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INDEX:
This came in via e-mail to The Radical Academy from one of our visitors: I have recently read Dr. Dolhenty's essay, Does God Exist?, and have three main questions about it. Perhaps I have missed their answers in the essay; if I have, I am very sorry. Could you please clarify their answers or point me to specific parts in the essay which directly answer these questions?
Dr. Dolhenty's response: Excellent questions and I will attempt to answer them as briefly as possible. I hope my answers will clarify rather than muddy the waters, since these are hefty problems and deserve our attention. I want you to note that I have re-ordered the questions slightly for this discussion. 1. Why is it assumed that this universe has always existed? This assumption was initially made in the argument in order to avoid begging the question of God's existence. ("Begging the question" is a logical fallacy.) A purely philosophical approach to the proving of God's existence, or at least of attempting to discover grounds for regarding belief in God to be reasonable, must steadfastly and stringently avoid the error of begging the question by assuming what is to be proved. In this instance we would be assuming God existed before we proved it - that is, begging the question. To avoid this fallacy, we must proceed on the assumption of an everlasting universe, the assumption that the universe has always existed and will always continue in existence, everlasting in an infinite time, time without beginning or end. (Incidentally, the universe could have always existed without violating the proposition that God, in fact, exists. God could have created - that is, produced something from nothing - for as long as he (or she) existed. If we presently assume God's existence and God could have created as long as he existed, then the universe could have always existed. There is no way to prove this philosophically, but it is not unreasonable to think such.) I want to emphasize that "creation" means the production of something from "nothing." The technical word is "exnihilation." Do not confuse the common usages of "creation" or "creating" with the technical meaning we use here. Human beings may "create" things in the common parlance, but they do not "create" things from "nothing." Another word that needs to be understood is the opposite of "exnihilation." This word is "annihilation," which means to pass away into "nothing." Coming into existence and going out of existence in the physical world are NOT exnihilation and annihilation. What comes into existence by natural processes does not come into existence "out of nothing," and what goes out of existence does not pass into "nothingness," that is, it is not reduced to nothing. What we have going on here in the physical world is simply a "transformation" of matter. Matter existing in one form or condition takes on existence in another form or condition. This brings us to the matter of "contingency." 2. Why is the universe fundamentally contingent? Let's be sure we understand the meanings of the terms to be used. Anything that exists either has its existence from, through, and in itself, OR it has its existence from, through, and in another. There are no other alternatives (principle of the excluded middle). A "contingent" being is any existing thing which has its existence from, through, and in another. Its existence is "dependent" upon the existence and action of another; its existence, strictly speaking, is "caused" by the action of another. The technical way of saying this is to say its existence is "ab alio," from the Latin word referring to from, through, and in which an individual entity in question has its existence. A "contingent" being has its existence "ab alio." On the other hand, a "necessary" being is that which exists "a se," that is, from, through, and in itself. That which exists "a se" or has "aseity" is a being that is independent, unconditioned, and uncaused. The transformation (and disappearance) of a particular material being is a sign of what is called "superficial" contingency. The things of this world are all contingent beings - superficially contingent - and this is manifested by the fact of their temporal finitude. They have existence only for the time during which they endure, from the moment they come into existence until the time they pass away. The contingent things of this world, having a dependent, conditioned, and caused existence, enduring only for a finite period of time, are all temporal and mutable. Furthermore, all the material existents in the universe are "parts" or components of the universe, but they do not constitute the universe itself. Unlike the things that are components of it, the universe as a whole, being a totality, is not a part of anything else. (We are using the term "universe" here as meaning "all of physical reality." The ideas of "parallel universes" and "mirror universes" proposed by some theoretical physicists involves a different definition of "universe." Our term "universe" as used here would be the sum total of all parallel or mirror universes should they become known to exist.) I have said the things of this world have a "superficial" contingency. This means they do not cease to exist into nothingness, but are simply transformed. At death, a living being ceases to be that living being, but its material reality is transformed into something else. It does not suffer annihilation (ride off into nothingness, so to speak). "Superficial" contingency must be distinguished from "radical" contingency. The sign of radical contingency would