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We
are pleased to present the following
excerpt from the book
The
Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can
Change A Culture and Save It From
Itself
by Lawrence E.
Harrison
Oxford University Press
- May 2006
From
the "Introduction":
- I am convinced that the luckiest of
geographic circumstances and the best
of laws cannot maintain a constitution
in despite of mores, whereas the latter
can turn even the most unfavorable
circumstances and the worst laws to
advantage. The importance of mores is a
universal truth to which study and
experience continually bring us back. I
find it occupies the central position
in my thoughts: all my ideas come back
to it in the end. -- Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democracy in
America
The influence of cultural values,
beliefs, and attitudes on the way that
societies evolve has been shunned by
scholars, politicians, and development
experts, notwithstanding the views of
Tocqueville, Max Weber, and more recently
Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, David
Landes, Robert Putnam, and Lucian Pye,
among others. It is much more comfortable
for the experts to cite geographic
constraints, insufficient resources, bad
policies, and weak institutions. That way
they avoid the invidious comparisons,
political sensitivities, and bruised
feelings often engendered by cultural
explanations of success and failure. But
by avoiding culture, the experts also
ignore not only an important part of the
explanation of why some societies or
ethno-religious groups do better than
others with respect to democratic
governance, social justice, and
prosperity. They also ignore the
possibility that progress can be
accelerated by (1) analyzing cultural
obstacles to it, and (2) addressing
cultural change as a remedy.
The influence of culture on the way
that societies evolve is central not only
to the goal of reducing poverty and
injustice around the world. It is also a
key factor in foreign policy, with
particular relevance to the Bush
administration's keystone policy of
promoting democracy: "[the] values
of freedom are right and true for every
person, in every society." If culture
matters in making democracy work, as
Tocqueville insists, and as the
disappointing experience of the United
States in promoting democracy (e.g., in
Latin America) suggests, then the keystone
is likely to crumble under the pressure of
cultures averse to democracy, as in the
Arab countries, not one of which has yet
produced stable democracy.
Some fundamental questions about what
drives human progress cannot be answered
without considering the role of culture
and/or cultural change. For example:
- Why have democratic institutions
failed to take root in any Arab
country?
- Why have the Confucian societies of
East Asia experienced transforming
rates of economic growth?
- Why are East Asian immigrants so
successful wherever they migrate?
- Why are Jews so successful wherever
they migrate?
- What explains the "miracle" of
Spain's transformation from a
traditional autocracy to a modern
Western European democracy?
- Why do the Nordic countries lead
the rest of the world in most
indicators of progress?
- Why have Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, two countries that share the
Caribbean island of Hispaniola,
followed such divergent paths?
Other Factors Matter,
Too
Culture can be crucial, but it is only
one factor, if an important one, in play
in human progress. Geography, including
climate and resource endowment, also
matters, not only in its direct impact on
economic development but also through its
influence on culture. Jared Diamond makes
a compelling case for the powerful
influence of environment in his
best-selling Guns, Germs, and
Steel, but he leaves space for
culture: "Among other factors
[explaining why some societies have
advanced more rapidly than others]
cultural factors . . . loom large . . .
Human cultural traits vary greatly around
the world. Some of that cultural variation
is no doubt a product of environmental
variation . . . But an important question
concerns the possible significance of
local cultural factors unrelated to the
environment. A minor cultural feature may
arise for trivial, temporary local
reasons, become fixed, and then predispose
a society toward more important cultural
choices . . ."
That colder climates forced humans to
plan ahead to get through the winter,
while humans in tropical zones had no such
problem, must surely be relevant in
explaining why most poor countries are
found in the tropical zones; and it may
also be relevant in explaining why the
warmer portions of some countries -- for
example, the south of Italy, the south of
Spain, the south of the United States --
are poorer than the colder portions.
Ideology and governmental policies can
also profoundly influence the pace and
direction that development takes: toward
or away from democracy and social justice,
toward or away from sustained rapid
economic growth. In contrast with Italy,
Spain, and the United States, the northern
part of Korea is poor, the southern part
rich. This reversal is largely because, in
the North, an ideology and the policies
that flow from it are hostile to economic
development and political pluralism, while
the ideology and policies of the South
have proven conducive to economic
development, which in turn has nurtured
democracy. This is a case where ideology
and economic policy seem to matter much
more than culture. Yet even in such cases,
culture is in play. North Korea's
authoritarian government is in part a
product of the same authoritarian current
in Confucianism that produced the
autocracies of Mao Zedong and his
predecessors and successors in China --
and the progressive authoritarianism of
Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. And, as we
shall see, ideological shifts have played
a key role in cultural change in several
countries.
