|
Aristotle's
Spurned Legacy
by George J. Irbe
Introduction
Up to now I have read closely only three of
Aristotle's works: the Nicomachean Ethics, On
the Soul (De Anima), and Politics. I
have also read Book XII of Metaphysics. My
selection of these particular books will
immediately indicate to the knowledgeable that my
intent has been to learn from Aristotle, not
necessarily of his logic which he is renowned for,
but rather about his understanding of the "human
condition." Of course, it is to be expected that
through works on topics like ethics, politics and
metaphysical conjectures the author will, perforce,
reveal his or her own personal beliefs and values,
and even something about his own character. It is
thus that I feel I have come to know --
deductively, from his turn of phrase -- some things
about Aristotle the man, and I am quite confident
that my impressions of him would not change
appreciably from the ones I hold at present, were I
to read all of his other works.
In seeking to understand (if only in my
imagination) what life was like for Aristotle and
what he revealed of himself through his writing, I
came also to appreciate for whom he was writing,
and why he wrote as he did. He wrote for all human
beings, because he saw their natures cast from the
same mould everywhere. He wrote patiently, hoping
to sway men, from kings to paupers, one by one, and
bit by bit, to get on the virtuous road to the good
life. Although he had little hope for success, he
never abandoned hope that most men might one day be
persuaded to follow his advice. That is when I
realized that my somewhat sentimental quest for
Aristotle the man in his writings had changed to a
beholding of what he left for the posterity of man.
He left us much more than mere philosophy. He left
us a legacy which, unfortunately, has been spurned
by Western civilization. So it is that I have
changed my initial choice of title for this piece
-- Impressions of Aristotle -- to the much
weightier one of Aristole's Spurned Legacy.
Making the best of the circumstances
It has ever been so that those who would
influence public opinion with respect to cultural
mores, social behavior, and political practice
(Aristotle was engaged in doing just that in his
role as teacher and tutor) must be careful not to
incur the displeasure of the citizens of the
influential propertied middle-class -- in
Aristotle's case, the oligarchs of the city-state.
A healthy measure of prudence and tact must be
exercised by the intellectual, the scholar, and the
teacher in order to maintain popularity and
reputation with the middle-class, on whose largesse
he mainly depends for his social and material
well-being. It seems logical to me that the man
who, in the Nicomachean Ethics, stresses the
virtues of wisdom, prudence, and temperance would
himself have practiced these virtues. As it
happened, Aristotle too, like the rest of us, did
not escape the vicissitudes of life's circumstances
and changing fortunes, as will be told in greater
detail below.
Aristotle was born in 384 BCE and raised in
comfortable circumstances, the son of a physician
to the Macedonian king. At the age of sixteen he
joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there
until Plato's death in 348. After departing from
Athens, Aristotle was invited by Hermeias, ruler of
Atarneus and a former member of the Academy, to
found a philosophical community at Assus. While
there, Aristotle married Hermeias' niece. He was
also tutor of Alexander (the Great), son of king
Philip of Macedonia for a short time. There is no
question that Aristotle spent many years studying
and teaching on the fringes of the upper class
society of the rich and powerful. Even after he
returned to Athens in 335, as a resident alien, and
founded the Lyceum, he maintained contact with his
friend Antipater, who was Alexander's viceroy.
However, securing a comfortable livelihood by
maintaining good relationships with the upper class
(which a person who is engaged in intellectual or
artistic pursuits is often obliged to do) does not
make one a member of that class, nor a sycophant of
that class.
As it was, Aristotle returned to Athens three
years after the city-state had suffered a strategic
defeat by Philip of Macedonia at Chareonea (338).
Philip himself was killed the next year (337), and
Antipater assumed rule as Alexander the Great's
viceroy. When Aristotle arrived in Athens two years
later the city was in a sour mood. Demosthenes, a
renowned Athenian orator, wished to preserve the
independence of Athens and other city-states from
Macedonian domination. He had been responsible for
inciting the city-states to form an alliance and
confront Philip on the field of battle; the result
of it was the crushing defeat of the alliance at
Chareonea. Philip had actually dealt very leniently
with Athens after his victory, but Demosthenes
persisted in agitating the Athenians to rise up
against the Macedonians. It appears that Aristotle,
therefore, had to run his Lyceum for more than a
decade in an atmosphere of hostility toward
Macedonia and suspicion of anyone who maintained
cordial relations with the Macedonian rulers. When
Alexander the Great died, in 323, Demosthenes
intensified his agitation against the viceroy
Antipater. For Aristotle, who was seen as a friend
of Antipater, Athens now became a very hostile and
dangerous place. He departed from Athens not to
return again. He lived the few months left of his
life in relative obscurity in Chalcis.
