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The "Good" and the Misguided, by George J. Irbe
(Con't)
Men have tried to subject the concepts of good
and evil, right and wrong, and their prescriptive
derivatives -- the oughts and ought nots -- to
various formalized, objective tests and treatments.
All these efforts have been made either in
ignorance of the Aristotelian concepts or in order
to disprove their validity. Some of the
philosophical methodologies which either question
the existence of a categorical good, or try to
prove its existence by other than Aristotelian
means, have gained popularity to the extent where
they are identified by the names of the
philosophers who originated them. Continuing on in
Adler's words:
- Of the two formal theses that have a
critical impact on the common-sense view, the
first is associated with the naturalistic or
empiricist approach to moral philosophy and the
second with the repudiation of naturalism and
empiricism. The first thesis is that all
evaluations are reducible to describable facts
-- that, for example, whenever we call something
good or bad, these words serve as short-hand for
a state of facts that can be reported or
described. Although this is the position of the
philosophical school that goes by the name of
"ethical naturalism" or "ethical empiricism," it
might be more appropriately called "ethical
reductionism", since it holds that whatever can
be validly said in discourse that uses terms of
value or makes moral judgments can be
reductively equated to what we know about the
nature of things through our empirical sciences
or through other empirical knowledge. It denies
that moral philosophy is even a relatively
autonomous discipline that has principles of its
own.
-
- The second formal thesis is expressed in the
proposition that the good is indefinable. This
not only (1) excludes the possibility of
defining good and bad by reference to the
describable properties or observable natural
things or processes; it also (2) excludes the
possibility of defining good and bad by
reference to unobservable or trans-empirical
entities.
-
- Being incompatible with one another, the
position of the naturalists and that of the
anti-naturalists cannot both be true; but they
can both be false. Both are wrong, each for a
different reason. No moral philosopher of note
prior to the eighteenth century claimed absolute
autonomy for ethics; none prior to the
nineteenth century attempted to reduce all
statements of value to statements of fact, or
normative judgments to descriptive
propositions.
-
- A statement of fact is one that asserts that
something is or is not, or asserts that it has
certain observable properties, that it behaves
in certain observable ways, that it stands in
certain observable relations to other things;
and that it may even take the form of an
explanation of the facts described by positing
the existence and operation of non-observable
entities.
-
- A statement of value is one that asserts
that something that exists, or some property
that it has, or something that it does, or
something that has happened or will happen, is
good or bad. And the apparent difference of such
statements from statements of fact is that the
words "good" and "bad" do not designate
observable properties or attributes of existent
things or processes. Goodness and badness are
not matters of observable fact. This can be
expanded to include descriptive and normative
statements -- is-statements and
ought-statements. Applied to human conduct, it
appears to make all the difference in the world
whether one says how men do in fact behave or
how they should or ought to behave.
-
- The naturalist in ethics contends -- and
this is his central contention -- that it can be
shown that every statement of value or normative
judgment can be reduced to a statement of fact
or descriptive judgment. The reduction can be
accomplished only in the following two
ways:
-
- (1) The first consists in equating the good
with the useful, and the better with the more
useful. When we say that X is good, we are
saying something that is subject to empirical
observation and testing; namely, that in fact X
serves as a means to or results in Y -- a state
of affairs that we think is good. If all values
can be reduced to matters of fact, then
everything that is called "good" is so called
because it is a means to something else. Nothing
can ever be called good in itself, good without
being in any way useful. Thus, if X is good
because it results in Y -- a state of affairs
that we also think is good, then Y is good in
the same way that we called X good, because it
in turn is a means to Z, and so on ad infinitum,
because there is nothing that can be called good
in itself or good simply as an end.
-
- (2) The naturalist similarly reduces
normative judgments or ought-statements to
descriptive judgments or is-statements. This
mode of reduction converts all ought-statements
into hypothetical statements. Just as the first
mode of reduction rested on the denial that
anything can validly be called good simply as an
end, so the second mode of reduction rests on
the denial that there are any valid categorical
ought-statements.
