The Good and the Misguided, by George J. Irbe

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The "Good" and the Misguided
by George J. Irbe

Aristotle begins his work The Nicomachean Ethics (the version used here is as translated by David Ross) with the statement in Book I: 'Every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is considered to aim at some good. Hence the Good has been rightly defined as "that at which all things aim".' A little further on, Aristotle discusses the good that is sought by men: 'If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.'

The chief good - the totum bonum - is also known as "happiness". Later on in Book I, line 1097a25, Aristotle elaborates on the meaning of happiness: 'Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. ... we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else ...'

It seems that Aristotle was confident that most of the contemporary scholars and educated people who would read his work would understand what he meant by the word "good" and accepted as given that "good" is a real, qualitative term, that "good" exists, just as does its opposite -- evil. Aristotle certainly did not question the validity of the concept of "good" as such. Only later on, in Book VI of the Ethics, and because he deemed it necessary to clarify the distinction between truth as arrived at by what he called "practical intellect" and "contemplative intellect", Aristotle indicated what the self-evident, categorical "good" is about by stating how men should decide what is really good for them, particularly in instances that involve moral decisions. Aristotle recognized the existence of real, self-evident goods, the kind that all men need and that all men, therefore, ought to desire whether they actually do or do not desire them; and when they do desire the right goods, they exercise the right desire.

This very important thought is stated by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1139a20:

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.

It is indeed regrettable that Aristotle did not devote more time and effort to elaborate on the meaning of "right desire" and its crucial role in determining what are the truly real goods for us. If he had done so, perhaps this crucial distinction would not have gone unnoticed for millennia by all but a very few scholars. The consequences of ignoring Aristotle's admittedly brief statement about "right desires" have been enormously detrimental to the development of Western philosophy on ethics and morals in the modern era.

To my knowledge, there is only one man today -- Mortimer J. Adler -- who has, literally single-handedly, brought the essence of Aristotelian ethics back into prominence, particularly by shining the spot-light on the very important concept stated by Aristotle in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.

I venture that civilization itself will eventually recognize that it owes Mortimer J. Adler quite a lot for refurbishing this crowning jewel of Aristotle's thought after it had been neglected for centuries.

I personally must thank Adler for arousing my interest in Aristotle's Ethics and for the exhilarating reassurance he has provided to me that the "good" IS, without a doubt. To me that is next in importance only to having a reassurance that God exists. And for that reassurance, also, I must thank Mortimer J. Adler. He provided it for me in his book How to Think About God (1980). If this resembles a paean to Mortimer J. Adler, let it be so. I cannot think of a more deserving philosopher, ancient or modern.

In the rest of this piece I will make copious use of passages from Adler's works. I hope I have his blessings to do so -- after all, nobody on this earth can expound on the subject better than he can.

First of all, I want to present the argument -- via Aristotle and Adler -- in support of the "good." Afterwards, I will present the arguments of the gainsayers, also in Adler's words, and Adler's refutation of their arguments.

Defining the "Good"

Before the emergence of several modern schools of thought in the philosophy of ethics, starting in the seventeenth century, philosophers recognized that, quoting Adler: 'there are certain primitive terms that transcend the categories which make definition possible. Among them are such basic philosophical terms as "being" and "non-being", "one" and "many", "same" and "other". These terms are predicable of any subject, and as predicable of any subject, they are predicated in an analogical, not a univocal, sense; any term that is thus predicable must be indefinable. (Note from Adler's Philosophical Dictionary: We speak univocally when in naming things we use a word with exactly the same meaning every time we use it. When we speak analogically we use the word in neither the same sense, nor in a different sense, when the senses are related or unrelated. The distinguishing mark of the analogical predicate is that we find it impossible to say what it is that is common to the several uses of it; e.g. the word "sharp").' [4]

Aristotle was a commonsense philosopher who did not see the necessity to attempt defining the analogical predicate "good". Adler provides further explanation of the nature of the indefinables:

The indefinables are, of all terms, the most intelligible, even though we cannot state their meanings in definitions. Instead, we state their meanings in axioms or self-evident propositions -- propositions that were called common notions because they do not belong to any particular discipline, propositions that Aristotle spoke of as correlating "commensurate universals" because their constituent terms are of equal scope as universal predicates. Such equi-valence makes these propositions convertible.