be to cease to be absolutely, an annihilation, a reduction to nothingness, a replacement by nothing. We have no experience in this world of such a phenomenon. The natural process of generation and corruption, of coming to be and passing away, does not involve annihilation. We also have no experience of exnihilation, that is, of something being produced from nothing. Perfectly natural causes can explain the existence of and transformation of all the individual material things within our physical universe. But what about the universe as a whole? If individual material things are superficially contingent, is the universe as a whole also superficially contingent? The answers appears to be "no." If the universe as a whole, as a totality, were superficially contingent, then what would it turn into if it were transformed, if it ceased to be, if it "died"? If the universe disappeared, what would happen to it? It would seem it would cease to be and be replaced by absolutely nothing. The universe as a whole is not an individual thing. We may think of it as a singular object of thought, but it is absolutely unique, for, since it is the sum total of everything that exists materially, there can be only one universe at a given time. If it "died," if it "passed" away, if it "disappeared," there would be nothingness. This is why I say that the universe is "radically" contingent." (Of course, as parts of the universe, individual material objects are dependent for their continuing existence upon the continuing existence of the universe as a whole. Were the universe reduced to nothingness, they also would cease to exist.) Now, why is the universe said to be contingent at all? Let's modify this question slightly and ask it this way: Is it possible for the universe that now exists to cease to exist and be replaced by nothing at all? If the universe can cease to exist, it would be contingent; that is the meaning of contingent. If this is so, then we are perfectly justified in inquiring about the "efficient cause" of this universe (its "creator"). If the universe cannot cease to exist, it would be "necessary." In this case, we needn't inquire about an efficient cause for its existence since its existence is necessary and explained from, in, and through itself. I have already said that the universe is, indeed, contingent, and moreover, is "radically" contingent. Let's see if this is so. What reason can be given for thinking that the continuing existence of the universe needs an efficient cause for its perpetuation in the state of existence? The reason is found in this fact: the universe that now exists is only one of many possible universes that may have existed in the past or ever will exist in the future. This is not to say that such has occurred or will occur in the future. It simply says that if other universes are possible, then this one is merely possible, not necessary - and is, therefore, contingent. Now, how do we know that this universe we presently inhabit is only a possible universe and not a necessary one? How do we know it is a contingent universe? Step One: we can infer such from the fact that the arrangement and disarray, the order and disorder, of our universe might have been otherwise, might have been different from what it is. There is no compelling reason to think that the natural laws which govern our universe are the only possible natural laws. Our universe is a universe of chance and randomness as well as a universe of lawful behavior. Its shape and structure could have been different from what it is. There is no philosophical or scientific reason that requires us to think this is the only possible manifestation of a universe. Step Two: whatever might have been otherwise in shape or structure is something that also might not exist at all. The fact is this: what cannot be otherwise also cannot not exist or, to put it another way, what exists "necessarily" cannot be otherwise than what it is. Whatever can be otherwise than what it is can also simply not be at all. If our universe can be different from what it presently is, then it can also cease to exist at all. And if it ceased to be at all, it would be reduced to nothingness. Our universe appears, then, to be radically contingent and not necessary. 3. Why is it later shown that the universe must have had a creative action to bring it into existence? How do we know that the universe would cease to exist without a preservative cause? The universe seems to be a radically contingent being and not a necessary being. Our existing universe is merely one of many possible universes. If this is so, then it would not exist at all were its existence not caused (had an efficient cause). A merely possible universe cannot be an uncaused universe. A universe that is radically contingent and requires a cause for its existence must have a cause that exists and acts to exnihilate ("bring out of nothing") this merely possible universe. This is required in order to prevent what is always possible for a merely possible universe - its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness. To bring into existence out of nothing that which, without such creative action, would not exist is to exnihilate. To preserve in existence that which, without preservative action, would cease to exist and be reduced to nothingness is also to exnihilate. Neither form of exnihilating action is within the power of natural causes. This is why we are led to conclude that some "other-than-natural" cause exists to accomplish either result. It is this cause which various people have called God, or Universal Mind, or Logos, or Supreme Being, or