-
- A hypothetical ought-statement always takes
the following generic form: "If you want Y, then
you ought to do X." There are many species of
this generic form: the hypothetical penal ought:
if you want to avoid the sanctions imposed by
the law, then you ought to behave in conformity
with it; the hypothetical approbative ought: if
you want the approval of your fellow-men or of
your community, then you ought not to behave in
a certain fashion; the hypothetical
technological or artistic ought: if you want to
produce a certain result, then you ought to take
the following measures; the hypothetical
pragmatic ought: if you want to make a good life
for yourself, then you ought to do this or that
in order to achieve it.
-
- Is-statements express the kind of knowledge
that can be called "know-that", hypothetical
ought-statements express the kind of knowledge
that can be called "know-how." The second mode
of reduction turns all ought-statements into
statements of fact by making all of them
hypothetical. For example, ought you to want Y,
which is the condition given for asserting that
you ought to want X as a way of getting it? The
only answer admitted by the naturalist is that,
if in fact you do want Z, and if in fact Y is a
way of getting Z, then and only then ought you
to want Y.
-
- The ethical naturalist maintains that all
statements of value can be reduced to statements
of fact and all normative or ought-judgments to
descriptive or is-statements. But that is not
the case. The end posited in the question that
common sense has tried to answer, "How can we
make a good life for ourselves?" asks about
something that is good as an end, not as a
means. The second reason for saying that the
reductionism of the naturalist is untenable is
because it can be said categorically that I
ought to make a good life for myself, and it can
be said categorically that one ought to seek
that which is really good for himself. This is
self-evidently true when we understand the
distinction between the real and the apparent
good. [3]
The last paragraph in the above passage says
something of the greatest significance, i.e., that
one should understand the meaning of a good life
and be able to distinguish between real and
apparent good. I would like to add the obvious
implication in the above statement that, in order
to have this understanding, one must be familiar
with and comprehend the contents of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.
Some philosophers, John Dewey for one, find it
difficult to grasp the idea of good as an end in
itself, as Adler uses the term when referring to
the totum bonum of a lifetime. Adler gives
the following response:
- John Dewey wages an unremitting attack on
the notion of what he calls "fixed ends" or
"ultimate ends." If, by an end, one must always
mean a terminal end Dewey would be completely
right, because there are no terminal ends in
this life. However, long before Dewey struggled
with this matter, philosophers had distinguished
between two senses in which an end can be called
ultimate -- terminally, and normatively. An end
is a final or ultimate end in a purely normative
sense of ultimate if (a) it is a whole good
toward the achievement of which all other
partial goods serve only as means, and if (b)
that whole good is never attained at any moment
in time. The only good that satisfies these two
conditions is a good life as a whole.
[3]
As for the naturalists, Adler says:
- The refutation of naturalism in ethics rests
on the truth of two propositions: (1) that there
is at least one good to be sought entirely for
its own sake and not as a means to anything
beyond itself; and (2) that there is at least
one categorical ought that is self-evident.
[4]
Among the misguided are the subjectivists of the
Epicurean or hedonistic belief that the good is
equivalent to pleasure, and therefore moral values
and prescriptive judgments are subjective and
relative. Adler disposes of them as follows:
- Identifying the good with pleasure, it is an
easy step to conclude that what is deemed good
by one individual because it gives pleasure may
not be deemed good by another. But the facts of
everyday life make it impossible to maintain
that the only thing everyone in fact desires or
regards as desirable is pleasure.
-
- Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics,
argued that pleasure accompanies our activities,
but "the pleasure proper to a worthy activity is
good and that proper to an unworthy activity is
bad."
-
- In the modern world the leading self-avowed
hedonist is John Stuart Mill who also cannot
long maintain the simple-minded view that the
only good is pleasure. Eventually he resorts to
distinguishing between pleasures that are more
or less desirable.
-
- Sensual pleasures are certainly not the only
things we desire. The pleasure we experience
whenever any of our desires is satisfied -- the
pleasure that is identical with the satisfaction
of desire -- is an accompaniment of the good,
but not identical with it. [1]
The most substantial -- and at first glance
invincible, but, as it turns out, misguided,
nevertheless -- assault on the very notion that
there can be any valid categorical
ought-statements, and thus, any legitimate code of
prescribed morals, comes from David Hume (1711-76).
