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Mind,
Language, and Society: Philosophy in the
Real World
John Searle's summation of earlier
writings is not just an essential tie-up
volume for existing readers; it is also a
perfect introduction to the work of one of
the clearest heads in the philosophy of
mind. Searle's book is a riposte to all
those academics who make a career out of
contradicting and complicating such
default positions as the existence of an
external reality, the reality of personal
consciousness, and the reasonable fit of
language to the perceived world.
Certainly, we should examine these
positions! But the first duty of
philosophy, Searle argues, is that it
should attempt to accommodate what is
known. As far as we can tell, for example,
consciousness is a biological product, but
there is a long-running contention between
the materialists--whose reductive
descriptions of consciousness arrive,
finally, at an embarrassed denial that
consciousness exists at all--and the
dualists, who cannot describe
consciousness without evoking some
supernatural involvement. Neither position
is tenable: each offers some corrective to
the other.
The good explanation is in there
somewhere, but the sheer intractability of
the debate won't let it be expressed. In
situations like this, Searle argues, it is
always the terms that are wrong--terms,
mind you, that in this case include
"matter," "mind," "physical," and
"mental." Searle--married as he is to
common sense--is of necessity one of our
most iconoclastic and creative
thinkers.
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