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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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A Conversation with Thomas Hill Green, by George J. Irbe (con't)
On Morality and Reason GJI: I take your last statement to express agreement with my conclusions that our morals are inspired by the teaching of the Greek philosophers. We know that the Greeks, and particularly their intellectually advanced philosophers, did not take their gods and their religious myths very seriously. You have stated above (#250) that the Greek philosophers "never professed to be inventors. They did not claim to be prophets of new truth, but exponents of principles on which the good citizen, if he thought the matter out, would find that he had already been acting." In other words, the moral code of the Greeks was based entirely on their common-sense observation and interpretation of human nature and human behavior, and required no intervention or oversight by supernatural powers acting through the mechanism of an organized religion. But you, Professor Green, appear to think that such oversight of men's consciences by God as portrayed by the Judeo-Christian religious dogma is necessary for the maintenance of morals in Western society. Can you elaborate on why you think so? THG: (#302). . so long as it is the life of men, i.e. beings who are born and grow and die; in whom an animal nature is the vehicle through which the divine self-realizing spirit works; in whom virtue is not born ready-made but has to be formed (however unfailing the process may come to be) through habit and education in conflict with opposing tendencies; so long the contrast must remain for the human soul between itself and the infinite spirit, of whom it must be conscious, as present to itself but other than itself, or it would not be the human soul. The more complete the realization of its capacities, the clearer will be its apprehension at once of its own infinity in respect of its consciousness of there being an infinite spirit -- a consciousness which only a self-communication of that spirit could convey -- and of its finiteness as an outcome of natural conditions; a finiteness in consequence of which the infinite spirit is for ever something beyond it, still longed for, never reached. Towards the infinite spirit, to whom he is thus related, the attitude of man at his highest and completest could still be only that which we have described as self-abasement before an ideal of holiness; not the attitude of knowledge, for knowledge is of matters of fact or relations, and the infinite spirit is neither fact nor relation; not the attitude of full and conscious union, for that the limitation of human nature prevents; but the same attitude of awe and aspiration which belongs to all the upward stages of the moral life. He must think of the infinite spirit as better than the best that he can himself attain to . . GJI: In what you have said so far, your concept of man's relationship with the Supreme being, who I call the Creator-God, differs from mine only in one important respect. I do not subscribe to your idea that God, who you describe as " the divine self-realizing spirit" works (I assume that you mean in a continuing process in time) through man's animal nature or through his soul. I believe that the onus is on the soul to mature, to develop its self-consciousness and conscience, and to acquire the knowledge and understanding of God and his creation and of his laws, including his moral laws. To that I would add that, although, as you say, God is not knowable like a matter of fact is knowable, acquisition of knowledge about the workings of his creation and his laws is essential to the perfection of the human soul. THG: (#317) . . The idea, in its various forms, of something that human life should be, [and] of a perfect being for whom this 'should be' already 'is,' cannot proceed from observation of matters of fact or from inference founded on such observation, . . Such ideas or principles of action, at work before they are understood, not only give rise to institutions and modes of life, but also express themselves in forms of the imagination. In complication with effects of passion and force, they produce the laws, whether enforced by opinion or by the magistrate, which form the essential and permanent element in the fabric of social obligation; and they also yield the imagination of a supreme invisible but all-seeing ruler, to whom service is due, from whom commands proceed as from an earthly superior -- the head of a family or the sovereign of a state -- and who punishes the violation of those commands. It is in the form of this imagination that, in the case at least of all ordinary good people, the idea of an absolute duty is brought to bear on the soul as to yield an awe superior to any personal inclination. In sudden calls upon the will, when the sustaining force of habit is of no avail, when no rewards or penalties, either under law or the state or the law of opinion, are to be looked for, whatever the course of action adopted, can any of us be sure that, except under the impression of the 'great task-master's eye' upon him, he would do the work which upon reflection he would admit should be done? GJI: I want to note that at this point you have introduced, without saying so outright, the notion of the God of the Judeo-Christian religion into the moral equation. (I take the liberty to interpret, here and elsewhere, your term "imagination" to mean "religion"). This God is the "all-seeing ruler, to whom service is due, from whom commands proceed as from an earthly superior . . and who punishes the violation of those commands." Then you go on to say that this religion is what instills the idea of an absolute [moral] duty in the souls of all ordinary good people. I conjecture that it is probably your Christian faith which compels you, like it did Thomas Aquinas, to delegate the enforcement of the moral code, which is based on man's reason, to a higher supernatural power, i.e. God; in line with Thomas Aquinas, you use theology as a corrective for philosophy. THG: (#318) It is a necessity . . of our rational nature that these forms of imagination, in which our highest practical ideas have found expression, should be subject to criticism. Is there really a divine ruler, who issues commands which we can obey or disobey; who somehow sees and hears us, though not through eye and ear; whom it is possible for us to please or offend? Now there is undoubtedly a sense in which these questions, once asked, can only be answered in the negative. The most convinced Theist must admit that God is as unimaginable as He is unperceivable -- unimaginable because unperceivable, for that which we imagine (in the proper sense of the term) has the necessary finiteness of that which we perceive; that statements, therefore, which in any strict sense could only be applied to an imaginable finite agent, cannot in any such sense be applied to God. As applied to Him, they must at any rate not be reasoned from as we reason from statements about matters of fact. The practice of treating them as if they were such statements, with the confusions and contradictions to which it