The role of political leaders with a
vision of a better society can also play a
crucial role. The Meiji leadership in
late-nineteenth-century Japan, Mustafa
Kemal in Turkey following World War I, and
Franklin Roosevelt in the United States of
the 1930s and '40s all brought about
transforming change -- in a political and
economic sense, to be sure, but in a
cultural sense as well. A more recent
example is the crucial role played by
Mikhail Gorbachev in the demise of the
Soviet empire and the movement, rapid in
some of its components and slow in others,
toward democratic capitalism.
I note in passing that each of these
leaderships came to power at a time of
national crisis, validating an observation
by Samuel Huntington, "Societies . . . may
change their culture in response to major
trauma." The corresponding crises: Japan's
awareness of its technological
backwardness and vulnerability in the wake
of the arrival of Commodore Perry's
flotilla in Tokyo Bay in 1853; the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World
War I; the Great Depression and World War
II; the failure of Communism to produce
prosperity, and increasing evidence that
the West was winning the Cold War.
Generally, however, what I wrote in
Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind
twenty years ago remains valid: "the
cultural environment importantly
influences the process through which
leaders gain their positions, the
priorities they apply in shaping policies,
and the people, institutions, and
practices they use to execute those
policies" -- not to mention culture's
influence on the leaders themselves.
Success can also breed cultural change
that slows the pace of economic growth.
Such has been the case in Japan in the
1990s and the first years of the
twenty-first century, and it may also be
true of some European countries, too, as
symbolized by France's move to a 35-hour
work week. The New York Times recently
noted that Norway's "bedrock work ethic"
is caving in as a result of the country's
affluence. These cases evoke the kind of
post-industrial culture that Ronald
Inglehart has analyzed: "Having attained
high levels of economic security, the
populations of the first nations to
industrialize have gradually come to
emphasize . . . values [other than
prosperity]; these groups give higher
priority to the quality of life than to
economic growth." I am reminded of Thomas
Mann's early novel of a north German
commercial dynasty, Buddenbrooks,
in which the dynastic fortune is
dissipated through lack of interest in
business in third and fourth generation
offspring; also a Chinese adage that
covers three generations: From rags, to
riches, to ruin.
The foregoing is not a full cataloguing
of the noncultural factors that influence
how societies evolve. But it does address
significant factors, some of which, for
example, ideology in North Korea (and in
East Germany) have trumped culture.
Culture is one of several relevant
factors. But in many cases, it may be the
crucial one.
Defining "Culture"
What do we mean by "culture"? "It has
been defined in myriad ways," as a recent
World Bank study observes. We commonly
hear references to "popular culture,"
which includes food, entertainment, and
clothing styles, among other dimensions.
And "culture" often brings to mind
literature, art, and music -- "high"
culture. But for our purposes, culture is
the body of values, beliefs, and attitudes
that members of a society share; values,
beliefs, and attitudes shaped chiefly by
environment, religion, and the vagaries of
history that are passed on from generation
to generation chiefly through child
rearing practices, religious practice, the
education system, the media, and peer
relationships. Those values, beliefs, and
attitudes are disaggregated in a 25-factor
typology of progress-prone and
progress-resistant societies presented in
chapter 2.
Culture is powerfully influenced by
religion, and the cultures discussed in
this book are defined, at a broad level of
generalization, by the predominant
religion or ethical code: Protestant,
Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Jewish,
Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, and Buddhist.
These are roughly comparable to the
"civilizations" that Samuel Huntington
analyzes in The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order,
although he groups together the European
Protestant and Catholic countries and the
British offspring countries (the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand) as "the West." However, our
analysis will go beyond these general
categories to specific countries within
"civilizations," and even to some
provinces, cities, towns, and ethnic
groups.
Over the generations, culture develops
a powerful momentum, but it is susceptible
to change. Attitudes and beliefs are more
susceptible than values: examples are the
transformation of attitudes on race in the
United States in recent decades, and the
not uncommon shifting of political
beliefs, or ideologies, from one political
party to another. Values, on the other
hand, are the bedrock of culture, and they
usually change more slowly than attitudes
and beliefs. An example is the central
Confucian value of filial piety -- the
responsibility of the child to honor,
respect, and obey the father. But rapid
modernization in Japan, South Korea, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and now China itself has
shaken even that bedrock value.
