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INDEX:
This question came in via e-mail from J.E.: I would like to know why conservatives are against the National Endowment for the Arts and yet they don't like today's culture. Conservatives talk about the need for raising the standards of excellence yet they call anyone who listens to opera a snob and an elitist. IF the free market is the indicator of how art should survive, I guess this means works by Augusta Read Thomas should be in the garbage and Marilyn Manson should be the musical genius of our age. Could someone in your organization please explain to me why the free market is the sole indicator of a public morality? Thanks. Dr. Dolhenty responds: First of all, let's take care of a few assumptions you have made. You assume that conservatives do not like today's culture. It would probably be more accurate to say that some conservatives do not like some "aspects" of today's culture. I know of no true conservative who condemns today's culture as a whole. But, speaking for myself, and I do not call myself a true conservative, there are many aspects of our "popular" culture today I think we would be better off without; for instance, the overuse of the "f" word in movies and the "steamy" sex scenes which have no other purpose than to shock (and I assure you I am no prude!). I think we would be better off without Howard Stern and his ilk. I think that type of public behavior is demeaning to us all. And I could go on. But, condemn the culture as a whole? No way. Secondly, you assume that conservatives call anyone who listens to opera a snob and elitist. I would challenge that assumption. There are many, many conservatives who are supportive of and fond of such things as opera. Consider William F. Buckley just for an example. I doubt if he would consider an opera fan to be a snob or elitist. I could probably name twenty or thirty well-known conservatives in the public eye today who would think the same way that Buckley does. I suspect you are confusing the term "conservative" with "red-neck," "Fundamentalist," "reactionary," or some other such image. A true conservative represents none of these images. That, my friend, is a stereotype. Thirdly, you are assuming that the free market is or should be the sole indicator of a public morality. I don't know where you got that idea, but it is not true. The free market is not the sole indicator nor should it be. I don't know of anyone who says that the free market is or should be the sole indicator of a public morality. There are too many other considerations to factor in. Our public morality is not the result of a free market per se, but of such things as our religious heritage, philosophical reasoning, cultural traditions, and so forth, and individuals, as members of a society, collectively and freely deciding the tenets of a practical ethics. Now that those assumptions have hopefully been taken care of, let's get on with the NEA and the free market. Conservatives in general, Libertarians and Individualists in particular, and I suspect most believers in a true free-market economy are opposed to the National Endowment for the Arts for basically the same reasons they are opposed to any other government bureaucracy which dispenses "public" money for things in which the federal government should not be involved in. The decisions about which arts or artistic endeavors are to be supported should be private decisions made by individuals or groups of individuals who voluntarily come together to promote such activities. I assume you believe in and support what is called "political democracy." Well, the free market and the activities of free individuals, either singly or collectively, is called "economic democracy." And this economic democracy should be the basis for promotion and support of the arts as well as most (not all, necessarily) social and cultural activities. The money used to finance the NEA is taken by force from all Americans who pay taxes. The fundamental principle operating here to support the NEA is coercion. An individual has no choice really which arts or artistic endeavors are to be supported. His money is taken by legal extortion and he is told what arts he will support -- like it or not. Also, there is no necessity for government to be involved in this activity. The arts are quite capable of taking care of themselves. There has never been a time in history that I know of where the arts were not adequately promoted and supported by private benefactors. In fact, I might argue that the arts thrived under private patronage, whereas today that may not be so, precisely because private benefactors may be unwilling to finance the arts because, after all, "the government already does it." I could probably argue that the arts have suffered as a result of the NEA, because I believe that generally any activity promoted and funded by a government tends toward the "lowest demoninator." Governments are not generally known to promote the "highest" and the "best." I suspect this may be reason our public schools are in the mess that they are. This argument, however, I'll bypass because it would take too long to present the evidence. Nevertheless, I can see no reason why the country needs the NEA. For heaven's sake, how do people think the arts were supported before the NEA came into existence, which was quite recently? The main point, though, that I think should be made is this: I nor anyone else should be coerced into supporting those arts or artistic activities to which we might be opposed or might not be interested in. A free people in a free society should be able to freely support those arts they want to and not support those they don't want to. It's as simple as that. Just and Unjust Wars: Katie sent me this e-mail: I was wondering what your opinion was on the subject of justified war. What wars do you think were justified if any? Dr. Dolhenty responds: My personal opinion regarding a "just" war is that the only war that can be truly justified is a defensive war, that is, a war in which one is defending one's country or geographical area or individual rights. An offensive war or war of aggression would, in my opinion, be an unjust war. Now, understand this is a very "general" position and many details or circumstances could modify my opinion. As to applying my policy to