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Adler on
Salesmanship
The Art
of Persuasion
by Mortimer Adler, Ph.D.
Part III
To be effective in the use of pathos, in
order to evoke favorable emotional impulses,
persuaders must bear two things in mind.
First of all, they must recognize those human
desires that they can depend upon as being present
and actively motivating forces in almost all human
beings -- the desire for liberty, for justice, for
peace, for pleasure, for worldly goods, for honor,
good repute, position, or preference. Taking for
granted that such desires generally abound with
driving force, persuaders can call upon them for
the objectives they have in mind, concentrating on
the reasons why the course of action recommended is
a better way of gratifying them than some
alternative that a competitor might be trying to
sell.
Here it is the logos rather than the
pathos that persuaders must employ to tip
the scales in their favor, whether they are trying
to make their products more desirable than those of
competitors or trying to make their candidate for
public office preferable to an opponent for the
office. Both products may serve the same purpose
and so both may be responsive to a desire that
exists and that they need only invigorate; their
task, therefore, is to give the reasons why their
product should be preferred.
Similarly, in political campaigning or in
legislative debate about conflicting policies,
where the emotional appeal is for the preservation
of peace, the protection of liberties, or the
securing of welfare benefits, persuaders do not
have to create a desire for peace, liberty, or
welfare. It is there to be used. They need only
argue that their candidate or their policy serves
that purpose better.
Persuaders cannot always count on desires that
are generally prevalent in their audiences and
ready to be brought into play. Sometimes they must
instill the very desire that they seek to satisfy
with their product, their policy, or their
candidate. Sometimes people have needs or wants
that are dormant, needs or wants of which they are
not fully aware. These, persuaders must try to
awaken and vitalize. Sometimes they must try to
create a desire that is novel -- generally
inoperative until they have aroused it and made it
a driving force. This is what must be done with a
new product on the market. So, too, this is what a
candidate for public office must do if his or her
claim to it is based on a novel appeal.
The element of ethos may either precede
or be combined with the employment of pathos
in the sales talk. The role of the PR expert or the
Madison Avenue consultant is to make the company
that is trying to sell a product look good as well
as to make the product itself more desirable than
what the competition has to offer. When such
experts in persuasion work for a political
candidate, they work in the same way. They try to
paint a glowing picture of their candidate's
character in addition to activating the motives for
subscribing to the policies for which he or she
stands.
With ethos and pathos fully
operative, logos remains the winning trump
in the persuader's hand. Here there are things to
be avoided as well as things to be done well.
Above all, the persuader should avoid lengthy,
involved, and intricate arguments. The task to be
performed is not to produce the conviction that can
result from a mathematical demonstration or
scientific reasoning. Effective persuasion aims at
much less than that -- only a preference for one
product, one candidate, or one policy over another.
Hence the argument to be employed should be much
skimpier, much more elliptical, much more
condensed.
Persuaders must, therefore, omit many steps in
the reasoning they present to catch the minds of
their listeners. The classical name for such
reasoning is the Greek word enthymeme, which
signifies a process of reasoning with many premises
omitted. The unmentioned premises must, of course,
be generalizations that the persuader can safely
assume will be generally shared. In arguments
before a judicial tribunal, counsel for the
prosecution or defense can take for granted certain
generalizations of which the court takes judicial
notice because, being generally acknowledged as
true, they do not have to be explicitly
asserted.
With such generalizations taken for granted, the
persuader can go immediately from a particular
instance, one that falls under the assumed and
unmentioned generalization, to the conclusion that
the applicable generalization entails. This is
arguing from example. If I wish to persuade my
listeners that a particular product or policy
should be bought or adopted, I can do so
effectively by showing how it exemplifies a
generally accepted truth.
I do not have to assert that whatever
contributes to a person's health is good. I need
only describe my product as doing just that and
doing it in full measure. I do not have to assert
that everyone has a right to earn a living and that
those who remain unemployed through no fault of
their own suffer a serious injustice. I need only
describe my policy as one that will increase
employment. If I am prosecuting someone indicted
for a serious crime, I do not have to assert that
suddenly leaving the vicinity of the crime is an
indication of guilt. I need only produce evidence
to show that the prisoner at the bar did precisely
that and that his departure has no other
explanation.
Brevity or sparsity of reasoning is not the only
factor in presenting a persuasive argument. Another
is the employment of what are called rhetorical
questions. Rhetorical questions are those so worded
that one and only one answer can be generally
expected from the audience you are addressing. In
this sense, they are like the unmentioned premises
in abbreviated reasoning, which can go unmentioned
because they can be taken for granted as generally
acknowledged.
Thus, for example, Brutus asks the citizens of
Rome: "Who is here so base that would be a
bondman?" adding at once: "If any, speak, for him
have I offended." Again Brutus asks: "Who is here
so vile that will not love his country?" Let him
also speak, "for him I have offended." Brutus dares
to ask these rhetorical questions, knowing full
well that no one will answer his rhetorical
questions in the wrong way.
So, too, Marc Antony, after describing how
Caesar's conquests filled Rome's coffers, asks:
"Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?" And after
reminding the populace that Caesar thrice refused
the crown that was offered him, Antony asks: "Was
this ambition?" Both are rhetorical questions to
which one and only one answer can be expected.
In the course of explaining how the three
essential elements in persuasion operate to make it
effective, I have indicated the various kinds of
speaking with a practical purpose that I have
lumped together under the general heading of the
sales talk. We normally restrict that term to
obvious instances of salesmanship in the
advertising and selling of commercial products. But
speaking with a practical purpose in the political
arena, in the legislative chamber, in a courtroom
where someone is being prosecuted or defended, at a
public ceremony where someone is to be honored or
something is to be commemorated -- all these, no
less than winning customers for a product, involve
selling.
Every form of public speaking with a practical
purpose involves the same three essential factors
in persuasion that must be employed in successful
salesmanship. What has just been said applies
equally to practical speaking that is not public --
the kind of speech made by the chairman of the
board to his colleagues, the kind of speech made by
the proponent of a certain policy at a business
conference, and even the kind of speech made by one
member of a household to the rest of the family,
with the practical purpose of getting them to adopt
a recommendation being advanced. In the classic
expositions of practical rhetoric, from Aristotle,
Cicero, and Quintilian down to the present, such
terms as "selling" and "salesmanship" do not occur.
The kinds of practical speaking are enumerated
under such headings as deliberative (which
refers to political oratory), forensic
(which refers to the kind of speech that occurs in
judicial proceedings, as, for example, counsel's
summation to a jury), and epidictic (which
refers to any effort to praise or dispraise
something, whether that be a person or a policy),
all of which are forms of persuasion.
It should be obvious that selling a product,
like praising a person or a policy, is an effort at
eulogistic persuasion. It should be no less obvious
that political and forensic oratory are efforts to
persuade the listeners to buy some thing -- a
policy being advocated or an evaluative
judgment.
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Part I...
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