Aristotle was one of the intellectual giants who
lived toward the end of the golden age of Greece.
Karl R. Popper remarks in his book Conjectures
and Refutations, (Ch. 5, XI), that the
development of Greek philosophy, especially from
Thales to Plato, is "a splendid story. It is almost
too good to be true. In every generation we find at
least one new philosophy, one new cosmology of
staggering originality and depth." Aristotle could
draw upon a lot of development of philosophical
thought by his predecessors which was at that time
still relatively fresh.
In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol.
I, Popper also expresses admiration for the Greeks
for their rapid development of the values system
that makes up democracy and the open society.
Popper sees this era as a significant turning point
in the history of mankind. I quote a passage from
Popper at length because it is a brilliant and
concise statement on that glorious era:
- . . . in the same generation to which
Thucydides belonged, there rose a new faith in
reason, freedom, and, as I believe, the only
possible faith, of the open society. This
generation which marks a turning point in the
history of mankind, I should like to call the
Great Generation; it is the generation which
lived in Athens just before, and during, the
Peloponnesian war. There were great
conservatives among them, like Sophocles, or
Tucydides. There were men among them who
represented the period of transition; who were
wavering, like Eurupides, or sceptical, like
Aristophanes. But there were also the great
leader of democracy, Pericles, who formulated
the principle of equality before the law and of
political individualism, and Herodotus, who was
welcomed and hailed in Pericles' city as the
author of a work that glorified these
principles. Protagoras, a native of Abdera who
became influential in Athens, and his countryman
Democritus must also be counted among the Great
Generation. They formulated the doctrine that
human institutions of language, custom, and law
are not of the magical character of taboos but
man-made, not natural but conventional,
insisting, at the same time, that we are
responsible for them Then there was the school
of Gorgias -- Alcimadas, Lycophron and
Antisthenes, who developed the fundamental
tenets of anti-slavery, of a rational
protectionism, and of anti-nationalism, i.e. the
creed of the universal empire of men. And then
there was, perhaps the greatest of all,
Socrates, who thought the lesson that we must
have faith in human reason, but at the same time
beware of dogmatism; . . . (p. 184)
These times of great intellectual, cultural and
political achievement by the Greeks in the 4th and
5th centuries BCE were also times of almost
constant tumult and warfare among the city-states.
For most of the time, there was an on-going
struggle between Sparta, who was the preserver of
the culture of the old tribal society, and Athens,
who was building a revolutionary mercantile empire
based on, if not a democratic, then at least a
timocratic model, and of a society which was
receptive to outside cultural influences and was
inclined to forget and abandon the old tribal
traditions. In Athens, a new phenomenon appeared in
society -- division of the citizenry along
ideological lines, which division has remained with
us ever since. The division was between
conservatives and progressives. The conservative
oligarchs of Athens favored, by and large, the
Spartan tribal culture and often conspired
treasonously against the populist democrats of
their own city. Those were politically and socially
unpredictable and uncertain times. Reputations,
offices, and thrones could be lost suddenly; so
could also ones very life.
In order to evaluate Aristotle, the man, it is
particularly important, therefore, to take into
account the tumultuous times he personally lived
in, and the equally tumultuous years before his
birth which he had knowledge of from recent
history. Karl Popper has a very negative view of
Plato for expressing tribal and totalitarian
sentiments in his works and for being a supporter
of the reactionary oligarchs of Athens; and more so
is Popper critical of Plato's uncle Critias, who
actually participated in the murder of people of
the democratic opposition after Athens fell to
Sparta. Popper similarly labels Aristotle, who,
after all, was Plato's disciple for many years, as
a supporter of the oligarchs, but I think he is
judging him too harshly.
Aristotle and democracy
It is true that Aristotle was not wild about
democracy, or more accurately, about the extreme
populist and anarchist forms of democracy. But it
is clear from his own writings in Politics that
Aristotle understood very well the good and the bad
of every form of government known to men. After
all, he lived in the laboratory where all the
different kinds of governments had been or were
being tried. He describes the pros and cons of
numerous kinds of governments, citing in each case
the places where they have been tried or are in
force. In the passage below, Aristotle discusses
democracy and oligarchy:
- In the many forms of government which have
sprung up there has always been an
acknowledgement of justice and proportionate
equality, although mankind fail in attaining
them, as indeed I have already explained.
Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion
that those who are equal in any respect are
equal in all respects; because men are equally
free, they claim to be absolutely equal.
Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who
are unequal in one respect are in all respects
unequal; being unequal, that is, in property,
they suppose themselves to be unequal
absolutely. The democrats think that as they are
equal they ought to be equal in all things;
while the oligarchs, under the idea that they
are unequal, claim too much, which is one form
of inequality. All these forms of government
have a kind of justice, but, tried by an
absolute standard, they are faulty; and,
therefore, both parties, whenever their share in
the government does not accord with their
preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. (P/BJ,
1301a26-39)
-
- That a state should be ordered, simply and
wholly, according to either kind of equality
[numerical or proportional], is not a
good thing; the proof is the fact that such
forms of government never last. They are
originally based on a mistake, and, as they
begin badly, cannot fail to end badly. The
inference is that both kinds of equality should
be employed; numerical in some cases, and
proportionate in others. Still democracy appears
to be safer and less liable to revolution than
oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is the
double danger of the oligarchs falling out among
themselves and also with the people; but in
democracies there is only the danger of a
quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth
mentioning arises among the people themselves.
And we may further remark that a government
which is composed of the middle class more
nearly approximates to democracy than to
oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect
forms of government. (P/BJ, 1302a03-15)
There is an amazing amount of political wisdom
in the above passages. First of all, Aristotle did
not like the kind of democracy which "arises out of
the notion that those who are equal in any respect
are equal in all respects." Today we would
characterize Aristotle as a moderate conservative.
Today, only a communist or hard-core socialist
demands that people must be equal in all respects,
i.e. materially equal. Aristotle certainly was
neither of those. It is also clear that Aristotle
favored a republican form of democratic government
that has a bicameral structure (a lower and an
upper chamber) because he recommends that "both
kinds of equality should be employed." And, have
not the people of liberal democracies concluded
from their experiences in the 20th century that
"democracy appears to be safer and less liable to
revolution than oligarchy?" Further, behold the
most amazing of Aristotle's remarks that "a
government which is composed of the middle class
[the bourgeoisie!] more nearly approximates
to democracy than to oligarchy." Is that not also
one of the sacred canons of modern Western
democracies? To cap it all, when Churchill said
that democracy is a bad form of government, except
that all the others are worse, did he say anything
different from Aristotle's remark that democracy
"is the safest of the imperfect forms of
government?"
Aristotle and slavery
I am of the opinion that slavery was one of the
issues on which Aristotle had to walk the fine
line. He is often criticized by modern scholars for
condoning slavery. But, would a public renunciation
of slavery by a teacher to the rich and powerful
have had any influence in speeding the abolition of
it? Hardly. However, it certainly would have been
detrimental to the well-being of Aristotle
himself.
Slavery has been practiced since the beginnings
of civilization, and most likely even before that.
Slavery has been a factor in the economy of many
societies and states up to our present times.
Slaves have been forced to do the dirty, physically
exhausting, and dangerous work that needs to be
done but that the free men are loath to do. Not so
long ago, slavery was a state-run enterprise in the
Soviet Union: Slaves (political prisoners) were
used in uranium mines and to clean nuclear-powered
submarines of radioactive waste.
In Aristotle's Greece the owning of slaves was
not only an economic but also a cultural practice.
By and large, Aristotle's pupils came from the
upper strata of society, from prosperous oligarchs
and kings. Ownership of slaves was indicative of
social status; it showed that one was rich enough
to afford to keep them. It would have been
unthinkable for them not to own slaves. But I can't
imagine Aristotle upholding slavery on
principle.
Through his lectures and writings on ethics and
morals, Aristotle was constantly trying to persuade
men that it is to their own benefit to live a
virtuous life and to allow the next fellow to do
likewise. At the same time, he had no illusions
about the nature of man, expressed very directly in
this statement:
- For man, when perfected, is the best of
animals, but, when separated from law and
justice, he is the worst of all; since armed
injustice is the more dangerous, and he is
equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by
intelligence and virtue, which he may use for
the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not
virtue, he is the most unholy and the most
savage of animals, and the most full of lust and
gluttony. (P/BJ, 1253a31-36)
Aristotle did not hold much hope that man (as a
species) could be perfected into the "best of
animals"; we must be content that some of us
acquire a smattering of virtue. Towards the end of
the Nicomachean Ethics he writes:
- Perhaps however, as we maintain, in the
practical sciences the end is not to attain a
theoretical knowledge of the various subjects,
but rather to carry out our theories in action.
