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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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Natural Law: Created by God, Perceived Through Reason, by George J. Irbe, continued...
The Rational Alternative to Natural Law There are people in group (2) of my classification above, whose rational thinking stops them short of allowing for any laws, either the physical kind of the natural world, or our moral laws, to be actually promulgated by a divine power, even though they may believe in God as such. Among them are those who nevertheless think that there is a sort of Natural Law which is simply the product of man's own reason. John Finnis and Germain Grisez are noted expounders of this theory. According to Finnis, "natural law embodies the practically reasonable pre-moral principles of right and wrong which are per se nota (self-evident)." [11] And Joseph Boyle, also of the same school, writes:
In making the case for the "practically reasonable pre-moral principles" rationalists like Finnis in effect make use of a potent logical argument used by Aristotle to deduce that certain prepositions are per se nota. (An easily-understood explanation of how this argument applies to moral concepts is given by Adler. [13]) Finnis et al use Aristotelian logic to argue that certain principles of Natural Law are similarly self-evident. Thus, they (apparently) avoid the requirement for a "divine promulgator" for Natural Law. There are other philosophers in this category, two of them favorites of mine -- Karl R. Popper and Friedrich A. Hayek -- who do not think that it is realistic to distinguish Natural Law as a unique species which is somehow above and beyond the ordinary run-of-the-mill law promulgated and enforced by human authorities. Both men are recognized as clear-headed, logical rationalists; both have difficulty accepting any transcendental influences on natural processes. That is not to say that rationalists like Popper and Hayek are necessarily atheists; they most likely believe in the biblical God, but do so in the rather limited sense of a God whose function is mainly to administer to human spiritual needs. Popper gives his opinion on natural law in The Open Society and Its Enemies [14]. He sees an important distinction between (a) natural laws, or laws of nature, such as the laws of thermodynamics, and, on the other hand, (b) normative laws, or norms, or prohibitions and commandments, i.e. such rules as forbid or demand certain modes of conduct. A law in sense (a) -- a natural law -- is describing a strict, unvarying regularity which either in fact holds true in nature (in this case, the law is a true statement) or does not hold (in this case it is false). We often call such natural laws "hypotheses." A law of nature is unalterable; there are no exceptions to it. Since laws of nature are unalterable, they can be neither broken nor enforced. They are beyond human control, although we may get into trouble by not knowing them, or by ignoring them. In contrast to a law of nature, a normative law in sense (b), whether it is now a legal enactment or a moral commandment, can be enforced by men. Also, it is alterable. There is a vary basic difference between Popper's views and mine in that I maintain that laws of sense (a) and (b), although distinct from each other, are both, nevertheless, part of the Natural Law promulgated by the Creator. I maintain that laws of both sense (a) and (b) are, by definition, unalterable, and that, in Popper's words, we get into trouble by ignoring them. But we get into trouble in two different ways, one of which hurts only us, the other hurts the natural world around us, of which we ourselves are a part. The first way we get into trouble is when we are careless with, or still ignorant of, the function of a physical law belonging to Popper's group (a). But, we have been endowed with intelligence that is superior by far over any other species here on Earth. Therefore, we have the ability to neutralize or avoid entirely the harmful and undesirable effects which the physical laws of nature may inflict upon us. These same laws can, and at times do, consign members of a lower species to destruction. Inevitably, sooner rather than later, we use our intellectual powers to mitigate or eliminate entirely these harmful effects. The second way we get into trouble is when we ourselves do violence to the natural world, sometimes in ignorance of the harm we are causing, but most often doing so knowingly and willfully. Mankind's rapacious exploitation and destruction of the Earth's environment is a glaring example of where the transgression of Natural Law in the physical sense is indistinguishable from transgression of Natural Law in the moral sense. However, it would be indeed rare to encounter a person who has been raised in the bible-based Western culture, and thus, conditioned by the commands of Genesis 1:27-29, and Genesis 9:1-3, to think that despoiling the natural world is a moral sin. Popper believes, then, that the distinction between laws in sense (a), i.e. statements describing regularities of nature, and laws in sense (b), i.e. norms such as prohibitions or commandments, is a fundamental one. However, he recognizes that many thinkers believe that there are norms -- prohibitions or commandments -- which are "natural" in the sense that they are laid down in accordance with natural laws in sense (a). Some of them argue that certain legal norms are in accordance with human nature, and therefore with psychological natural laws in sense (a), while other legal norms may be contrary to human nature; and that those norms which can be shown to be in accordance with human nature are really no different from natural laws in sense (a). Popper adds that there are still others who think that natural laws in sense (a) are really very similar to normative laws since they are laid down by the will or decision of the Creator of the Universe. It is my impression that Popper at least makes a concession of sorts to the possibility of there being a natural moral law when he says that he reserves the term "natural laws" exclusively for laws of type (a), since it is easy to speak of "natural rights and obligations" or of "natural norms" if we wish to stress the "natural" character of laws of type (b). Nevertheless, Popper believes that norms are man-made in the sense that we must blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither nature, nor God. It is our business to improve them as much as we can, if we find that they are objectionable. The standards are not to be found in nature. Nature consists of facts and of regularities, and is in itself neither moral nor immoral. I find some of Popper's language rather enigmatic. He says that "it is we who impose our standards upon nature, and who in this way introduce morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part of this world. We are products of nature, but nature has made us together with our power of altering the world, of foreseeing and of planning for the future, and of making far-reaching decisions for which we are morally responsible. Yet responsibility, decisions, enter the world of nature only with us." As Popper says, nature by itself is neither moral nor immoral. But, how then do we introduce morals into nature, and by what means do we impose standards upon it? I do not see how we can introduce morals into the natural world; we find it difficult enough introducing morals to ourselves, or rather ourselves to morals. On the other hand, one could not agree more with Popper's statement that we have the power to alter the world and to make far-reaching decisions for which we are morally responsible. To that I would add that in exercising that power we should be obeying both the physical and moral components of the Creator's Natural Law. Friedrich A. Hayek is a champion of the free market system. He is a Nobel laureate in economics; he is also renowned for his works on the substance and essence of law, and how law is used and misused by legislatures when they attempt to ameliorate social ills and inequalities -- some of them actual and most of them only perceived. Hayek reasons, quite sensibly in my opinion, that mankind has undergone an evolutionary process in cultural and societal development. The rules of just conduct, or laws, have likewise evolved in tandem with society and culture. Hayek sees the modern, politically and economically free society as the culmination of man's cultural evolution which he calls the "Great Society." Hayek and Popper were contemporaries; both were born in the Austro-Hungarian empire at the dawn of the 20th century. They were acquainted professionally and in many respects held similar views of the world. They also share a skeptical view of the concept of Natural Law. Hayek presents a persuasive argument for the evolutionary development of law [15a], from which I have selected several quotes:
Hayek, just like Popper, states categorically: "Nature can be neither just nor unjust." Hayek has this to say about "the law of nature":
It appears that, although Hayek "rejects the interpretation of law as the construct of a super-natural force," he concedes in a round-about fashion that there are rules which may be given to man "independent of any particular person's will," and that these rules "which are not brought about by human design may therefore well be objectively given to us." Hayek remains mute on the source of these "objective" gifts, but I have no hesitation in saying that they are the Natural Law gifts of the Creator. I can go along happily with Hayek's assertion that "law [is] the product not of any rational design but of a process of evolution and natural selection." That assertion holds as well for someone who believes that Natural Law has always existed and that man's understanding of it has grown through the evolutionary process. I would only add that instead of "natural selection" I would describe the process as "learning by trial-and-error." |
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