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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY |
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by Mary Whiton Calkins
Perhaps the most fundamental contrast between conceptions of the good is that between individualistic or (as they used to be named) egoistic theories on the one hand, and social, or altruistic, conceptions on the other. It must, however, carefully be borne in mind that there is a sense in which a self is always egoistic, for, whatever else a man is conscious of, he is always (though often very vaguely) conscious of himself. Similarly, there is a sense in which a self is always altruistically, or socially, conscious, for there is no really isolated self and even such predominantly "impersonal" experiences as thinking and perceiving have a social reference. That is to say, we are aware that other people, similarly placed, see what we see and hear what we hear; and we regard the laws of though as universal, held by everybody. The clear understanding that every man is, in this fundamental sense, both egoist and altruist and that the two attitudes are not incompatible is an important introduction to the study of ethical egoism and altruism. For when a moral system is designated as egoistic (individualistic) or altruistic (social) either term is used, in a sense, far narrower than that which has just been formulated, to indicate a basal form of willing. It will be convenient first to present in a relatively uncritical fashion both the egoistic and the altruistic theory. Egoistic willing is, as we know, self-assertion, the subordination of my environment, personal or impersonal, to myself. And, from the standpoint of ethical egoism, the good which I ought to seek is precisely my own good, not that of anybody else. The argument for ethical individualism (or egoism), is variously stated. It is sometimes urged that the supreme object of will is a man;s own good since only so can his will be directed toward that part of the universe, himself, which is under his own control. A man can not, it is argued, by his willing, alter the course of the sun or the conduct of a tradesman but he can affect his own conduct and he may gain his own pleasure, advantage, enlargement. Or again, it may be argued empirically that men actually reach their highest levels of achievement, develop their utmost strength and capacity, only under the spur of ambition, only in conditions of widest freedom, only through stressing their own individual purposes. The culmination of such a view is Nietzsche's teaching (as it is usually interpreted) -- the doctrine that human progress is forever impossible except as each man relentlessly seeks his own advantage in total disregard of the needs of other men so that, out of the welter of failing, defeated beings there may emerge the superman -- the man strong enough to trample down all rivalry and opposition and to win against all odds. Most often, however, egoism is argued negatively by the destructive criticism (presently to be summarized) of altruistic conceptions coupled with the implication that egoism is the only alternative to altruism. Altruistic (or social) will -- sharply contrasted with egoistic self-assertion -- is loyalty, or devotion, the subordination of myself to a cause, a person, an ideal -- in a word, to some object other than my narrow and individual self. The altruist conceives the moral self as furthering the happiness or the perfection no longer of himself but of another self or selves. To the altruist (in the strict meaning of the term) the good man is one who lavishes and sacrifices his own possessions, health, opportunities, his very life, for others. To be good consists in turning from one's own end, in crucifying, in torturing, in annihilating one's self so that one may thereby rescue, help, or enrich others. The mother who completely subordinates herself to her children is thus the never failing embodiment of the altruist's ideal. But there are as many forms of altruism as there are types of personal and social relationship. The cavalier who gives himself, body and soul, to the king's cause, the Jesuit who yields himself to his order, the union workman who goes on a sympathetic strike -- these all are (or may well be) altruists. For the altruist abjures his own good and seeks that of other self or selves. And he appeals alike to the casual observer and to the close student of biography to confirm his view that the good men are altruists and that conversely, in Spencer's words, "an unchecked satisfaction of personal desires -- in absolute disregard of all other beings would cause...social dissolution." Clearly, the altruist repeats, men who are ever seeking others' gains -- devoted physicians, tireless teachers, lavish givers -- are willing a good to which the merely individual egoistic good must be subordinate. But the egoist is never silenced by this appeal to experience. He first notes as incidental to his argument, the patent fact that many alleged altruists are really egoists in disguise, seeking, under the cloak of avowed altruism, their individual ends: reputation or material gain. And next, admitting the sincerity of genuinely altruistic ideals, the egoist emphasizes the divergence among them and the difficulty of harmonizing the objects of the personal, the domestic, and the patriotic altruist. It is, on the face of it, equally altruistic to sacrifice oneself for one's parents, one's children, one's state; but altruism contains no principle by which to decide between these conflicting objects. With greatest effect, however, the critic attacks the fundamental position of altruism strictly defined, namely, disregard of oneself. Herein, he insists, the altruistic conception is essentially irrational. The mother who wears herself out in the passionate pursuit of what she deems best for her children is purposing to defeat her own end (for she is actually choosing a course which makes her useless to the very beings whose good she is willing); and the object of her will, involving as it does disregard of an individual life, her own, can not possibly be viewed as the incontrovertibly ultimate good. With Herbert Spencer, the critic of altruism, one may go further and argue that a completely altruistic world is inherently impossible since if literally every self wills another's good, thereby giving up his own, nobody experiences good and so the end sought by each altruistically willing self is nonexistent.
Excerpted from The Good Man and the Good, by Mary Whiton Calkins |
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