In the face of Hume's challenge of Aristotelian
ethics we once again find Mortimer Adler and his
unfailing philosophical lance answering the call
and unseating an opponent of recognized renown:
- The logical fallacy to which Hume called
attention is that it is fallacious to draw an
ought-conclusion from premises that consist
entirely of is-statements. [4]
-
- Hume is entirely correct. A prescriptive
conclusion cannot be validly drawn from premises
that are entirely descriptive. He is responsible
for the skepticism about the objective truth of
moral philosophy that is prevalent in the
twentieth century. This skepticism goes by the
name of "noncognitive ethics." The content of
noncognitive ethics is neither true nor false.
[1]
-
- Hume's "naturalistic fallacy" can be
summarized in two sentences. (1) Our descriptive
knowledge of matters of fact, even if it were
complete, gives us no basis for affirming the
truth of prescriptive imperatives -- statements
of what ought or ought not to be done. (2) That
being the case, an ethics that is deontological
rather than teleological, i.e., an ethics of
moral obligation rather than one of expediency,
is impossible.
-
- The first position is true, but the second
does not follow from the first. It is a non
sequitur. There need be only one self-evident,
categorical imperative which combined with true
statements of fact validates true prescriptive
conclusions. "You ought to desire everything
that is really good for you, and nothing else
ought to be desired" is the required
self-evident, categorical imperative. It is
derived from Aristotle's conception of right
desire and from his distinction between real and
apparent goods. [2]
-
- The very understanding of the "really good"
carries with it the prescriptive note that we
"ought to desire" it. We cannot understand
"ought" and "really good" as related in any
other way. With this self-evident truth as the
first principle we can solve the problem posed
by David Hume. By employing this first principle
as a major premise and adding to it one or more
descriptive truths about matters of fact (in
this case, descriptive truths about human
nature), we can validly reach a conclusion that
is a further descriptive truth. [1]
-
- But when we know the needs or natural
desires of men, as a result of knowing the
elements of human nature and the universal
features of human behavior, and when, knowing
what is really good for men, we let that lead us
to normative conclusions about what all men
ought to desire, are we not committing the modal
fallacy Hume had in mind when he found
ought-conclusions issuing from a series of
is-statements about matters of fact? Aristotle
had spotted the possibility of such fallacious
inference twenty-two centuries earlier.
-
- Aristotle had laid down the rule that in
order validly to conclude that something ought
to be done, the premises must involve at least
one ought-statement. The paradigm of the
practical or normative syllogism makes clear
that a normative or ought-conclusion cannot be
validly inferred from premises that consist
entirely of non-normative propositions, that is,
statements of fact, is-statements, descriptive
propositions.
-
- Our conclusions about what men ought to
desire are drawn from the facts of human nature
and behavior. However, they are not drawn
exclusively from matters of fact. The facts
about human nature and behavior constitute that
which functions as the minor premise in the
reasoning under consideration. The major premise
is the normative principle that we ought to seek
that which is really good for us. This
self-evident or indemonstrable principle -- an
ought judgment -- is intuitively known; it is
known to be true when we understand the meaning
of the good and the distinction between the real
and the apparent good. As such, it is not only a
normative proposition, but also one that is
independent of all matters of fact; that is, of
any empirical knowledge we may have or be able
to obtain about human nature, and especially
about human needs or natural desires. Being
independent of all matters of fact, it can be
validly combined with such matters of fact as we
may know, to produce by valid inference a whole
series of conclusions taking the following form:
(since X as a matter of fact is something that
we need) X ought to be desired. [4]
-
Casting doubts on the existence of a categorical
good has been advantageous to many proponents of
ideological dogmas during the last 250 years. And
there have been philosophers willing to accommodate
the demands for a noncognitive ethics. Adler has
recognized the possibility for misconstruing the
relationship between "good" and "desire":
'Identifying the good with the desirable rather
than with pleasure in either of its two senses
still leaves them unprotected against subjectivism
and relativism.' [1]
One of the early modern philosophers, Baruch
Spinoza (1632-1677), 'advanced the view that
whatever in fact we desire we call good. Whatever
objects we happen to desire, we deem them good
because we desire them, not the other way around --
desiring them because they are in fact good.
[1]
Spinoza's erroneous conclusions can be refuted
relatively simply; as Adler says: 'the error it
involves can be removed by calling attention to
another relation between good and desire than the
one considered by Spinoza. This involves a
distinction between two kinds of desire, with which
modern philosophers from Spinoza to Mill and others
do not seem to be acquainted. [1]
Adler is here referring to the distinction
between "natural desires" and "conscious
desires."