Cosmic Intelligence, or whatever. It is a "supernatural" cause because it is an "other-than-natural" cause. No natural causes can explain the exnihilation of the universe (nor its possible annihilation, for that matter). The critical point is that the Supreme Being's (or whatever you want to call it) preservative action must be argued before the creative action, so as to avoid "begging the question," thereby committing a logical fallacy. Once the preservative action is successfully argued for, then the creative action argument can be successful since it follows logically from the preservative action argument. The preservative cause is needed to explain the continuing existence in actuality of a merely possible universe; the creative cause is needed to explain the actualization of a merely possible universe. The only alternative to this argument, I think, is to maintain that this is the only possible universe that ever existed or could exist in the future. You would have to have some compelling reason for thinking this. Neither science nor philosophy can, as far as I can determine, present a good reason why this is the only possible universe. And, if other universes are possible, then this universe is truly contingent, and not necessary. If this universe is contingent, and "radically" so, then some efficient cause must exist which both preserves it and created it in the first place. That is all that is being argued. The specific nature of this efficient cause is another question. I might add that some modern philosophers and scientists have been so arrogant as to say about the questions above: "Don't ask." It's as if those who ask the why and wherefore of the universe are somehow retarded or juvenile. Their answer to "Why there is a universe at all?" is to respond, "Don't ask." This is what philosopher Ken Wilber refers to as the philosophy of "oops." See his brief remarks about this matter HERE. Many modern philosophers and scientists merely "assume" that this is the only possible universe and is, therefore, necessary and not contingent. But "what can be easily assumed, can be easily denied." You never hear them argue their case. They do not give compelling reasons why this is the only possible universe. At least I have not heard them give reasons. They seem to always revert to the philosophy of "oops." The following e-mail came to me from D.S.: I recently browsed the Radical Academy web page and found it quite interesting. I am glad that a web page exists which takes Mortimer Adler seriously as I think Adler's philosophy is a good antidote to the "insanity" which is prominent in contemporary philosophy. I have a question regarding your proof for principle of sufficient reason in the existence of God. You remark that something must either have existence from itself or from another, so that anything which is not basically self-existent (having existence from itself), must have it from another being. What do you mean when you use the word "from"? I can't help but think that "from" can only be interpreted in a causal sense, and if that is the case then the argument seems to be assuming the principle of causality/sufficient reason in order to prove it. What would you say to someone who insists that a being does not have to have its being from anything at all? This is not saying that its being is "from" nothing, since someone who stated that would be saying that "nothingness" caused something to exist, which would be absurd. It is simply questioning why any finite thing could not simply "pop" into existence causelessly. Thank you in advance for your response. Thank you for your question, David, let's tackle it. If something suddenly did "pop" into existence, from what did it "pop"? Did it "pop" from "something" or from "nothing." Those are the only two choices. If it did "pop" from something, then there is no problem as it has a sufficient reason for its existence (whatever brought it into being or produced it). If it did "pop" from "nothing," then we have a problem. Either it was caused by some being capable of production from nothing (such as God or whatever) or it simply came from "nothing" without being produced by anything, which is absurd. I am not "assuming" the Principle of Causality nor the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Both principles are self-evidently true. Propositions which are "self-evident" are not provable and they are not "assumptions." Deny a self-evident principle and any conversation stops right there. There are not many self-evident principles or propositions, but those that are true by the fact they are self-evident are vitally important. If you deny you exist, for instance, I will not waste my time talking with you. Why should I? If you deny that other minds exist (such as mine), why should I waste my time trying to convince you that I exist? I cannot "prove" I exist anymore than you can prove you exist. We don't "assume" we exist, we simply know it because there is no other choice! (Read my essays in The Dolhenty Directory which critique Universal Skepticism.) So, now, here is the basic argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Everything, in so far as it is a "being," has reality. Whatever reality a being has, it must have it either of and by itself or from and by another being; in the first case it has the sufficient reason for its reality in itself, and in the second case it has it in the other. This is so obvious that the mere statement suffices to show its truth. And if it has no reality, it is no being at all, and this is simply due to the fact that it has not received reality either of itself or