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Encounter
With Thomas Hill Green
by George J. Irbe
INTRODUCTION
Just like a large plant will often grow by
chance and in an unlikely place from a tiny
wind-blown seed, so it frequently happens to me
that a chance encounter of a reference or citation
in a book that I am reading will capture my
interest which will lead me to pursue a new project
that will grow to substantial size and take up much
of my time. My first encounter with Thomas Hill
Green (picture) was in
such incidental manner. While engaged in research
on the history of religion, I was reading Origin
and Evolution of Religion, by E. Washburn
Hopkins, PH.D., LL.D (1923) where I found a remark
that "Professor Green gives today as the foundation
of rights and of right the capacity of the
individual to conceive a good as the same for
himself and others; rights are determined by that
conception. Ethics thus becomes altogether divorced
from religion." The reference cited was T.H.
Green's Lectures on the Principles of Political
Obligation. My interest was sparked immediately
by Green's belief that a good is the same for an
individual as for others - in other words, a
universal good. This sounded like 'pure' Aristotle,
and like Aristotle's noted exponent in the 20th
century, Mortimer J. Adler. Was it possible that
another Aristotelian thinker had preceded Adler in
the 19th century?
Forthwith, I obtained a copy of the book cited
by Hopkins. This particular edition is a reprint
from Green's Philosophical Works, Vol. II,
reprinted in 1941 with an introduction by Lord
Lindsay of Birker, former Master of Balliol
College, Oxford. Lindsay's introduction states that
Lectures on the Principles of Political
Obligation were delivered by T.H. Green in 1879
and published after his death in 1882. Green was
Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the
University of Oxford. Lindsay identifies Green with
the school of thought known as the Oxford
Idealists. Subsequently, by searching internet
sources on Green, I discovered that today he is
largely consigned to obscurity, and almost always
characterized tersely only as an 'idealist' without
any further elaboration. Lindsay says in his
introduction that "Green and his fellow-idealists
represent the renewed liberalism of the last
quarter of the nineteenth century." This
characterization had a special appeal to me,
because I like to think of myself as having a
philosophical and political affinity with the
liberals of that era. Their idealism had a benign
effect on society, in contrast to the corrosive
Marxist and Socialist ideologies which were already
eating away at the social fabric even while
classical liberalism was at its most popular.
Although I read all of the Lectures, I
realized at the start of the very first one that I
will not find Green's full dissertation on the
nature of the Aristotelian 'good' in this book,
because Green states in the second paragraph of the
first lecture that he has explained in previous
lectures what he understands " . . moral goodness
to be, and how it is possible that there should be
such a thing; in other words, what are the
conditions on the part of reason and will which are
implied in our being able to conceive moral
goodness as an object to be aimed at, and to give
some partial reality to the conception." To me,
this sentence was replete with evidence of the
abstract intellectual tools of Aristotle's thought
and provided for me the conclusive proof that Green
was an Aristotelian philosopher worth knowing. I
realized that I must search for other sources that
would contain material from Green's 'previous
lectures.'
Without too much effort, thanks to the internet,
I soon identified the book I had to have: Green's
Prolegomena to Ethics, first published in
1883; I obtained a Oxford University Press 1924
issue of it. The Prolegomena is a very
thorough work; frequently, it is also rather
difficult to read. Green not only develops his own
beliefs and theories about man and his morality,
but he also states and refutes many of the
objections raised against them by other competing
philosophies.
The basic organization of Prolegomena is
by small (usually one to two pages long)
consecutively numbered sections. The Introduction
takes up the first eight sections. The body of the
work is divided by Book and Chapter in the
following manner:
Book I: Metaphysics of
Knowledge
Chapter I
- #9 - 54 The Spiritual
Principle in Knowledge and in Nature
- #12 - 18 The Spiritual
Principle in Knowledge
- #19 - 54 The Spiritual
Principle in Nature
Chapter II
- #55 - 73 The Relation
of Man, as Intelligence, to the Spiritual
Principle in Nature
Chapter III
- #74 - 84 The Freedom
of Man as Intelligence
Book II: The
Will
Chapter I
- #85 - 114 The Freedom
of the Will
Chapter II
- #115 - 153 Desire,
Intellect, and Will
- #118 - 129
Desire
- #130 - 147 Desire and
Intellect
- #148 - 153 Will and
Intellect
Book III: The Moral
Ideal and Moral Progress
Chapter I
- #154 - 179 Good and
Moral Good
- #156 - 170 Pleasure
and Desire
- #171 - 179 The
Intrinsic Nature of Moral Good
Chapter II
- #180 - 198
Characteristics of the Moral Ideal
- #180 - 191 The
Personal Character of the Moral
Ideal
- #192 - 198 The Formal
Character of the Moral Ideal
Chapter III
- #199 - 217 The Origin
and Development of the Moral Ideal
- #199 - 205 Reason as
Source of the Idea of a Common Good
- #206 - 217 The
Extension of the Area of Common Good
Chapter IV
- #218 - 245 The
Development of the Moral Ideal -
cont'd
- #219 - 239 Pleasure
and Common Good
- #240 - 245 Virtue as
the Common Good
Chapter V
- #246 - 290 The
Development of the Moral Ideal - cont'd
The Greek and the Modern Conceptions of
Virtue
Book IV: The
Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance of
Conduct
Chapter I
- #291 - 309 The
Practical Value of the Moral Ideal
Chapter II
- #310 - 328 The
Practical Value of a Theory of the Moral
Ideal
Chapter III
- #329 - 351 The
Practical Value of a Hedonistic Moral
Philosophy
Chapter IV
- #352 - 382 The
Practical Value of Utilitarianism Compared With
That of the Theory of the Good as Human
Perfection
In this essay I will discuss the contents of the
first three books and compare some of Green's ideas
with my own and with Aristotle's. I will use only
the consecutively numbered sections when making
reference to, or quoting from, Green's work. The
table of contents of Prolegomena has been
reproduced in detail so that the reader can easily
determine the general topic to which a referenced
section belongs.
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