If so, to know what virtue is is not enough; we
must endeavour to possess and to practise it, or
in some other manner actually ourselves to
become good.
-
- Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient
in themselves to make men virtuous, 'large fees
and many' (as Theognis says) 'would they win,'
quite rightly, and to provide such discourses
would be all that is wanted. But as it is, we
see that although theories have power to
stimulate and encourage generous youths, and,
given an inborn nobility of character and a
genuine love of what is noble, can make them
susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they
are powerless to stimulate the mass of mankind
to moral nobility. For it is the nature of the
many to be amenable to fear but not to a sense
of honour, and to abstain from evil not because
of its baseness but because of the penalties it
entails; since, living as they do by passion,
they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature,
and the things that will procure those
pleasures, and avoid the opposite pains, but
have not even a notion of what is noble and
truly pleasant, having never tasted true
pleasure. What theory then can reform the
natures of men like these? To dislodge by
argument habits long firmly rooted in their
characters is difficult if not impossible. We
may doubtless think ourselves fortunate if we
attain some measure of virtue when all the
things believed to make men virtuous are ours.
(N/HR, 1179a34-1179b19)
So it is, then, that Aristotle himself thought
that he was teaching the standards for human
perfection to a mostly imperfectible bunch. Among
other imperfections, Aristotle had to resign
himself to the imperfection of slavery. When I read
the following passage from Politics I can
imagine in my mind's eye Aristotle instructing a
group of (probably youthful) students in what today
would be called Economics 101. (I can even imagine
that to Aristotle this was perhaps boring course
material which he had to cover as part of the
curriculum.) He is discussing rather mundane
matters of household management. He says that the
ability to manage a slave is a need of practical
life; he is also hoping that the current attitude
of master to slave can be improved, no doubt in
order to better the lot of the slave (". . .
seeking to attain some better theory of their
relation than exists at present"). Note also that
Aristotle uses here the non-committal, impartial
expression (which he employed frequently) of "some
are of the opinion"; not "I think", not "we
believe," but an unspecified group of "some." That
is how one keeps out of trouble with the powers
that be.
- And there is another element of a household,
the so-called art of getting wealth, which,
according to some, is identical with household
management, according to others, a principal
part of it; the nature of this art will also
have to be considered by us. Let us first speak
of master and slave, looking to the needs of
practical life and also seeking to attain some
better theory of their relation than exists at
present. For some are of opinion that the rule
of a master is a science, and that the
management of a household, and the mastership of
slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I
was saying at the outset, are all the same.
(P/BJ, 1253b13-1253b19)
However, Aristotle counters that statement
immediately with a somewhat provocative
assertion:
- Others affirm that the rule of a master over
slaves is contrary to nature, and that the
distinction between slave and freeman exists by
law only, and not by nature; and being an
interference with nature is therefore unjust.
(P/BJ, 1253b20-23)
Again, Aristotle sounds impartial on the subject
-- "others affirm", not "I believe." But, having
mentioned the hypothesis that slavery might be an
interference with nature, i.e. an unnatural
relationship between men, he returns to the
prevailing conventional wisdom which argues that a
slave is, after all, a possession, and concludes
with:
- Hence we see what is the nature and office
of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but
another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may
be said to be another's man who, being a human
being, is also a possession. (P/BJ,
1254a14-16)
It is important to note the interjection of the
otherwise redundant phrase "being a human being." I
think that Aristotle is subtly challenging his
students to contemplate the illogicality of the
idea that any member of the human race could be
thought of as a physical possession. If it can be
said of one human being that it is possible for him
to be a possession, it can be said of all human
beings, even of Athenians. That is not a conclusion
that would be welcome in the minds of any of
Aristotle's students.
Aristotle next proceeds to state the question of
whether slavery is or is not a natural
institution.
- But is there any one thus intended by nature
to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is
expedient and right, or rather is not all
slavery a violation of nature? (P/BJ,
1254a18-19)
It is to be noted that Aristotle starts out with
a categorical statement asserting that slavery is a
natural thing, supposedly supported by reason and
fact:
- There is no difficulty in answering this
question, on grounds both of reason and of fact.