wars of the past, many of us here at The Center for Applied Philosophy would disagree over the judtification for specific wars. It's not a "cut and dried affair." I would point to the Vietnam War as, in my opinion, an unjust war, but some of my colleagues here would probably disagree with me. I would apply the same position to the Korean War. World Wars I and II would "appear" to be justified, but whether OUR participation was justified is problematic. I can understand what England and France were justly defending, but what were we defending? If one considers it in terms of defending "democracy" and assisting our allies, then I suppose an argument could be made. I would probably argue that our participation was "just" in this sense. As I said, it's not a simple affair of right and wrong, or just and unjust. Probably the most unjust war we as a nation participated in was the Spanish-American War which was fought simply to protect the interests of certain American business groups and which appears to have started with a falsely-created incident. Most of the above is open to debate and I would listen carefully to anyone who disagreed with me. It is a complicated issue that has to be taken on a case by case (or war by war) basis. Unfortunately, your question yields no simple answer. Change and Permanence, Appearance and Reality: I received the following question by e-mail from Bobby R., who is a college freshman at (in my personal opinion) one of the best colleges in our country. Thanks for taking questions. Here is one on what "sameness" means when attributed to things in the physical world. There are some who would say that the physical world, the world of everyday experience, is in an unqualified flux, i.e. that things are changing in all respects at all times. Such a person might point to a clock and say, "That's not the same clock now as it was a moment ago," even though the clock has not undergone any perceptible changes. Their reason for saying this is that the clock, they say, is composed of tiny particles that are constantly not only bumping one another around, but are also swapping with the particles in the air, the wall, the desk, etc. On the one hand, I understand that such an argument is to some extent self-refuting. I could ask, "If everything is in a constant flux, how do you know that you're still making the *same* argument you were making a moment ago?" or "But aren't you talking to me as if you expect me to be a persistent interlocutor who stays the same as myself despite the buzzing of my particles?" But on the other hand, I see the plausibility behind my interlocutor's insistent request, "But what about the tiny particles?" To what would you say I am attributing sameness when I say "That clock is the same as it was a moment ago."? Certainly, I'm not talking about the tiny particles of matter that compose it, if there indeed are such. Am I talking about the perceivable attributes of the clock, such as its color, size, shape, the constant, audible ticking of its hands, its stable position on the wall, etc.? If so, is it accurate for me to say that the clock is the same at two different times, when all I really know is that the clock that I perceive, and in the forms that I perceive it (ticking sound, color, etc.) is the same at two different times? By calling it the same, am I shamelessly ignoring a true fact about it (its busy particles), or am I saying that in spite of that stuff there is still an object that persists? Would you explain how a contextual realist would defend my attribution of sameness to the clock? Dr. Dolhenty responds: One of the most striking and mysterious of all the appearances in the world about us is that of change. The problem of change arose early in the history of philosophy: how is it that things can change and yet remain themselves? For a century and a half this problem of "change and permanence" dominated early Greek philosophy. This is essentially the problem you are dealing with, Bobby, and then you add a further twist to it by throwing in those mysterious "particles" which are said to constitute the physical objects we see around us. What this does is add another dimension to the situation, sometimes called the problem of the "one and the many." I shall attempt to provide some insight into the solutions for these problems. First of all, though, I want to be sure we are clear about a very important principle that influences this case: the principle of non-contradiction. It is unfortunate, I think, that when we ordinarily speak of the principle of non-contradiction, we shorten it to say something like, "a thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time," or "a statement cannot both be true and not true at the same time." While most of us probably know what we mean, we are leaving out a vital phrase that should always be understood as being part of the principle of non-contradiction. This phrase is: "in the same respect," or "from the same point of view," or "in the same way," or "in the same kind," or "with the same mode of existence," or "within the SAME CONTEXT." You will see the importance of this added phrase as we proceed. 1. The Problem of Change and Permanence Heraclitus is given credit for being the philosopher of change: "You can't step into the same river twice." Parmenides, on the other hand, is given credit for being the philosopher of permanence: "Change is really an illusion, and an impossibility, because Being is all there is or there is Nothing." Here we have the two extremes of the issue. And, as is usual in such issues where unacceptable extremes are involved, the correct answer lies somewhere in between. The first thing we need to do with regard to physical objects (I will not deal with nonphysical objects in this analysis) is make a distinction between "subject" and "form." Every physical being has two essential constituent principles: a material or potential subject which is called prime matter, and its perfection or act which is called substantial form. (Understand, now, that this is a "metaphysical" explanation and not a "scientific" one; "prime matter" is to be distinguished from "secondary matter" which is what the empirical scientist deals with and which we experience around us in physical objects.) This distinction between prime matter and substantial form takes into account both