. Love possesses its object in
the manner of knowledge. Love is like knowledge,
only better than all forms of purely intellectual
knowledge. That's why Aquinas says: it is better to
love God than to know Him, and better to know
things than to love them.
Weismann: I
had a discussion recently with a college professor
who asserted that u love is merely a cultural
accretion that is in no way essential to man's
existence, and that the human race will probably
sometime learn to dispense with it." What is your
comment on that statement?
Adler: I am
glad to give it. The need for love is one of the
deepest needs in human nature, because we are by
nature social. But we are social persons, not
social animals. Hence we cannot be satisfied, as
the gregarious animals are, simply by herding
together, simply by being useful to another, or
simply by the pleasures of bodily contact.
We want to share one another's lives. How can
this be done? Only by conversation -- which is
indispensable to love. Love without conversation is
impossible. Conversation without love is quite
possible, but then it is only abstract discussion,
not the heart-to-heart talk which is the
conversation of lovers.
Unless we love and are loved, each of us is
alone, each of us is deeply lonely. Unless we enjoy
the community of love -- the communication or
conversation of love, we cannot get out of
ourselves, and we are shut out from all others, as
animals are, even when they herd closely
together.
Everything I have said today about love as
friendship indicates that it can exist in a world
without sex. My last point about conversation shows
this quite simply.
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