inevitably leads, only enhances doubt as to the reality of the divine Spirit; of which we must confess that it is inexpressible in its nature by us, though operative in us through those practical ideas of a possible perfect life, of a being for whom this perfect life is already actual, which, acting upon imagination, yield the language of ordinary religion. GJI: I must interject here that I consider my belief system to be that of a rational Theist. I concur fully with your characterization of God; it is God as perceived by philosophers. But I do not see why my belief in God or my efforts to live a moral life should need expression in, as you put it, "the language of ordinary religion." Furthermore, I hazard to say that your "ordinary good people" find religion a necessity in their practice of a moral life only because they have been told for millennia by agents with a vested interest in established religion that they cannot do so without it. My blunt language on this point conveys my strong feelings about it. I expect that you will have something to say in rebuttal to it. THG: (#319) Now when criticism comes to do its inevitable work upon the language of imagination in which our fundamental moral ideas have found expression, a counter-work is called for from philosophy, which has an important bearing upon conduct. It has to disentangle the operative ideas from their necessarily imperfect expression, and to explain that the validity of the ideas themselves, as principles of action, is not affected by the discovery that the language, in which men under their influence naturally express themselves, has not the sort of truth which belongs to a correct statement of matters of fact. It has to show when and how -- these ideas not being matters of fact or obtained by abstraction from matters of fact -- the figures of speech employed in expressing the aspirations and endeavors to which they give rise, being derived by metaphor from sensible matters of fact, are liable to mislead us if we argue from them as though they conveyed literal truth. It has to point out what is the sense in which alone the question as to the truth of such language can properly be asked or answered. If the question is asked, for instance, whether there is truth in the language, habitual to the religious conscience, in which God is represented as giving us certain commands and seeing whether we perform them or no, the philosopher will remind us that to enquire whether such language is true, in the same sense in which it might be true that I ordered my servant to do certain things this morning and took notice whether he did them, is as inappropriate as it would be to enquire (according to an example employed by Locke in another connection) whether sleep is swift or virtue square. It can only be reasonably asked whether it is true in the sense that it naturally expresses, in terms of imagination, an emotion arising from consciousness of a relation which really subsists between the human soul and God. GJI: You are saying, then, that our fundamental moral ideas are expressed in the language of religion and that it is the task of the philosopher to interpret such religious language. But I ask why this need be so. Obviously, the Greek philosophers found no need to express the meaning of moral ideas in religious terms; they succeeded quite admirably expressing the moral ideas in rational language. But for all that, the Greek philosophers did not deny the existence or importance of the spiritual part of man. For example, Aristotle exhorts us: "Thus we should not follow the recommendation of thinkers who say that those who are men should think only of human things and that mortals should think only of mortal things, but we should try as far as possible to partake of immortality and to make every effort to live according to the best part of the soul in us; for even if this part be of small measure, it surpasses all the others by far in power and worth." [Nic. Eth. X.vii.]. But, please continue with your explanation, Professor Green. THG: (#319) If the infinite Spirit so communicates itself to the soul of man as to yield the idea of a possible perfect life, and that consequent sense of personal responsibility on the part of the individual for making the best of himself as a social being from which the recognition of particular duties arises, then it is a legitimate expression by means of metaphor -- the only possible means, except action, by which the consciousness of spiritual realities can express itself -- to say that our essential duties are commands of God. If again the self-communication of the infinite Spirit to the soul of man is such that man is conscious of his relation to a conscious being, who is in eternal perfection all that man has it in him to come to be, then it is a legitimate expression of that conscious relation by means of metaphor to say that God sees whether His commands are fulfilled by us or no, and an appropriate emotion to feel shame as in His presence for omissions or violations of duty incognizable by other men. (#320)The above must not be taken to mean that it is to be considered the business of philosophy to justify the language of religious imagination universally and unconditionally. Even as that language is current in Christendom, there may be much in it that a true moral philosophy will have to condemn as inconsistent with the highest kind of moral conviction. Objection may properly be taken, for instance, to the ordinary representation of God as a source of rewards and penalties; as rewarding goodness with certain pleasures bestowed from without, as punishing wickedness with pains inflicted from without. The objection to it, however, is not that it represents God under a figure which is not a statement of fact (for the same objection would apply equally to all the language of religion), but that the figure is one which interferes with the true idea of goodness as its own reward, of vice as its own punishment. It is an important function of philosophy to examine the current language of religious imagination, not with the unreasonable view of testing its speculative truth, as we might test the truth of some doctrine about natural phenomena, but in order to satisfy ourselves whether it worthily expresses the emotions of a soul in which the highest moral ideas have done their perfect work. GJI: You say that "it is an important function of philosophy to examine the current language of religious imagination, [but] not with the unreasonable view of testing its speculative truth." But philosophy, if it is going to be genuine and not merely theological, like Aquinas', cannot help but test the speculative truth of religion, which is also asserted to be "revealed" truth. As far as I am concerned, it would be just as well if philosophy avoided any involvement with religion at all, just as I would prefer to see religion not usurp moral philosophy. I know that the first is possible because the Greeks already have done so; I must regretfully concede that the second can hopefully only come about at some time in the distant future, whenever religion in general and Christianity in particular has lost its grip on the minds of men. |
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