the "dynamic" properties (changing) and the "static" properties (permanent) of the things of nature. So, we say that the essence of physical substance is intrinsically and really constituted from a substantial "determinable" principle which is prime matter, and from a substantial "determining" principle which is the substantial form. Furthermore, these principles are really distinct from each other, yet these principles constitute one essence because they are not complete substances but incomplete. They are not existing "things" but principles of the essence of the physical object that exists. They mutually complete one another in constituting one substantially complete being. Regarding your clock. That clock is intrinsically constituted (from an ontological point of view) from a twofold principle. One such principle, prime matter, is the purely determinable substantial principle in the essence of that clock; it is the "stuff" out of which the clock is made (don't confuse this with the "stuff" you can see and feel -- the "stuff" of which we're speaking here is an intellectual abstraction, a concept of the highest order). The metal or plastic that makes up your clock is "secondary" matter, the material "hard stuff," not an ontological abstraction. The difficulty many people have here is because prime matter can be "thought," but not "sensed." This notion of prime matter is one which is arrived at as the result of a rational analysis; it is something we are led to as the result of an act of reasoning, and which cannot in any way be grasped by the senses. The same applies to the concept of "substantial form." The notion of "form" is also an intelligible principle, not reducible to anything that can be seen, touched, or imagined. Prime matter, then, is one of the principles constituting your clock; it is the principle of limitation, a principle which limits form, restricts it, so to speak, which makes it individual, quantified, existing in a definite time and place. The other principle is that of substantial form, which is the "determining" principle (as contrasted to prime matter which is the "determinable" principle). It is the substantial form that "determines" that your clock is a clock and this particular clock and not some other clock. The form is that which makes your clock to be what it is, gives it its basic way of being. The principle of substantial form is the principle which provides for the stability and permanence of things. The principle of prime matter is the principle which accounts for change, individuality, imperfection. Neither of these principles can be found separated in the physical world; outside the intellect, forms exist only partially, imperfectly realized, coming to a relative completion only, through the successions of change, for form is never found separated from the second principle, the principle of prime matter. So, from the viewpoint of or within the context of prime matter, your clock is constantly changing as an individual clock, yet, from the viewpoint of or within the context of substantial form, your clock remains the same clock from moment to moment (until a new substantial form is introduced and then it becomes something else entirely). There is no contradiction here because the clock remains the same and continually changes depending on whether we are talking about prime matter or substantial form, two different principles, two different contexts, so to speak, that complement one another, and need to exist together for actual existence to even be possible. Again, the above is a philosophical analysis, not one from empirical science. The physical sciences do not probe into being or things "as such." They probe this "particular" being or thing and only its secondary properties or accidentals. On the other hand, metaphysics or ontology probes within the ultimate depths of "being" to discover its characteristics using strictly a rational analysis. Philosophy deals with the concept of change "as such," while empirical science deals with secondary changes as they occur in the world of the senses. 2. The Problem of the One and Many Now to your problem with "particles." The tiny particles of which you speak, which we are told "compose" your clock, are, first of all, secondary matter and not prime matter. These molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles are of no direct concern to the philosopher. The philosopher leaves it to the empirical scientist to determine whether or not such things exist and what kind of things they are if they do and what their specific characteristics are. But a problem has arisen which seems at first to pit philosophy against science and vice versa because of a confusion over what we can call "existential contexts." The problem basically involves the issue of whether our commonsense picture of the physical world, where objects are solid, firm, hard, etc., is true, or whether the world that empirical science has presented to us, that is, a world where physical objects are largely empty space in which tiny invisible bodies are moving about at great speeds, interacting with one another in a variety of ways, and making a physical object only "appear" to us to be solid, of a certain size, shape, and weight, and having certain other sensible qualities, such as color, etc. Which is the "real" reality? The clock we see before us when we want the time? Or the invisible bodies which constitute the clock? Is the clock we see merely an illusion or a convenient "fiction"? Is reality really nothing more than the existence of invisible particles? Can reality be "reduced" to nothing more than its smallest constituents? What we are confronted with here, according to Dr. Mortimer Adler, is the fallacy of reductionism, "a mistake that has become most prevalent in our own day, not only among scientists but also among contemporary philosophers." What is the fallacy of reductionism? Adler continues: "It consists in regarding the ultimate constituents of the physical world as more real than the composite bodies these elementary components constitute." Regarding your clock, it means that the subatomic components constituting your clock are more real (or given more reality) than the actual clock itself that you use for telling time. And, furthermore, reductionism, says Adler, "may go even further and declare these