from another being; in both cases it is a "non-being" because it has no sufficient reason for its reality. If it could have reality nevertheless, it would have to receive it from "nothing." But "nothing" has no reality itself and can, therefore, never give reality to anything. Consequently, were such a reality without a sufficient reason, it would both "be" and "not be" at the same time; it would "be," because that is the supposition; and it would also "not be," because, having no sufficient reason to account for its reality except "nothing," it could receive only that which "nothing" could give, which is precisely nothing. But "to be" and "not to be" at the same time is a violation of the Principle of Contradiction; and that is an absurdity. Hence, if a being has reality, it must have it either of itself or from another, i.e., it must have a sufficient reason for itself: Nothing is without a sufficient reason: Everything must have a sufficient reason for its being and existence. The Principle of Causality is an outgrowth of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, just as the latter is a development of the Principle of Identity and of the Principle of Contradiction. These principles cannot be proved and they need not be proved; they are self-evident, and need only be explained in order to show their truth and validity. In virtue of the Principle of Identity, "A thing is what it is." Nothing can be simpler and truer. This is common sense and good philosophy. Then, in virtue of the Principle of Contradiction, "A thing is what it is, and it can be no other"; if it could be another, it would not "be what it is." In consequence of this, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is equally self-evident: "Everything must have a sufficient reason to be what it is." If it had no sufficient reason for its existence and being, it would not exist. If a thing could exist without sufficient reason, it would exist (that is the supposition) and not exist at the same time (because it has no sufficient reason for its existence), and that would be in violation of the Principle of Contradiction. Therefore, if a being exists, it must have a sufficient reason why it exists and why it is this particular "being" rather than another. I received the following e-mail and sent the question on to Max Weismann at the Center for the Study of The Geat Ideas, since it related to Mortimer Adler. Dear Sir: Dr. Adler often speaks of "common sense"....How does common sense compare to wisdom? Can a man have wisdom and lack common sense? Could you point me in the right direction? Thank You, J.B. Max Weismann answers: Dear J.B., Your letter and excellent questions were forwarded to us by our friend and colleague, Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty of the Radical Academy. Your letter affords us the opportunity to clarify a common misunderstanding about common sense. And no, we do not believe that it is possible for one to be wise and lack common sense. Wisdom is the goal, and the utilization of common sense is a crucial means towards that end. In our everyday conversations, we say or hear someone say, "that person just does not have any common sense" or "that young woman really has a lot of common sense." This use of the term, common sense, refers to the sound or unsound judgments or actions of particular individuals. However, this is not the same "sense" that is meant when it is used by philosophers. When philosophers use the compound "common sense," the word common is used as "communal" meaning shared by all men everywhere at all times and places regardless of their backgrounds; the word sense is used as "experiences" and/or "opinions" commonly shared by mankind. I think it appropriate here to insert two quotes that should shed further light on this matter. The first quote is from Harvard University Professor George Santayana's book, "Skepticism and Animal Faith" (1923): "I think that common sense, in a rough dogged way, is technically sounder than the special schools of philosophy, each of which squints and overlooks half the facts and half the difficulties in its eagerness to find in some detail the key to the whole. I am animated by distrust of all high guesses, and by sympathy with the old prejudices and workaday opinions of mankind: they are ill expressed, but they are well grounded." The second quote is from Dr. Adler's book entitled, "The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense" (1970): "The distinctive method of philosophical inquiry involves reliance on the common experience of mankind, and an appeal to it as the test of the validity of philosophical theories, either about what is and happens in the world or about what men ought to seek and do. It also involves an assessment of the validity of commonsense answers to the kind of questions for answering for which common experience by itself is adequate, no additional empirical evidence or investigation being needed. Philosophy thus conceived is a development of the insights already possessed by the man of common sense in the light of common experience; it is a development that adds clarifying analytical distinctions, the precise definition of terms, the reinforcement of systematic reasoning, and the critical exploration of problems to which no satisfactory solution is yet available. The philosophical knowledge achieved by these additions confirms, even as it elaborates, the commonsense wisdom one need not be a philosopher to possess. This question was e-mailed by R.F. in regard to my essay "Is Objectivism Merely a Disguised Materialism?": Can you please explain to me how you