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Judging
Cultures and Societies
by George J. Irbe
In The Time of Our Lives, Mortimer J.
Adler makes the argument that the basic goods
necessary for the Aristotelian 'good life' are the
same for every man of every race and culture. In
Adler's own words, in Section 5, Chapter 12 of the
book: "... the value system involved in the scale
of real goods that constitute a good human life is
relative only to human nature, and not to societies
and cultures... It is a universally applicable
standard ..."
Adler has thus provided us with an objective
means that we can use with confidence -- facing
unflinchingly the wrath of the Torquemadas of
political correctness -- to rate and compare the
beneficence and viability (or lack thereof) of one
culture, society or civilization relative to
others, as well as rating them in an absolute
sense. As Adler assures us: "... we can judge human
societies or cultures as good or bad, better or
worse, in spite of all the injunctions against
doing so delivered by the sociologists and cultural
anthropologists." We can do this by looking at how
easy or difficult it is for any individual member
of that culture, society or civilization to attain
the universally invariant norms of "a good
life."
We start with a definition of 'a good life,'
also called 'happiness' and the 'totum bonum':
- A whole life made good by the possession of
all the things that are really good for a man,
and by the possession of them to the fullest
extent that they are really good, neither more
nor less, together with the possession of such
other goods as the individual may want, on the
condition that obtaining these goods does not
interfere with his getting real goods that he
needs." Thus understood, "'happiness' and 'a
good life' are simply different names for the
totum bonum, the totality of real goods ... Each
type of real good that is a constituent element
in the totum bonum corresponds to a different
natural need. They are such things as health,
pleasure, wealth, friends or loved ones, and
knowledge ...[Section 3, Chapter
12]
To the above one should add that the practice of
moral and intellectual virtue in choosing the goods
is also implicit in the pursuit of the Aristotelian
good life or happiness.
Common sense -- indeed, the very laws of nature
-- tell us that no human being, while in possession
of his normal mental faculties, would profess to
deliberately seek the contraries of the real goods
for a happy life -- illness, pain, poverty, enemies
- and thus an unhappy life. We do know, however,
that men can mistakenly choose and give priority in
their life to apparent goods that are not goods at
all or are harmful if over-indulged in, and neglect
choosing the real goods. But no one could argue
against the obvious by questioning the soundness of
the advice that all men ought to seek, first and
foremost, the real goods in right amounts that
constitute the really good life, also called
happiness, or the totum bonum. And there is hardly
a person of sound mind to be found anywhere in the
world who when specifically asked whether he would
like to have the real goods, such as health,
wealth, pleasure and friends, would answer
"No."
Adler acknowledges "the relevance of all the
facts about individual and cultural differences
that we either know as a matter of ordinary
experience or have learned from investigations
conducted by the behavioral scientists." Then Adler
goes on to state:
- But these are not the only facts to be taken
into account. There is also the pre-eminent fact
that all men belong to the same biological
species and, as such, are the same in nature,
that is, have the same biological properties,
the same basic native capacities-dispositions
and needs. When this fact is put together with
the facts of individual differences, we see that
while the general outlines of a good life are
the same for all men because they all have the
same specific nature, the details that fill that
outline in differ from man to man because men
all differ individually from one another.
[Section 4, Chapter 12]
The common denominator, then, for the 'general
outlines of a good life' for people of different
cultures and societies is this set of real goods
common to all men.
When Aristotle first acquainted men with what it
is that they seek, i.e., happiness, he also
explained that it was the ideal of perfection of
all ideals of perfection, not really of this world.
Like with other ideal perfections, e.g., truth,
love, nobility, we can only hope to approach the
perfect state of happiness asymptotically.
Therefore, we understand that we can never expect
to attain all the real goods to perfection, or the
completely perfect good life, or the perfect state
of happiness. But, the bothersome fact is that when
we look at mankind across the globe, we see
societies and cultures where, if we were to devise
an index for measuring 'happiness' or the 'good
life' among the population according to the
standards set by Aristotle and espoused by Adler,
indications of the good life would barely register
at all in the population, and then only among a
ruling elite. So the question naturally arises why
that is so.