ultimate constituents to be the only reality, relegating everything else to the status of mere appearance or illusion." So that is the problem. What is the real reality? The clock or the elementary constituents of which it is composed? "How," asks Adler, "is this fallacy of reductionism, this philosophical mistake, to be corrected, as it must be if our commonsense view of things and if a philosophy of nature that accords with it is to be validated?" The best solution I have found to this problem is the one offered by Dr. Mortimer Adler, and I will be, more or less, paraphrasing his solution in what follows. But, let's first be sure we understand the conflict. The clock you are looking at in order to get the time fills a certain area of space. To say, on the one hand, that that space envelope is filled with the single, solid body that you experience as the perceived clock contradicts saying, on the other hand, that that space envelope is largely a void filled by moving and interacting imperceptible particles. The conflict or contradiction here is not simply between filled and empty space. It involves a contradiction between the one and the many. The clock of your experience, the reality of which a philosophy of common sense defends, is not only a solid body, but even more fundamentally it is a single existing thing. The clock of scientific theory consists of an irreducible multiplicity of discrete units, each having its own individual existence. Now, if your clock as a unitary being, with all the qualities we sense that it has, is dismissed as a mere illusion forced on us by our sense-experience, then there is no conflict. Of if the elementary particles or constituents of the empirical scientist are merely theoretical entities which have no real existence, if they are merely mathematical forms, then their existence is posited for theoretical purposes as useful "fictions" and they don't really challenge the commonsense view that your solid clock is really real and really exists as that physical object which you sensually experience. If, however, real existence of the same kind is attributed to the entities described by the commonsense view and by the scientific view, then we cannot avoid a conflict that must be resolved. A clue or hint that leads to the solution is contained in the bold words in the preceding statement: "of the same kind." Both the solid clock and the imperceptible particles have real existence, but their reality is not of the same kind, not of the same mode or context or degree. By virtue of that fact, the conflict can be resolved. The contradiction is then seen to be only apparent. An assertion about the elementary particles as the imperceptible constituents of the clock and an assertion about the perceptible solid clock as an individual thing, both occupying the same space, can be reconciled on condition that we recognize different grades or degrees or CONTEXTS of reality. The reality of the elementary particles of empirical science cannot be reconciled with the reality of your clock as an individual sensible substance if both the particles and the clock are asserted to have the same mode or context of existence or grade of being. The same thing can also be said about the subatomic particles and the atoms of which they are component parts. The subatomic particles are less real than the atoms; that is, they have less actuality. The elementary particles of nuclear physics are in a state of "potentia," "possibilities for being or tendencies for being," according to physicist Werner Heisenberg. The mode or context of being of the material constituents of a physical object cannot be the same when those constituents exist in isolation and when they enter into the constitution of an actual object. Thus, when the clock exists actually as one physical object, the multitude of atoms and elementary particles which constitute it exist only "virtually." Since their existence is only virtual, so is their multiplicity; and their virtual multiplicity is not incompatible with the actual unity (oneness) of the clock on your wall or on your desk. Again, the same thing can also be said about a single atom and the elementary particles which constitute it; or about a single molecule and the atoms which constitute it. When an atom or molecule exists as a unit of matter (secondary matter, of course), its material constituents have only virtual existence and, consequently, their multiplicity is also only virtual. Now, what exists "virtually" has more "reality" than the merely "potential" and less than the fully "actual." The virtual existing components of any composite whole become fully actual only when that composite breaks up into its constituents parts. If your unitary clock were exploded into its ultimate material constituents, the elementary particles would assume the mode or context of actual existence; their virtual multiplicity would be "transformed" into an actual multitude. Here is the critical point. The mode or context of existence in which the particles are discrete units and have actual multiplicity cannot be the same as the mode or context of existence that they have when they are material constituents of the one clock in actual existence. There is a real conflict between the commonsense view and the empirical scientific view of the reality of physical objects only if we assign the same mode or context of existence to the elementary particles, for instance, in a cyclotron, and to the particles that enter into the constitution of an actual clock. But if these existents are assigned different modes or contexts of existence, the philosophical commonsense theory and the empirical scientific theory are reconciled and are no longer in conflict. There is no real contradiction at all. One interesting aspect of this solution is that we reach the conclusion that the perceptible individual objects of common experience (your clock, for example) have a higher degree of actual reality than the elementary particles of which they are composed. So, what is the really "real"? The answer should be obvious. That physical object you call a clock and that you consult from time to time is the "real" thing, it is actual reality, just as your common sense tells you it is. Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book...
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