make the jump from abstract thoughts to an abstract universe? Intellect and ideas are the abstract thoughts of human-beings. They are nonmaterial. But how does that make everything else in the universe nonmaterial as stated in the paragraph below from subject criticism? "If, on the other hand, the intellect and ideas are nonmaterial existents, and everything else in the universe is Idea or Thought or Mind, then Objectivism fall into the Idealist camp." Dr. Dolhenty responds: Let's clarify this question so we understand each other. First of all, I am not sure what you mean by jumping from abstract thoughts to an abstract universe. If you are using the term "abstract" as synonymous with the term "nonmaterial," then you are asking how one can jump from nonmaterial thoughts to an nonmaterial universe. If this is the case, I don't know either. The universe, as I comprehend it, is composed of both material and nonmaterial beings or, maybe better said, material and nonmaterial realities. The intellect of human beings is one such nonmaterial or "immaterial" reality. The intellect is not the brain. The brain, it is true, is a necessary condition for the exercise of the human intellect, but it is not a sufficient condition for its operation. (For a clarification of the term "idea" as I understand the term, see Adler on Ideas. For a clarification of "intellect" and the immateriality of the intellect, see Chp. 4 of Adler's Intellect: Mind Over Matter. See the Adler Bookshelf.) The statement you quote out of my essay refers to the position of metaphysical Idealism. According to the Idealist nothing exists but Idea or Thought or Mind. These, being nonmaterial realities, means that the universe as a whole is Idea, Thought, or Mind, and, therefore, nonmaterial. The Idealists have an argument for this position, an argument I believe to be invalid and which is opposed to common experience. I do not share that view of reality. If Objectivism accepted that position, it would be Idealistic from a metaphysical point of view. It does not, so Objectivism is not based on any sort of metaphysical Idealism. Diametrically opposed to Idealism is metaphysical Materialism, the doctrine that the universe is nothing more than matter in motion and, if something cannot be measured by the instruments of empirical science, for instance, it does not exist. This might be considered the second metaphysical position. There is, however, a third metaphysical position, a natural and "mild" dualism, which maintains that there are both material and nonmaterial beings or realities in existence. While the brain is a material being, the intellect is a nonmaterial being. An "idea" is a nonmaterial being, while the physical operations used to generate an idea (sensory images and electro-chemical processes) are material realities. I happen to fall into this philosophical camp. (Incidentally, by "mild" I mean not extreme and not opposed.) Now my basic question in the essay you cite was where does Objectivism fit into any possible metaphysical framework. It is not a metaphysical Idealism; the Objectivists have made that clear and a study of their philosophy supports that argument. And I more or less stated that in my essay. That leaves two alternatives: metaphysical Materialism or a natural metaphysical dualism of material and nonmaterial being. The Objectivists themselves claim they are not metaphysical Materialists. If they are not metaphysical Materialists, then they must fall into the same philosophical camp as I do. Yet, they apparently deny the existence of nonmaterial being. If this is true, then the only alternative is metaphysical Materialism and yet they deny they are Materialists. So my question was in regard to this apparent metaphysical problem and I suggested that maybe Objectivism is really a "disguised" materialism. Here is the problem stated in another way: If Objectivism accepts the existence of nonmaterial being (not any particular nonmaterial being, just that such exists or can exist), then it has to be open to the "possibility" of any particular nonmaterial being, including God, angels, an immortal soul, and so forth. Not that such beings do, in fact, exist, but that their existence is possible and rational. My understanding of Objectivism (and please correct me if I have misunderstood its position) is that it is opposed to even the possible existence of such nonmaterial beings as God, angels, immortal souls, and such. If Objectivism in fact accepts that nonmaterial being exists, it certainly has not made clear, metaphysically at least, what nonmaterial beings it accepts as existing. I dare say, when it comes to metaphysics, Objectivism appears to be an extremely weak philosophical position. Its emphasis has always been on epistemology and this means putting the cart before the horse. Metaphysics must be prior to epistemology, but this seems not to be the case with Objectivism. It has dealt with "how we know reality" before it dealt with "reality itself." So, I'm back to my original question. If Objectivism is not a metaphysical Idealism (and I agree with that), and if it is not a natural dualism of material and nonmaterial being (which it does not appear to be), then what is left? The only metaphysical position left is Materialism. Yet it denies it is a Materialism. Does its denial contradict its real position? At this point, I have no other alternative but to think that Objectivism is a "disguised" Materialism, that is, a metaphysical wolf in a metaphysical sheep's clothing. Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book...
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