Granted that in most of the unhappy societies
much of the pervasive misery and the absence of the
real goods that people need for a good life are
caused by a malformed, or primitive, economic
structure. But if we glance back in history a few
hundred years, we see that subsistence-level
economic conditions were the norm in almost every
society and culture. The question then becomes:
what other factors beside the purely economic
factor, which itself may be dependent on the other
factors, promote, or detract from, the pursuit of
happiness in the general population; factors that
account for unequal rates of progress in different
civilizations and societies. Furthermore, there
arises the secondary question whether these factors
may also explain why one society succeeds in the
invasion of another's domain and in establishing
economic and social domination over the other --
known as colonialism.
We can reason that any given individual in a
society either has the awareness and appreciation
of the critical importance of the real goods which
he needs for a good life, or he does not. In the
first instance, that individual will most likely
try his best to live life according to the
Aristotelian standards (although he may not be
specifically aware of them as such). In the second
instance, the individual will most likely achieve
very little of the good life. However, human beings
never cease to observe and to learn from others.
Therefore, we can also reason that in cultures and
societies which generally value the goods that are
really good for man and encourage the acquisition
of these goods by all its members, the numbers of
individuals who are ignorant of the value of the
real goods should be decreasing as a matter of
course, to the point where, as is said, ignorance
is no excuse.
We can observe the very obvious and natural fact
that a society in which the pursuit of the real
goods necessary for the really good life is open
to, and practiced by, the greatest numbers of
individuals is also a society where a general
consensus prevails on the paramountcy of the value
of the real goods over other traditional cultural,
religious or political beliefs held in that
society. Simply put, we cannot help but note that
the successful society or civilization is the one
that values the freedom of the individual above all
other values, whereas the society or civilization
which values other things more than freedom is
likely to be regressive or stagnant.
Friedrich A. Hayek has given much thought to the
cultural and societal evolution of man. Although
Hayek has not subscribed specifically to
Aristotelian ethics, we can incorporate some of his
views on the evolution of society with ours. Hayek
writes in his trilogy Law, Legislation and
Liberty, in the Epilogue of Vol. 3, "The
Political Order of a Free People":
- Man has not developed freedom. The member of
the little band to which he had to stick in
order to survive was anything but free. Freedom
is an artefact of civilization that released man
from the trammels of the small group, the
momentary moods of which even the leader had to
obey. Freedom was made possible by the gradual
evolution of the discipline of civilization
which is at the same time the discipline of
freedom. It protects him by impersonal abstract
rules against arbitrary violence of others and
enables each individual to try to build for
himself a protected domain with which nobody
else is allowed to interfere and within which he
can use his own knowledge for his own purposes.
[p. 163]
-
- What man probably found most difficult to
comprehend was that the only common values of an
open and free society were not concrete objects
to be achieved, but only those common abstract
rules of conduct that secured the constant
maintenance of an equally abstract order which
merely assured to the individual better
prospects of achieving his individual ends but
gave him no claims to particular things. [p.
164]
-
- Tradition is not something constant but the
product of a process of selection guided not by
reason but by success. [p. 166]
Note (p. 163) that "Freedom was made possible by
... the discipline of civilization ...," and that
freedom allows the individual to "... use his own
knowledge for his own purposes." We can be bold and
extend that thought to say that the evolution of
the discipline of civilization (a characteristic of
the successful civilization) has enabled the
individual to use his own knowledge (e.g., of what
constitutes a good life) for his own purposes (the
main purpose being the pursuit of happiness).
Perhaps there are cultures and societies still
today which fear the open and free society and
therefore find it (as on p. 164), "... most
difficult to comprehend that the only common values
of an open and free society were ... only common
abstract rules of conduct ..." (here we can include
the rules of conduct that lead to the good life, as
recommended by Aristotle); "... that secured the
constant maintenance ..." (by a government of laws,
not men); "... of an equally abstract order which
merely assured to the individual better prospects
of achieving his individual ends ...'(the good
life)'... but gave him no claims to particular
things' (one is not to depend on government to
provide the material wherewithal of a good
life).
All societies and cultures have traditions.
Hayek says (p. 166) that traditions are not
constant, but change through an evolutionary
process of trial-and-error, where the old
traditions give way to new ones, if the new prove
to be superior to the old. That, after all, is the
hallmark of a successful, viable society or
civilization.