Another philosopher, from more recent times,
G.E. Moore (1873-1958), has had popular appeal
because he claims that the "good" cannot be
legitimately defined by conventional methods.
Moore's mistake (or perhaps a deliberate logical
legerdemain) is about the meaning of definitions,
identities, and indefinable terms. Adler explains
it in the following manner:
- The error revealed in Moore's discussion of
attempts to define the good is the mistake that
Moore himself makes in supposing that
definitions are statements of identities. The
argument by which Moore tried to show that the
good is indefinable is itself based on a
misunderstanding both of definitions and of
indefinable terms.
-
- It is necessary to correct this
misunderstanding. To get this clear, let us
begin by examining Moore's "open-question
argument" in its own terms. The argument
proceeds as follows:
- Define the meaning of "good" by using the
term "X" as the defining property, and let "X"
stand either for something observable or
something merely thinkable. The definition of
good would then take the form "whatever is good
is X". In Moore's view, it would also be true
that whatever is X is good, because in his view
of definition, the good and X are identical. The
words "good" and "X" are strictly synonymous.
But when we consider the proposition, "Whatever
has the property X is good," we find we are
still able to ask, "Is this particular instance
of X really good?" Thus, according to Moore, the
open-question argument shows that the good is
indefinable.
-
- Early philosophers knew on other and better
grounds that the good is indefinable; they did
not need this argument to discover it. They knew
that not all terms can be defined, and that
certain primitive terms transcend the categories
which make definition possible. How, then, can
we state their meanings? The ancient answer to
this question is :in axioms of self-evident
propositions that were called "common notions"
because they do not belong to any particular
discipline, propositions that Aristotle spoke of
as correlating "commensurate universals" because
their constituent terms are of equal scope as
universal predicates. That is why they were once
called propositions per se nota -- propositions
known to be true through the understanding of
their terms.
-
- When Moore refers to analytic propositions,
he does not have in mind what the philosophers
prior to the seventeenth or eighteenth century
would have called axioms or propositions per se
nota, but only that conception of analytical or
tautological propositions which he inherits from
Locke and Kant. It is this sense of "analytic"
that most twentieth-century philosophers employ
when they regard self-evident or necessary
truths as nothing but tautologies. That is
clearly what Moore has in mind when he thinks
that if there were a definition of good, it
would produce an analytic proposition (in his
view a statement of simple identity) that should
preclude any further question. [4]
Adler points out that if the meaning of "good"
is understood in the Aristotelian sense as being an
indefinable, commensurate universal term, Moore's
argument that defining good is an open question
turns out to be completely irrelevant.
A noted philosopher of our own times, A.J. Ayer
(1910-1989), maintains that ethics is noncognitive,
and uses what is called the correspondence theory
of truth to show that, unlike a descriptive
is-statement, a prescriptive ought-statement is
neither true nor false, and thus meaningless. Adler
responds, as follows:
- There is another critical point that tends
to remove prescriptive judgments from the sphere
of truth and put them in the realm of mere
opinions that are neither true nor false. This
point is made by A.J. Ayer, as well as others in
his circle. It appeals to the correspondence
theory of truth: We have a hold on truth when we
assert that that which is, is, and that which is
not, is not; and we suffer falsehood when we
assert that that which is, is not, or when we
assert that that which is not, is.
-
- This correspondence theory of truth, of the
agreement of the mind with reality, obviously
applies only to descriptive statements --
statements that involve assertions about what is
or is not. Just as obviously it does not apply
to prescriptive statements. Ayer is justified in
dismissing the prescriptive "ought" statement as
neither true nor false if the only kind of truth
consists in the agreement of the mind with
reality, for there are no matters of fact or
real existence with which a prescriptive
judgment can agree. [1]
-
- Aristotle also provides us with the
refutation of Ayer's argument, by answering the
question, "How can an ought-statement be true or
false?" Aristotle explains the difference
between the kind of truth that he calls
practical (the kind that is attributable to
ought statements) and the kind of truth he calls
speculative or theoretical (the kind that is
attributable to is-statements). [5]
-
- In Chapter 4 of On Interpretation
Aristotle proceeds, in terms of grammatical
distinctions, to separate declarative sentences,
which assert something, from other types of
sentences, such as the interrogative, the
subjunctive, and the imperative, which do not
assert anything, but merely ask a question,
express a wish, or give a command. He then says
that only declarative sentences express
propositions -- for only they make assertions,
and nothing but an assertion can be either true
or false. Every ought-statement can be expressed
as a command, and a command does not assert
anything, and so cannot be true or false. But,
although all ought-statements can be expressed
as commands, there are many commands that cannot
be expressed as ought-statements.