For that some should rule and others be ruled is
a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from
the hour of their birth, some are marked out for
subjection, others for rule. (P/BJ,
1254a20-23)
But his argument appears to be contrived,
leading one to suspect, once more, that Aristotle
is presenting this weak case only to please the
consciences of his students and their elders, many
of whom were from slave-owning families, rather
than to please his own. He actually slides off the
point, and spends lines 1254a24 to 1255a02 citing
various natural instances of "rulers" and "ruled,"
which are really not instances of master and slave
in the true sense, but are rather natural
hierarchical and cause-effect relationships. After
all, to state that in the natural world one will
always find that something or someone is in charge
-- the master of the situation or process --
doesn't equate it with slavery. Aristotle could not
present any proof of slavery in the natural world
because he could not find any. Instances of actual
slavery in the natural world are very rare; only a
few have been found, mainly in the insect domain.
Nevertheless, Aristotle states the conclusion that
slavery is a natural thing. Aristotle, like many
who came after him, had to conform with the
"political correctness" of the time:
- It is clear, then, that some men are by
nature free, and others slaves, and that for
these latter slavery is both expedient and
right. (P/BJ, 1255a02)
As if to confirm our suspicions that Aristotle
has made the spurious argument for slavery in the
natural world simply to please his patrons, he
hastens to amend it. Just in case we are not quick
enough on the up-take, he throws in an enigmatic
reference to his own unstated personal opinion with
the remark: "Even among philosophers there is a
difference of opinion."
- But that those who take the opposite view
have in a certain way right on their side, may
be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave
are used in two senses. There is a slave or
slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of
which I speak is a sort of convention -- the law
by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to
belong to the victors. But this right many
jurists impeach, as they would an orator who
brought forward an unconstitutional measure:
they detest the notion that, because one man has
the power of doing violence and is superior in
brute strength, another shall be his slave and
subject. Even among philosophers there is a
difference of opinion. (P/BJ, 1255a03-11)
As I understand it, what Aristotle implies in
the above quote is that there really is only one
kind of slavery which consists of the subjugation
of man by man by violent means, usually in war, but
not exclusively in war. The practice of raiding
other tribes which are considered to be less
civilized than your own for slaves is also a
violent act conducted with superior brute strength.
The "slavery by nature" looks more and more like a
phantom concept inserted into the argument by
Aristotle in order that he might propitiate the
beliefs of the ruling classes.
Finally, Aristotle recognizes the racial
underpinnings of slavery. Men do not enslave their
own kind, only people who they consider to be
"barbarians," i.e. people who are racially,
ethnically, or culturally greatly different from
themselves. The "barbarians" turn out to be the
"natural slaves." Aristotle can be faulted only for
concurring (reluctantly, in my opinion, i.e. "it
must be admitted") with the conventional belief
(prevalent in the Greek world then and still
prevalent in some parts of the world today) that
certain alien ethnic and racial groups "are slaves
everywhere."
- Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a
principle of justice (for law and custom are a
sort of justice), assume that slavery in
accordance with the custom of war is justified
by law, but at the same moment they deny this.
For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And
again, no one would ever say that he is a slave
who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the
case, men of the highest rank would be slaves
and the children of slaves if they or their
parents chance to have been taken captive and
sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call
Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to
barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they
really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke
first; for it must be admitted that some are
slaves everywhere, others nowhere. (P/BJ,
1255a21-32)
In spite of the above concession to slavery,
Aristotle by no means endorses it. It seems to me
that Aristotle never abandons his belief that all
men are basically the same, because they are
members of the same species. A man is still a human
being even when enslaved, and has the potential to
be a friend and freeman. Indirectly, Aristotle
hints that abolition of slavery is most likely to
happen in a democracy. This point is addressed in
the following passage from the Nicomachean
Ethics:
- For master and slave have nothing in common:
a slave is a living tool, just as a tool is an
inanimate slave. Therefore there can be no
friendship with a slave as slave, though there
can be as a human being: for there seems to be
room for justice in the relations of every human
being with every other that is capable of
participating in law and contract, and hence
friendship is possible with everyone as far as
he is a human being. Hence even in tyrannies
there is but little scope for friendship and
justice between ruler and subjects; but there is
most room for them in democracies, where the
citizens being equal have many things in common.
(N/HR, 1161b04-10)
I conclude my argument that Aristotle the
ethicist and logician could not, in his heart of
hearts, approve of slavery with this brief remark
he made in Book VII of Politics:
- . . . there is nothing grand or noble in
having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a
slave; . . . (P/BJ, 1325a25)
Aristotle is renowned for always exalting the
grand and the noble. He is saying that those who
own slaves and use them as slaves lack nobility of
character.
To Page
2
|