How does culture influence the way that
societies progress? Cultures can be
thought of as overlays on a universal
human nature, overlays that go a long way
toward explaining the behavioral
differences that are reflected in the
divergent political, social, and economic
evolution of societies, for example of
Western Europe and the Arab countries.
Relevant is an observation from the widely
read Arab Human Development Report
2002, commissioned by the United
Nations Development Program and Arab Fund
for Economic and Social Development:
- Culture and values are the soul of
development. They provide its impetus,
facilitate the means needed to further
it, and substantially define people's
vision of its purposes and ends.
Culture and values are instrumental in
the sense that they help to shape
people's hopes, fears, ambitions,
attitudes and actions, but they are
also formative because they mould
people's ideals and inspire their
dreams for a fulfilling life for
themselves and future generations.
There is some debate in Arab countries
about whether culture and values
promote or retard development.
Ultimately, however, values are not the
servants of development; they are its
wellspring . . .
-
- Governments -- Arab or otherwise --
cannot decree their people's values;
indeed, governments and their actions
are partly formed by national cultures
and values. Governments can, however,
influence culture through leadership
and example, and by shaping education
and pedagogy, incentive structures in
society, and use of the media.
Moreover, by influencing values, they
can affect the path of
development.
Throughout this book, I will be
generalizing about cultures and religions.
That is inevitable in a project that seeks
a deeper understanding of what constitutes
"culture," how it influences behavior, and
what might be done to modify it. But one
must be mindful that cultures are not
homogeneous; that all cultures have, in
Robert Hefner's words, "their own internal
pluralism, variety, or rival 'streams."'
Moreover, individual variation exists in
all cultures: progress-prone people will
surely be found in progress-resistant
cultures, and vice versa. Nevertheless,
there is compelling evidence, for example
from Geert Hofstede's comparative analyses
of cultural differences in IBM offices
around the world, and the World Values
Survey, which assesses values and value
change in some 65 countries, that
meaningful patterns exist in the values,
beliefs, and attitudes of nations, and
even "civilizations," that make
generalizations both valid and useful.
Defining
"Progress"
Any attempt to define "progress" is
likely to collide with the views of people
who subscribe to cultural relativism, the
theory that each society or culture must
define its own ideas "about what is true,
good, beautiful and efficient" and that
cultures are neither better nor worse,
simply different. Cultural relativism was
at the root of the American
Anthropological Association's opposition
to the 1948 United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on the grounds
that it was an ethnocentric imposition of
the West on the rest of the world. Yet the
declaration today provides us with a
definition of progress that is
substantially accepted well beyond the
boundaries of "the West":
- The right to life, liberty, and
security of person
- Equality before the law
- Freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion
- The right to take part in . . .
government . . . directly or through
chosen representatives
- [The right to assure that]
the will of the people [is] the
basis of the authority of
government
- The right to an [adequate]
standard of living
- [The right to] adequate
medical care and necessary social
services
- The right to education
No one can argue that the UN
Declaration is fully "universal." Surely,
there are individuals and groups who would
disagree with one or more of the
components of progress. However, a
majority of the world's people surely
would agree with the following assertions,
which are a restatement of the
declaration:
- Life is better than
death.
- Health is better than
sickness.
- Liberty is better than
slavery.
- Prosperity is better than
poverty.
- Education is better than
ignorance.
- Justice is better than
injustice.
-
Excerpt Copyright
© 2006 by Lawrence E. Harrison.
Reprinted with permission.
Lawrence E. Harrison is
Senior Research Fellow and Adjunct
Lecturer at the Fletcher School at Tufts
University. He is the author of
Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind,
Who Prospers?, and The Pan-American
Dream, and co-editor, with Samuel
Huntington, of Culture Matters: How
Values Shape Human Progress. Between
1965 and 1981, he directed USAID missions
in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Harrison
was associated with Harvard University's
Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs for eight years during the period
1981-2001. His articles have appeared in
The New York Times, Washington Post,
Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe,
Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Policy, and
The National Interest, among other
publications.
The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics
Can Change A Culture and Save It From
Itself, by Lawrence E. Harrison
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