Ought-statements are grammatically of the same
type as is-statements; they are declarative
sentences and make assertions. In short, the
declarative mode of sentence is equally
available to express two logically different
types of propositions, each equally assertive:
the descriptive proposition, which asserts that
something is the case, and the normative
proposition, which asserts that something ought
to be desired or done. [5 - Note #
10].
-
- The truth of is-statements consists in an
agreement or correspondence between what the
statement asserts and the way things in fact
are. The truth of ought-statements consists in
an agreement of the statement "with right
desire." Thus, an ought-judgment of the type
"You ought to seek X" or "You ought to do Y" is
true if it agrees with right desire, and false
if it does not. In other words, in relation to
ought-statements, conformity with right desire
plays the same role that conformity with the
facts, with the way things are, plays in
relation to is-statements. The standard of right
desire is set by one basic categorical ought:
one ought to make a really good life for one's
self by desiring each and every real good that
is part of the totum bonum, and by
seeking each in such order and proportion with
respect to the others that all can be possessed
to the fullest extent that each is really good;
and one ought not to seek anything the
possession of which would interfere with
achieving a good life for one's self. This basic
categorical ought concerning the ultimate end is
the normative principle that governs the making
of a good life and also sets the standard of
right desire by reference to which all other
normative propositions -- all of them
conclusions about the means to a good life --
are to be judged true or false. [5]
-
- The truth of the normative principle is not
itself an instance of normative truth, but is
rather the kind of truth called truth of
understanding. It is the kind of truth that is
possessed by any self-evident proposition,
whether it be an is-statement such as "The whole
is greater than its parts," or an
ought-statement such as "One ought to make a
really good life for one's self by seeking the
totum bonum."
-
- All normative propositions other than the
one basic normative principle must have the
twofold character of being (a) conclusions, and
as such not self-evident, and (b) statements
concerning the means to a good life -- the means
that ought to be desired and employed in order
to achieve the end that ought to be sought, the
totum bonum. Other than the one normative
principle, all normative propositions are either
of the form "One ought to desire X," which is a
normative conclusion about a constructive means
to a good life, or they are of the form "One
ought to do or have M," which is a normative
conclusion about an instrumental means to the
good life.
-
- Although descriptive, empirical knowledge of
matters of fact has entered into our reaching
these conclusions, the conclusions themselves
are normative propositions, and their truth is
not descriptive, but normative truth. The
conclusions are normatively true by conforming
to the standard of right desire -- desire for
the end, the totum bonum, that ought to
be sought.
-
- Normative conclusions are always drawn from
mixed premises -- partly factual and partly
normative. That is the only way they can be
validly established. Though a normative
conclusion would not be true if its factual
premise were not true, it still remains the case
that it has normative truth by virtue of
conforming to the standard of right desire, not
by virtue of the factual truth that underlies
it.
-
- Our knowledge of such matters of fact as are
involved in reaching normative conclusions is
empirical knowledge, subject to the same
empirical tests by which any statement of fact
can be falsified or have its degree of relative
truth confirmed. [5]
Immanuel Kant is the father of the school of
moral philosophy which is based on reason. Kant and
his followers are on the "good" side in the dispute
about morals and ethics; but their absolutist view
of moral standards lacks the human touch. Whereas
Aristotelian ethics allow for the foibles of human
nature and for exceptions to the general rule,
Kantian ethics do not.
In Adler's view, one of Kant's failings is
'ignorance of the distinction between real and
apparent goods, together with ignorance of the
correlative distinction between natural and
conscious desires. It is the source of the
fundamental error made by Kant and Pritchard with
regard to the primacy of the right over the good.'
