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BOOK REVIEW Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 by Mark Moyar Cambridge University Press - August 2006
Reviewed by Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty It is certainly about time that a scholar trained in historical research takes a new look at the Vietnam War era and evaluates it on the basis of the wealth of new evidence which has become available. This new book by Dr. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, offers a serious challenge to those of the so-called "orthodox school" of historians and commentators regarding the War itself, its justification, and its consequences. Self-described as a "revisionist" historian, Moyar provides a reassessment of the events from America's first intrusion into the Vietnam arena (mainly in the form of "advisors"), through the fateful assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, to the placement of U.S. ground forces into Vietnam by President Lyndon Johnson. For the record, I am not in either the "orthodox" or the "revisionist" camp of historians; I am solidly in the "let's find the truth" and the "objective evidence" camp. Furthermore, I am not a member of the "vast right-wing conspiracy" that the Publishers Weekly mentions in its review ("Revisionists will embrace the book; the orthodox will see it as more evidence of a vast, right-wing conspiracy"). The facts of the matter are that I remember well the Vietnam War, lost my closest childhood friend -- a Navy pilot -- when he was shot down over Vietnam (how well I remember the dreaded telephone call that night from my parents!), and can recall exactly where and when I received the news about Diem's assassination in November of 1963 (and remarked angrily to one of my colleagues, "Well, we have just lost South Vietnam to the Communists."). I was teaching an American history course at the time and, although I was lecturing on the American War for Independence, I followed on a daily basis all the events in Southeast Asia as they were unfolding. Moyar's book, therefore, has great meaning for me personally since I lived through the era he covers and had strong opinions about what was going on in the world at that time. Much of what Moyar discloses some forty or so years later, many of us suspected at the time (that is, those who didn't agree with our government's strategy vis-a-vis Vietnam, took seriously the matter of international Communism on the move, and didn't swallow everything the media and its correspondents were telling the American people). The merciless killing of President Diem was especially appalling to us and we "knew" that some members of the Kennedy administration had to be involved. Moyar provides much rich detail and background about this incident, which, in my view, was the most significant disaster of the period, and he furnishes evidence that shows, in my opinion, that all too frequently in American foreign policy "politics" trumps "good sense." It is interesting to note the following which is related by Moyar: "The Communists, unlike most of the Americans, were very quick to grasp the profound significance of the November 1963 coup. Upon hearing of Diem's assassination, Ho Chi Minh remarked, 'I can scarcely believe that the Americans would be so stupid.'" Well, I have to take issue with Ho Chi Minh's remark. I have no problem whatsoever believing that our government can be that stupid. It has shown it time and time again and continues to show it, for instance, in the planning and execution of the war resulting in the current Iraq fiasco. (Two years ago I wrote that "Iraq may well become George Bush's Vietnam." I was laughed at by a few colleagues. Who's laughing now?) Many U.S. government officials involved in the Vietnam situation are justly criticized by Moyar, particularly American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, which is no surprise to me. Lodge seemed more concerned with his potential candidacy as the Republican nominee for president than with the future of Vietnam and the menace of Asian communism. Lodge probably could have prevented the Diem assassination but chose not to do so which, in my view, makes him implicit in the coup. Furthermore, according to Moyar, Ambassador Lodge "relied very heavily on U.S. newspaper correspondents for information. The assessments that he telegraphed to Washington much more closely resembled the assessments of the press than they did the assessments of the American military and the CIA...." Ah, yes, the American press. One does have to confront the issue of the influence of reporters and correspondents on foreign policy. And Moyar does so at many points throughout the book. Consider just one of the incidents narrated by the author. On February 27, 1962, Diem's palace was attacked by two of his own pilots. One was shot down and fell into the Saigon River, was rescued by the police and taken into custody. The bombing raid was not part of any military plan. The captured pilot, however, "confessed that he had expected U.S. support for overthrowing the government as the result of reading articles in Newsweek and Time." There was a constant battle between the South Vietnamese government and some of the American press and one could interpret the behavior and writings of certain reporters as actually helping to determine American foreign policy, a situation that historically results in the making of bad policy. (As obvious examples, I simply point to some irresponsible reporters who "covered" the American Civil War or the Spanish-American War and through their inaccurate and biased -- but highly influential -- reporting inflamed public opinion and impacted governmental policies.) At least two reporters in Vietnam are singled out for special criticism by Moyar: David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan. As well they should be. In too many cases to cite here, their reporting was anything but "objective" and "unbiased." It is interesting to note that the Publishers Weekly review commented on this by stating: "Though Moyar marshals many primary sources to buttress his political point of view, he undermines his argument by disparaging those he disagrees with (calling Sheehan and Halberstam, for example, 'indignant,' 'vengeful,' and 'self-righteous')." And one has to wonder in what way Moyar's argument is undermined by these "disparaging" words if, in fact, those are exactly the words which describe the behavior of those named reporters? Me thinketh that publication protesteth too much. Of course, its constituency includes the journalism crowd. Vietnam is still a disaster which haunts the American psyche. We lost a lot of good Americans on that battlefield and we have, in my opinion, failed to learn the real lessons of that debacle. Moyar gives us much to ponder over; his book is replete with details; his prose illustrations are vivid and on the mark. The serious reader will find Triumph Forsaken a valuable contribution to American military history. Highly recommended. 
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