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BOOK REVIEW

Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution,
by Francis Fukuyama

Farrar, Straus and Giroux - April 2002

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Reviewed by Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty

The biotechnology revolution is upon us, says Francis Fukuyama in his new book Our Posthuman Future, and we had better begin to deal with the challenging social, political, and economic issues which will be raised by the changes to come.

Fukuyama points out that we are already a society that is widely using and abusing drugs like Prozac and Ritalin to modify behavior and psychological states and we now seem to be all too eager to employ our expanding knowledge of human genetics to influence everything from increasing intelligence to prolonging life. But these may be the least of the problems we face in the future. The author also discusses such controversial issues as eugenics, the prospects for germline enhancement, embryonic stem-cell research, human cloning, and "designer babies."

According to Fukuyama, "the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a 'posthuman' stage of history." The importance of this, he argues, is "because human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable continuity to our experience as a species." Furthermore, our human nature is "what defines our most basic values" and "shapes and constrains the possible kinds of political regimes, so a technology powerful enough to reshape what we are will have possibly malign consequences for liberal democracy and the nature of politics itself."

So the question is raised: "What should we do in response to biotechnology that in the future will mix great potential benefits with threats that are either physical and overt or spiritual and subtle?" The answer, according to Fukuyama is, "We need to start thinking concretely now about how to build institutions that can discriminate between good and bad uses of biotechnology, and effectively enforce these rules both nationally and internationally."

The concerns raised by Fukuyama are legitimate and timely. His arguments regarding the potential damage of some aspects of biotechnology are compelling. The reasons he gives for his concerns should be familiar to all of us who are within the tradition of classical philosophical realism. Indeed, at the outset, Fukuyama tells us that "The case that I will lay out here might be called Aristotelian, not because I am appealing to Aristotle's authority as a philosopher, but because I take his mode of rational philosophical argument about politics and nature as a model for what I hope to accomplish."

And what is it that Fukuyama wants to accomplish? It seems to me that he wants to provide a rational foundation for suggesting that any type of biotechnology needs to be regulated which may affect human beings in their most essential characteristics, that is, those universal features which mark a human being as a human being and not some other being. In other words, any scientific procedure which may adversely alter human nature ought to be subject to control and supervision. A valid concept of human nature, including our subsequent understanding of human rights and human dignity based on this concept, is the justification that supports society's intervention into any proposed procedure of biotechnology. Fukuyama rightly notes:

Aristotle argued, in effect, that human notions of right and wrong -- what we today call human rights -- were ultimately based on human nature. That is, without understanding how natural desires, purposes, traits, and behaviors fit together into a human whole, we cannot understand human ends or make judgments about right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust. Like many more recent utilitarian philosophers, Aristotle believed that the good was defined by what people desired, but while utilitarians seek to reduce human ends to a simple common denominator like the relief of suffering or the maximization of pleasure, Aristotle retained a complex and nuanced view of the diversity and greatness of natural human ends. The purpose of his philosophy was to try to differentiate the natural from the conventional and to rationally order human goods.

It is unfortunate that most modern social philosophers have either ignored or dismissed this important Aristotelian formulation. For where else are we to appeal as grounds for human rights and human dignity but to human nature itself? The only alternative I see is to the political community and, if that be so, then human rights and human dignity are at the mercy of whatever arbitrary whims society or government holds at any moment. It would be difficult, then, on philosophical grounds, to argue against any type of human experimentation as long as it had the alleged approval of society. Witness what happened in Nazi Germany in the 1930s; I don't think any reasonable person buys into that form of "scientific" experimentation. In other words, there are limits to what can be permitted, even in the name of "scientific progress."

Summing it up, Fukuyama argues the need to restore notions of human rights, human nature, and human dignity. He draws on Aristotle and the concept of "natural right" to argue against the unchecked development of biotechnology. His claim is that a substantive human nature exists, that basic ethical principles and political rights such as equality are based on judgments about that nature, and therefore that human dignity itself could be lost if human nature is altered. His final leap to human dignity, the notion that all humanity exists on a higher moral plane than the rest of the natural world, is perfectly in accord with the classical realistic tradition. It follows, then, that acts that deny human dignity, such as reproductive cloning, should be prohibited outright. And in this he is absolutely correct.

How to do it? Fukuyama argues that state power, possibly in the form of new regulatory institutions, should be used to regulate biotechnology. And he points out that pessimism about the ability of the global community to do this is unwarranted. There are other areas of technology, he notes, which the world community regulates, such as nuclear technology, biological and chemical warfare, and so forth. "We do not," he maintains, "have to regard ourselves as slaves to inevitable technological progress when that progress does not serve human ends." Furthermore, he continues, "True freedom means the freedom of political communities to protect the values they hold most dear, and it is that freedom that we need to exercise with regard to the biotechnology revolution today."

Fukuyama's arguments are familiar terrain for those of us in the tradition of classical philosophical realism. He has correctly set the foundation for his argument and rationally presented his case. We understand what he is saying and agree that, regarding this particular technology, regulation is necessary for what we interpret as the "common good" of humankind. Political libertarians and classical liberals, however, may bristle at the word "regulation." Most of us who claim to fall into one of those two camps tend to look on regulation with a distrusting eye. So I will say a few words to my fellow libertarians and classical liberals about Fukuyama's call for regulation.

The world is a dangerous place and this was brought home to Americans as never before on September 11th, 2001. There are people who do not accept the intrinsic value of human life and do not accept our understanding of human nature, natural rights, and human dignity. While human freedom and liberty is essential to our lives as human beings, it is not unlimited. The concept of "laissez-faire" never meant that human beings could do whatever they wanted to do in any and all circumstances. As Aristotle correctly pointed out, we are social and political animals. We are meant to live in a community with other human beings. This is the environment in which we are to achieve our rational end as human beings. This being so, governments are instituted among us to regulate certain behaviors which may be inimical to the individual members of the community or to the community as a whole.

Fukuyama is cognizant of the fact that "Excessive regulation in the past has led many to become instinctively hostile to state intervention in any form, and it is this knee-jerk aversion to regulation that will be one of the chief obstacles to getting human biotechnology under political control." But, he points out,

...it is important to discriminate: what works for one sector of the economy will not work for another. Information technology, for example, produces many social benefits and relatively few harms and therefore has appropriately gotten by with a fairly minimal degree of government regulation. Nuclear materials and toxic waste, on the other hand, are subject to strict national and international controls because unregulated trade in them would clearly be dangerous.

I, for one, do not want my next-door neighbor building a nuclear weapon in his basement. Nor do I want toxic waste dumped into the vacant lot next to my house, even if it is someone else's private property. And so it is with certain aspects of the biotechnology revolution. There are sound reasons to put limits on biotechnology and these limits can be and need to be enforced. This is, in my opinion, Fukuyama's main thesis in his book, and with this I wholeheartedly agree.

Our Posthuman Future deserves to be read by all those who are concerned about the direction in which biotechnology is going. No, let me go further. This book needs to be read by all thinking human beings. The reason is simple: human beings, or human nature as we have understood it up to now, may be at stake. Fukuyama is no Luddite, neither am I. But the simple fact is this: just because something in science or technology "can" be done, does not mean it "should" be done. When we learn that lesson, maybe the world will be a better place.

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