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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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Historical Notes
The freedom of the will is defended by Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, René Descartes, John Locke, and many others of very different schools of thought. Kant denies free will in the noumenal world, but admits it in the phenomenal world as a postulate of practical reason. The freedom of the will is denied by the determinists and the fatalists, who in one way or another hold that the will is necessitated either from within or from without. Several forms of determinism may be distinguished. Mechanical determinism is defended by extreme materialists, such as Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). In general, they admit that understanding and willing are purely material processes, subject to the same mechanical laws which govern the whole cosmos. Biological (physiological) determinism is defended by many psychoanalysts who follow Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), and by the behaviorists (John Watson). In general, they admit that man's activity is rigidly fixed by biological determinants, such as the activity of endocrine glands, hereditary factors, surroundings, etc. NOTE: While it cannot be denied that hereditary factors, glands, etc., exercise influence upon the will, and that in abnormal cases can prevent deliberation and therefore also free choice, we deny that these factors normally necessitate the will. Psychological determinism derives its origin from Leibnitz, who did not deny the freedom of the will, but explained it in such a way that determinism resulted. According to psychological determinism there is an intrinsic necessity for the will to choose the greater good. NOTE: While we are willing to admit that the greater good exercises a powerful attraction, so that more often than not the greater good is chosen, we deny that the will is necessitated by the greater good. Metaphysical determinism asserts that the freedom of the will must be rejected because it would imply a violation of the principle of causality. On the one hand, the will would be the cause of its free choice, and, on the other, the will is not sufficiently determined to make this choice and therefore not its cause. NOTE: Our explanation does not violate causality, for the will is sufficiently determined by the ultimate practical judgment to be the cause of the choice. Moreover, the concept of cause does not imply that the effect follows of necessity, but merely that the effect has a cause. Theological determinism, as defended by, for instance, John Calvin (1509-1564), denies the freedom of the will, because when God moves the will He determines its act in such a way that there can be no free choice. Under theological determinism we may classify also the pantheism of Benedict Spinoza, according to whom the divine causality necessitates all other modes of being. Fatalism, which holds that everything happens of necessity as decided by fate, may also be classified under theological determinism. NOTE: In regards to Calvin's position, while we admit that God moves the will, we deny that He moves anything against its nature, so that the freedom of the will is safeguarded. |
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