One can read Hayek's Law, Legislation and
Liberty for the details of his hypothesis on
the evolutionary development of civilization which,
according to Hayek, proceeded in tandem with the
development of man's intellect. However, Hayek's
analysis may be incomplete in that it takes the
simple Darwinian approach which focuses only on the
successful outcomes. Man's society is a rather
different entity than a biological species. The
demise of a culture or civilization that is no
longer competitive in what it offers to its
individual constituents is by no means a sure
thing, as it is for a biological species that
cannot adapt to environmental changes. An
obsolescent culture can survive for a long time,
albeit in relative misery, on the negative energy
generated by the intransigence of its obsolete
traditions.
It is customary to blame all the ills of the
so-called third world on their miserable economies
and living standards. The developed nations are
blamed for keeping the third world in economic
bondage as bad as under the defunct colonial
system. This is wrong thinking. In reality, the
unhealthy economy is merely a symptom of the real
causes for the enduring misery in a society.
The traditions that inhibit access by
individuals to the real goods necessary for a good
life are generally some mix of cultural customs and
practices, religion, and politics. Adler states in
of The Time of Our Lives: "Consequently, it
is highly probable that under certain societal or
cultural conditions, it may be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for an individual to satisfy all
his natural needs to attain, to the requisite
degree, all the things that are really good for him
as a human being." [Section 5, Chapter
12]
Indeed, a headline in today's paper is fitting
testimony to the problem. It reads: "Bad government
to blame for plight of poor nations: UN."
There is no hope for solving the problem of
wide-spread unhappiness (the opposite of the good
life) all over the world if we refuse to face and
acknowledge the truth of things. We pretend that
the problem lies were it does not; we are willing
to bury the truth about things lest we offend
somebody's tender ethno-cultural or religious
sensitivities. But although it is very painful, at
times, to acknowledge the truth, the blessings that
come after the truth has been acknowledged make it
all worthwhile. Adler must be thanked for
recommending what we must be bold enough to do,
even at the risk of stepping on our own and others'
ethno-cultural tender spots, if we are to face the
problem squarely. In his own words:
- Hence, by applying this standard, it is
possible to judge any society or culture as good
or bad, better or worse, including our own, and
we can do so without falling into the
ethnocentric predicament that is the bugaboo of
the sociologist and anthropologist. A society or
culture is good if it does not prevent its
members from making a really good life for
themselves, and one is better than another if,
to a greater degree than that other, it
facilitates the pursuit of happiness for all or
for more of its members. A society or culture is
bad if it prevents some or all of its members
from achieving the totum bonum that constitutes
a really good human life, and one is worse than
another if, to a greater degree than that other,
it interferes with the pursuit of happiness for
all or for more of its members. [Section 5,
Chapter 12]
I will conclude by suggesting a reorganized
structure for the United Nations General Assembly.
This structure is rather inegalitarian but it
provides a salutary incentive to the member nations
to do better. First of all, the UN should devise a
plan, according to Adler's standards, for periodic
appraisal of all member nations. Member nations
(and prospective new members) could be rated on a
scale, say, from one to five, on the extent to
which their social environment provides the
necessities for the pursuit of happiness by the
individual.
The General Assembly should be divided into a
lower and upper chamber. Member nations that score
3 or more on the 'happiness' scale would sit in the
upper chamber, those with a lower rating would sit
in the lower chamber. Resolutions passed by the
lower chamber would also have to pass in the upper
chamber to come into effect. Resolutions approved
in the upper chamber by 66 percent of members
cannot be challenged in the lower chamber; if upper
chamber approval is by simple majority only, the
resolution can be challenged in the lower chamber
only if it is objected to by at least 66 percent of
its members. Similar procedures can be established
for UN financing and expenditures on the various
programs that it runs. Finally, if the Security
Council is retained as the executive body of the
UN, seats in this Council should go only to member
nations who rate a minimum of four on the
'happiness' appraisal scale. Veto power in the
Security Council should belong only to members who
rate a five. I wonder if a system of this kind
could ever be adopted by the United Nations.
Questions/Comments? Post them in The
Radical Academy Forum
Mr. Irbe's Website: Classical
Liberal George
E-mail Address: George
J. Irbe
A Brief
Autobiography of George J. Irbe
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