One example of this very special type of proposition is Euclid's common notion that a whole is greater than any of its parts. This statement, or the converse statement that any part is less than the whole, explicates the meaning of both of these indefinable terms, which are commensurate universals, by stating their relation to one another. That is why they were once called propositions per se nota -- propositions known to be true through the understanding of their terms.

The proposition about wholes and parts is a self-evident and necessary truth. When we understand its truth, no open questions of fact remain. We cannot ask, "Is it really true that this part is less than the whole to which it belongs?"

With respect to "good" as an indefinable term, its commensurate universal is expressed by the term "desire" -- or any of the synonyms for this word, such as "appetite," "yearning," "seeking," "aiming at," "tending toward," and so on. The correlation of these commensurate universals is stated by such terms as "satisfies" and "aims at"; thus we can say, "The good is that which satisfies desire," and "Desire is that which aims at the good." Here the correlating terms "satisfies" and "aims at" function exactly as the correlating terms "greater than" or "less than" in the case of the whole and part.

The self-evident propositions or axioms which correlate the good and desire not only show that good and desire, like whole and part, are primitive indefinable terms; the axioms also explicate the meaning of these terms.

The correlation of the good with desire can be summed up in the statement that the good is the desirable and the desirable is the good. However, "good" and "desire" are no more identical in meaning than whole and part are. [4]

We must focus next on the sense in which Aristotle used the word "right" in "right desire". As everyone knows, there are different kinds of desires, and not all of them are commendable. But then, good and desire being commensurate universals, one can infer that there can also be less than commendable goods. However, that appears to be an illogical contradiction: can there be a "bad" good? Yes, in a sense, indeed there can be, as explained by Adler in the following passages:

At the beginning of Western philosophy, Socrates repeatedly observes that no man seeks that which in fact he deems injurious, harmful, or disadvantageous to himself and, conversely, that everyone seeks that which in fact he deems beneficial, advantageous, or good for himself. Socrates immediately adds that the deeming or opining of what is beneficial or harmful, advantageous or disadvantageous, may, of course, be mistaken. In other words, that which appears good to the individual (that which he deems advantageous to himself) may in fact be bad for him (disadvantageous, injurious, or harmful). Here, in its seminal form, is the basic distinction between what later came to be called the real and the apparent good.

By the apparent good, we mean that which is called "good" by an individual because, and only because, it is in fact desired by him. By the real good, we mean that which is good for an individual whether or not he is aware of desiring it.

But, have we not now postulated a meaning for good other than the one that derives from the correlation of the good with desire? The solution of this problem lies in a distinction between two modes of desire, each correlative with a different mode of the good.

Certain desires are elements in the make-up of man, whether or not the individual consciously acknowledges them, whereas other desires come into existence only as a result of factors that operate on the individual. The philosophers prior to the seventeenth century who recognized this distinction between two modes of desire called desires of the first type "natural desires," and desires of the second type "conscious desires."

We can use the word "needs" for all desires inherent in the nature of man and common to all men, and "wants" for all the desires elicited by circumstances and thus as various as the circumstances of individual experience.

The axiom that the good is the desirable and the desirable is the good covers both modes of desire and both modes of the good, but not in the same way. The real good is the good that is correlative with needs, and the apparent good is the good that is correlative with wants. Real goods satisfy natural desires or needs; needs aim at real goods. The correlation of apparent goods with wants means that apparent goods are things we do in fact consciously desire. In contrast, the correlation of real goods with needs means that real goods are things we should or ought to desire, whether in fact, at this moment, we consciously do or not.

This last point adds to the intuitive truth that the good is the desirable another intuitive truth that takes the form of a normative judgment; namely, that the real good ought to be desired, and nothing but that which is really good ought to be desired. These two intuitive truths are the only self-evident principles required in order to establish ethics or moral philosophy as a relatively autonomous discipline. [4]

Now we have the gist of it. There are two types of goods: apparent goods and real goods. Real goods correlate with needs and natural desires -- what Aristotle called right desires. Apparent goods correlate with wants and conscious desires.