[5]
- Kant's solution of these problems is to make
moral duty or obligation, expressed in
prescriptive or "ought judgments," totally
independent of our desires and totally devoid of
any reference to matters of fact, especially the
facts about human nature. His categorical
imperative is a prescriptive statement that he
regards as a moral law by which our reason must
be bound because it is self-evidently true. In
the first place, it is not self-evidently true.
In the second place, it boils down to the golden
rule which, however revered, is an empty
recommendation. To say that one should do unto
others what one wishes them to do unto oneself
leaves totally unanswered the pivotal question:
What ought one rightly to wish others to do unto
one's self?
-
- Kant's assertion that the only thing that is
really good is a good will, a will that obeys
the categorical imperative and discharges its
moral obligation accordingly, flies in the face
of the facts. To identify the good with a good
will violates facts with which we are all
acquainted, as much as to identify the good with
sensuous pleasure. [1]
Summary statements
Adler summarizes the main points in the great
debate over morals and ethics:
- The three main supports for the widely
prevalent view, among philosophers as well as
among people generally, that moral values and
prescriptive judgments are entirely subjective
and relative can be stated as follows:
-
- One is Spinoza's identification of the good
with that which the individual deems to be good,
because the object deemed or called good is
consciously desired by the individual. A second
is Hume's criticism of arguing for a
prescriptive conclusion on the basis solely of
matters of fact or real existence. The third is
the point made by the twentieth-century
exponents of noncognitive ethics. If the only
kind of truth is to be found in descriptive
statements that conform to the way things really
are, they are then correct in excluding
prescriptive or "ought" statements from the
realm of what is either true or false.
-
- An error with regard to the relation between
the good and the desirable is, in part,
responsible for subjectivism and relativism. An
error with regard to the relation between value
judgments and judgments about matters of fact is
also in part responsible for this. One other
thing that is in part responsible is a failure
to answer the question about how prescriptive
judgments can be true. [1]
-
At the conclusion of Chapter 13 - Oughts can be
true, in The Time of Our Lives, Adler makes
a suggestion for improving the methods of how we
look at and analyze the meaning of "truth", and he
also recommends care in appraising the truth of
normative conclusions.
- The twofold division of the modes of truth,
which has reigned in modern philosophy since the
days of Hume and Kant, must be replaced by the
fourfold division that subdivides (I) a priori
truth into (Ia) verbal truth and (Ib) truth of
understanding; and (II) a posteriori truth into
(IIa) descriptive and (IIb) normative
truth.
-
- The truth of normative conclusions depends,
in the first place, on the truth of
understanding that belongs to the basic
normative principle about the ultimate end to be
sought, and, in the second place, it depends on
the empirical truth of a large number of
descriptive propositions which relate to
whether, as a matter of fact, something in
question is or is not a means to the end. Hence
the truth of normative conclusions is at best a
relative degree of truth, lacking certitude. It
is always the truth of doxa [opinion],
never the truth of episteme [scientific
knowledge]. [5]
Conclusion
This has been an effort, first and foremost, to
clarify my own understanding of the foundations for
the ethics of common sense which Aristotle
discerned 2400 years ago. I imagine that Aristotle
(like the noted Greek philosophers who preceded
him) observed the characteristics and behavior of
men and subjected his observations to a keen,
rational analysis and drew some commonsensical
conclusions regarding them.
I imagine that Aristotle had to shake his head
in amazement at some of the foolish and evil things
men did then, no less than we have to do so today.
The nature of man has not changed that much in the
last 2400 years. He still does foolish and evil
things. More often than not, he still chases after
the apparent good and over-looks the real good.
And, more often than not, he ends this life
bemoaning his unhappy state.
But even so, knowing that the real good always
has been and always will be there for one to
choose, and knowing that happiness can be had if
one lives the good life, fills one's soul with a
quiet joy and confidence.
References
[1] Ten Philosophical Mistakes,
by Mortimer J. Adler (1985); Chapter 5.
[2] Desires, Right & Wrong,
by Mortimer J. Adler (1991); Chapter 5.
[3] The Time Of Our Lives, by
Mortimer J. Adler (1970); Chapter 9.
[4] The Time Of Our Lives,
Chapter 10.
[5] The Time Of Our Lives,
Chapter 13.
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Mr. Irbe's Website: Classical
Liberal George
E-mail Address: George
J. Irbe
A Brief
Autobiography of George J. Irbe
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