Apparent goods, wants, and conscious desires can be innocuous and benign, but they can also be actually bad for a man. The real goods, needs, and natural (right) desires are always self-evidently true. This leads Adler to declare that 'the distinction between natural and acquired desires, or needs and wants, and the distinction between real and merely apparent goods enable us to state a self-evident truth that serves as the first principle of moral philosophy: We ought to desire whatever is really good for us and nothing else.'[1]

This first principle of moral philosophy contains the word "ought" which makes it a prescriptive statement. Adler can make this ought statement with confidence, because common sense indicates that 'the very understanding of the "really good" carries with it the prescriptive note that we "ought to desire" it. We cannot understand "ought" and "really good" as related in any other way.'[1]

This self-evident first principle allows us to promulgate the "oughts" and "ought nots" of a natural code of morals and ethics. Subsequently, Adler defines the entire foundation of this system of ethics in terms of a basic categorical ought, which he calls the normative principle that governs the making of a good life and also sets the standard of right desire:

The standard of right desire is set by the one basic categorical ought that states our obligation to seek the complete good, the totum bonum that leaves no need unsatisfied. Formulated with maximum explicitness, that categorical ought with respect to the end can be expressed as follows: one ought to make a really good life for one's self by desiring each and every real good that is part of the totum bonum, and by seeking each in such order and proportion with respect to the others that all can be possessed to the fullest extent that each is really good; and one ought not to seek anything the possession of which would interfere with achieving a good life for one's self. [5]

The Misguided

There are those who say with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

There are others who basically say: "there is nothing good or evil but thinking makes it so."

The men who through the ages have ignored, or have been ignorant of, the content of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, have struggled through various philosophical approaches while trying to prove or disprove the validity of a categorical and universal moral code which sets the standard of good, evil, right, and wrong; and prescribes the oughts and ought nots for the implementation of such a code.

I call these men "misguided," because, be it due to either a naive or a willful ignorance of him, they have not been guided by Aristotle. Mortimer Adler simply says that they are mistaken; one of his books used as a source here is titled Ten Philosophical Mistakes. In that book, and elsewhere, Adler refutes the claims and criticisms of the non-Aristotelians. Jousting in the philosophical arena is done with a plethora of terms and concepts. Adler has few equals in wielding this weaponry, as he vanquishes the "misguided" opponents. To start with, let's have Adler prepare the ground and describe the terms of engagement.

Here Adler defines some of the operative terms of the argument:

The subjective is that which differs for you, for me, and for everyone else. In contrast, the objective is that which is the same for you, for me, and for everyone else.

The relative is that which varies from time to time and alters with alterations in circumstances. In contrast, the absolute is that which does not vary from time to time and does not alter with alterations in the circumstances.

On one side of the issue about moral values and prescriptive judgments are those persons who hold that they are subjective and relative. On the other side of the issue are those persons who hold that they are objective and absolute.

There are two types of judgments: (1) descriptive - existential or characterizing assertions about what does or does not exist, or what is or is not the character of a existent thing; (2) prescriptive (also called normative because they lay down standards or norms of conduct) - assertions involving oughts and ought nots about what ought or ought not be sought or what ought or ought not be done. [1]

Clearly there is a chasm between judgments about what does or does not exist, or about what are or are not the characteristics of some existent thing, and judgments about what ought or ought not to be sought or what ought or ought not to be done. The first type of judgment, involving assertions that are existential or characterizing, let us call descriptive. The second type, involving oughts or ought nots, let us call prescriptive. Sometimes the latter are also called normative because they lay down standards or norms of conduct.

The chasm referred to above is the chasm between matters of fact on the one hand, and questions of value on the other hand, especially such values as good and evil, right and wrong. Judgments about these matters are intimately related to the type of judgment that I have called prescriptive or normative. If one thinks that something is really good, that is tantamount to saying that it ought to be sought. So, too, if one thinks that something is really right to do, that is tantamount to saying that it ought to be done.

There is one group of people who think that when we are dealing with reality, with matters of fact and real existence, we do have genuine knowledge and have some hold on truth, even though that truth may be subject to doubt and correction. But in their view, our judgments of value about good and evil, right and wrong, or our prescriptive judgments about what ought or ought not be done, are neither true nor false. They express nothing but our personal preferences, our likes and dislikes. Moral judgments are just mere opinion, concerning which there is no point in arguing, as there is no point in arguing about matters of taste or personal predilection. They may even quote Montaigne or Shakespeare to the effect that "there is nothing good or evil but thinking makes it so."

The other group of people takes the diametrically opposite view. For them there are absolute and universal standards of right and wrong, of what ought to be done or ought not to be done. They feel secure in their dogmatic assertion that the existence of objective moral values and standards is incontrovertible.

Both groups are equally dogmatic. The first group would be unable to defend its subjectivistic and relativistic attitude toward moral values, if that view were critically challenged. The second group would be unable to support the opposite view by rational arguments. It might appeal to articles of religious faith, but that is as far as it could go. [1]

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